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The idea of “financial inclusion,” understood as the access to and use of a broad range of 
retail financial services (including bank accounts, payment services, credit, and insurance) 
by everyone in society, emerged as a global priority in the late 2000s. Financial inclusion 
now features prominently in global economic governance and the activities of disparate 
international organizations, states, businesses, and civil society organizations. This 
dissertation asks: what explains the origins and evolution of the global financial inclusion 
agenda? Existing scholarship often emphasizes the interests and power of Western states 
and businesses, asymmetric debt and power relations, and the centrality of class conflict. 
In contrast, I offer a more complete explanation by interrogating the agenda’s ambiguity 
and coalitional politics. Ambiguity is typically conceptualized as a tool deliberately used 
by an entrepreneur for the purpose of expanding support. I introduce the novel concept of 
participatory ambiguity, defined as the process by which entrepreneurs and coalition 
members construct multiple cognitive frames around a central idea. In so doing, I theorize 
how ambiguity is co-produced by disparate actors who use language (or branding) and 
creative action to legitimate multiple policies and outcomes and secure space for their own 
interests.  I argue that the origins and evolution of the global financial inclusion agenda are 
best explained by participatory ambiguity and the specific mechanisms of quantification, 
institutional layering, and coordination effects. Empirically, I draw on more than 70 
interviews and archival documents from three countries (Ghana, United Kingdom, United 
States), as well as quantitative text analysis on an original collection of 49 national 
strategies. Further, I combine variation in global support for the agenda over time with a 
“most likely” country case study (Ghana) and “least likely” issue area (humanitarian 
assistance). My research identifies how ambiguity mitigated coalitional conflict and 
enabled the incorporation of key constituencies, specifically those associated with global 
financial security or financial stability. This dissertation thus contributes to constructivist 
scholarship on the agency and power of global South actors in global politics, as well as 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Since the late 2000s, the idea of “financial inclusion” has become a global priority. 
Financial inclusion can be understood as the access to and use of retail financial services 
(bank accounts, payment services, credit, and insurance) by everyone in society. 
Explanations about why financial inclusion became a priority in the first place and how 
the idea has evolved over time are incomplete. Several scholars argue that the financial 
inclusion agenda is a continuation of commercialized microcredit, where small loans are 
provided to extremely poor individuals for the purposes of starting businesses. 
Additionally, the financial inclusion agenda is argued to be primarily promoted by Western 
states and businesses. These explanations make important contributions to our 
understanding of the agenda, but they do not consider the full range of policies, outcomes, 
and organizations that are associated with financial inclusion. In this dissertation, I ask: 
what explains the origins and evolution of the global financial inclusion agenda? I offer a 
new explanation that focuses on the ambiguity of the agenda. In this context, I argue that 
ambiguity is understood as the capacity of a central idea (like financial inclusion) to be 
linked with multiple policies and outcomes. My theory, called participatory ambiguity, 
focuses on how many different organizations together create ambiguity around the 
agenda, which ensures broad support for the idea.  My explanation reveals how different 
organizations and countries from throughout the global South actively shaped the agenda 
during its creation and as it evolved. I use evidence from a variety of sources to support 
my argument, including more than 70 interviews with individuals from governments, 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and businesses. I also gather 
and analyze a set of National Financial Inclusion Strategies from countries across the global 
South. I examine the financial inclusion agenda from several perspectives, including its 
origins in the 2000s and evolution in the 2010s, as well as its implementation across global 
South countries, in Ghana, and in humanitarian assistance activities. This project makes an 
important contribution to our understanding of financial inclusion, the agency of global 
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The global financial inclusion agenda emerged in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis and has become a prominent feature of global economic governance. The essential 
idea, as described by the World Bank, is that all “individuals and businesses have access 
to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs – transactions, 
payments, savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and sustainable way” 
(World Bank, 2018d). Following the crisis, new organizations and initiatives formed at the 
global level to advance the agenda, such as the Group of 20 (G20) Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion. Philanthropic organizations, like the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, funded new projects aimed at data collection and knowledge dissemination. 
Ministries of Finance and central banks across much of the global South incorporated 
financial inclusion objectives into financial regulation. The new agenda has even extended 
well beyond the domains of retail banking and international development, as it is 
increasingly incorporated into the governance of global trade and humanitarian assistance. 
 Reflecting these developments, this dissertation seeks to answer: what explains the 
origins and evolution of the global financial inclusion agenda? Existing scholarship often 
emphasizes the interests and power of Western states and businesses, focusing attention on 
the asymmetric power relations associated with credit and the primacy of class conflict in 
political competition (Bateman, 2012; Mader, 2015; Soederberg, 2013, 2014a). In contrast, 
I synthesize historical institutionalist, constructivist, and political marketing research to 
provide a more complete explanation that highlights the agency of global South actors and 





participatory ambiguity, which I define as the process by which entrepreneurs and 
coalition members construct multiple cognitive frames around a central idea. In the context 
of negotiations and coalition formation, the concept of ambiguity has previously been 
theorized in a top-down fashion as a tool used strategically by powerful policy 
entrepreneurs (Jabko, 2006; Jegen & Merand, 2014). In contrast, I show how ambiguity 
can also be co-produced by disparate actors who use language (or branding) and creative 
action to legitimate multiple policies and outcomes and thereby secure space for their own 
interests.  Applied to the origins and evolution of financial inclusion, I combine 
participatory ambiguity with three central mechanisms – namely quantification, 
institutional layering, and coordination effects – to reveal how a global coalition was 
formed and sustained over time. 
 This dissertation relies on diverse forms of empirical evidence including primary 
documents, an original set of 49 National Financial Inclusion Strategies, and more than 70 
elite interviews spanning Ghana, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In terms of 
method, I employ historical process tracing and congruence analysis to evaluate the 
available evidence and key sequences of events against the observable implications of my 
own and historical materialist explanations. I also analyse the National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies using quantitative content analysis. In so doing, I demonstrate the co-production 
of ambiguity around financial inclusion and how it facilitated the construction of a global 
coalition around the goals of poverty alleviation, economic development, financial 
stability, and financial integrity. Compared to historical materialist accounts, I provide a 





the role of ambiguity in coalition building and maintenance, and the pluralistic forms of 
political conflict. 
This project makes important contributions to our understanding of the financial 
inclusion agenda and the wider literature on global economic governance. By identifying 
the origins of the agenda’s ambiguity, I address an important gap in the existing literature 
on financial inclusion (Dafe, 2020). I also build on and complement recent work that 
unpacks how the implementation of the global financial inclusion agenda varies across 
domestic contexts (Bernards, 2016; Dafe, 2020; Settle, 2020; Singh, 2019).  More 
generally, the novel concept of participatory ambiguity offers a lens through which the 
evolution of other ambiguous agendas, such as sustainable development or gender equality, 
might be re-assessed. Finally, this project contributes to broader scholarship on the 
intersection of ideas, ambiguity, and coalitions in global politics, as well as recent debates 
in international political economy on shifts in power and authority towards the global 
South.  
 
1.1 Literature Review 
Existing scholarship on the global financial inclusion agenda can be situated in two ways. 
First, a large body of research interrogates the promotion of financial inclusion using 
historical materialist and post-structuralist perspectives. This literature emphasizes the 
primary roles of transnational capital, credit-based financial services, and class conflict, as 
well as the use of financial technology and disciplinary logics of neoliberalism as tools for 
governing marginalized communities. Second, a limited number of scholars explore the 





ambiguity as the financial inclusion agenda is adopted in different contexts. While this 
collection of research makes many insightful contributions, it faces several theoretical and 
empirical challenges. Most acutely, I argue that it obscures how agency and power are 
exercised by non-elite actors (particularly in the global South) in both the creation and 
evolution of the agenda, diverting theoretical attention to a narrow set of actors and 
practices. 
 Focusing on the global promotion of financial inclusion, historical materialist 
accounts often position it within broader forms of neoliberal development and 
financialization. From this perspective, the promotion of financial inclusion is intimately 
linked to the power of transnational finance. Research on financial inclusion thus closely 
parallels prior accounts of microcredit and microfinance, devoting substantial attention to 
the commercialization of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and the role of global capital 
markets and international financial institutions (Bateman, 2010; Mader, 2015; Roy, 2010). 
Moreover, there is a central focus on credit and debt relations, with some scholars arguing 
that the more holistic financial inclusion agenda is “almost entirely fake” (Bateman, 2012). 
Indeed, Soederberg’s (2014a, p. 30) situates her analysis of the financial inclusion agenda 
as follows: 
My objective is to challenge the institutional tropes and practices upheld by states 
and international development organisations (e.g., World Bank, IMF, G-20) that 
assume financial inclusion and the democratisation of credit to be the most efficient 
method of assisting the poor in the neoliberal era. 
 
Soederberg (2014a, p. 188) further argues “that the G20 financial inclusion agenda is not 
a neutral project, but one that is aimed at constructing the dependence of the poor in the 
global South on privately created money (credit).”  Her work (Soederberg, 2013, 2014a) 





securitization of MFI-originated loans. In turn, she argues that the integration of local 
finance into international capital markets contributes to asymmetric debt and power 
relations across much of the global South.   
 Scholars have also noted how ideas and language are used to advance financial 
inclusion. This scholarship builds on neo-Gramscian (Cox, 1983; Gill, 1993) insights by 
arguing that the financial inclusion agenda contains both ideational and material 
dimensions, which help to conceal the extractive logics that remain at its core. Earlier work 
problematized the “hegemonic discourse” of microcredit and microfinance within the 
global development architecture (Rankin, 2001, 2002, 2013; Weber, 2002). Similar claims 
extend to the promotion of financial inclusion. Mader and Sabrow (2019, p. 42), for 
example, contend that “financial inclusion” is part of a legitimation effort rather than a new 
or distinct agenda: “The disjuncture between rhetoric and reality suggests that the actors 
themselves are not fully convinced of the effectiveness of their new mission, or their own 
capacity to deliver on it effectively; but, they nonetheless have adopted new myths and 
perform new ceremonies for legitimation purposes.” Roberts (2015) similarly criticizes the 
links drawn between financial inclusion, “financial empowerment,” and gender equality.1 
Shifting focus to the global soft law that supports the global financial inclusion agenda, 
Soederberg (2014a, p. 172) criticizes the knowledge production associated with this form 
of global governance: “[S]oft law in the neoliberal era necessarily leads to the enhanced 
role of capitalists (individually as experts and collectively in epistemic communities) 
 
1 In particular, Roberts (2015, p. 108) calls attention to how “financial empowerment” operates as an agenda 
that “promotes the empowerment of women via financial deepening, obscures the gendered labour associated 






within public–private governance initiatives. This expert knowledge is vital to the 
construction and legitimacy of the neoliberal regulation of dispossessive capitalism.” From 
this perspective, the ideational construction of “financial inclusion” is intimately connected 
to underlying material interests and class conflict. 
In examining financial inclusion through its ties to digital finance, critical 
explanations have also stressed the centrality of governance through finance. The 
promotion of digital financial inclusion is argued to divert attention to the personal failures 
and responsibilities of the poor. For instance, Marron (2013, p. 786) stresses the connection 
between financial inclusion and individual responsibility: “The point was to change the 
conduct of the poor in order so that they might better adapt to their economically 
disadvantaged position, so that they might engage in the ‘correct’ kinds of financial 
practices most conducive to personal responsibility.” The digital financial infrastructures 
developed in association with financial inclusion aid in this process of governance by 
enabling the commodification of behavioural data (Gabor & Brooks, 2017).  
Notwithstanding the new technologies and technological actors associated with digital 
financial inclusion (compared to microcredit and microfinance), Jain and Gabor (2020, p. 
3) theorize that many of the actors responsible for its promotion remain the same:  
Financialised inclusion is powered by alliances between fintech companies, 
international development institutions and philanthropic companies who deploy the 
insights of new behaviourism to transform the poor into better-behaved financial 
subjects through digital monitoring and evaluation, adding an element of digital 
coercion to the financialisation of everyday life. 
 
The rapid development and adoption of new financial technologies thus has important 
consequences for how individuals are constituted, constrained, and governed by finance 





 More recent work on financial inclusion acknowledges and interrogates the 
ambiguities associated with the idea. Dafe (2020, p. 506) provides an explicit analysis of 
the ideational ambiguity of financial inclusion, arguing that interpretations of the agenda 
vary in terms of “its targets, its relationship to other economic goals, and the role of the 
market.” In recognizing the ambiguity of the global agenda, Dafe (2020) considers how 
opportunities are created for policymakers and organizations to exercise agency and 
leverage the agenda’s ambiguity to their advantage. Bernards (2016) similarly uses the 
ambiguity of the agenda as an analytical starting point, focusing instead on efforts to shape 
the informal economy in Senegal by both the state and the International Labor 
Organization. The empirical focus of this scholarship is on the promotion of financial 
inclusion by a single global actor (e.g., the International Labour Organization; Bernards, 
2016) or domestic elites (central bank policymakers in Kenya and Nigeria; Dafe, 2020).   
An alternative explanation of the origins and evolution of the global financial 
inclusion agenda remains necessary for several reasons. First, historical materialist 
explanations provide a limited theoretical view of the actors responsible for shaping and 
implementing the agenda. There is a tendency to treat “global capital” as a homogenous 
set of actors with clearly defined preferences.  Even within the domain of finance, diverse 
actors display different (and competing) preferences in the construction of markets and 
regulation (Pagliari & Young, 2014; Kastner, 2014). Financial inclusion is associated with 
considerable political conflict between firms, namely commercial banks, financial 
technology (fintech) firms, and telecommunications companies. Treating international 
organizations as vehicles for the imposition of agendas favourable to global capital and 





p. 8) suggest, “IPE scholars have too readily accepted as axiomatic the notion that the IMF 
and the World Bank go about their business by seeking to normatively diffuse or coercively 
impose a standard set of neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ policies in each case.”  A more 
complete explanation requires consideration of how civil society organizations and states 
throughout the global South actively construct the agenda. 
Second, the dominant focus on credit-debt relations through commercialized 
microfinance and, more recently, financial technology, masks broader dynamics 
encompassing other financial practices. This overstates the role of credit in answering the 
central research question. The disparate actors that constitute the supporting coalition are 
not universally (or predominantly) engaged in the provision or promotion of credit. 
Historical materialist accounts centered on credit-debt relations risk obscuring the role (and 
power) of coalition members whose support for the agenda is driven by non-credit related 
practices and goals. 
 Third, existing accounts of the initial development of financial inclusion as an idea, 
as well as the construction and maintenance of its ambiguity, are inadequately theorized. 
Indeed, while theoretical expectations might lead us to believe that the meaning of financial 
inclusion was resolved at the outset, or alternatively shifted from a development to 
business-centered idea (as could be argued in the case of sustainable development), the 
evidence suggests that ambiguity in the meaning of financial inclusion has not been 
resolved over time. As noted by Dafe (2020), we have a limited understanding of the causes 
and consequences of these ambiguities with respect to the global financial inclusion 





2002, 2013a), explaining the development of the agenda necessitates a clear understanding 
of the actors and mechanisms responsible for its ambiguous construction. 
Finally, the available empirical evidence challenges key elements of the historical 
materialist explanations of financial inclusion. There is a tendency to present the evolution 
from microcredit to microfinance to financial inclusion in linear terms, with 
intergovernmental organizations (like the World Bank or G20) and Western development 
agencies at the forefront. For example, Gabor and Brooks (2017, pp. 425-427) note that 
concerns about over-indebtedness and the negligible benefits associated with microfinance 
had become “pervasive” by the late 2000s.2  As such, the World Bank’s 2008 report 
(Finance for All) “side-stepped such pressing questions about the pitfalls of market-based 
financial sector development” by refocusing on commercial financial institutions and a 
broader array of services within a market-based framework (Gabor & Brooks, 2017, p. 
426). Yet, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, this explanation overlooks the wider range 
of actors, many from the global South, who were actively promoting greater access to 
financial services. Moreover, the transition away from credit and a narrow focus on 
microfinance institutions preceded the crises associated with microfinance in the late 
2000s.  
The subsequent evolution and implementation of the agenda also required active 
support beyond transnational capital. Empirical evidence again conflicts with historical 
materialist expectations. For example, there are numerous instances of protest and 
resistance by civil society against microcredit (Guérin et al., 2015). Resistance to financial 
 






inclusion, by comparison, is remarkably absent. One of the few examples can be found in 
Uruguay, where the implementation of new policies mandating a shift towards the use of 
electronic payments sparked protests and petitions. Yet, as explained by a protest leader 
(Rhyne, Financial inclusion backlash in Uruguay, 2019a), “[w]e say yes to the financial 
system, we say yes to the cards, we say yes to the banks….We say no to the obligation.” 
Notable is the resistance to the specific implementation process, not the financial inclusion 
agenda itself. In the absence of overt conflict, we might instead look to the normative or 
coercive mechanisms employed by powerful global actors. The evidence provided 
throughout this dissertation contradicts these expectations.  Reflecting these issues, a more 
persuasive explanation of the origins and spread of the global financial inclusion agenda 
must broaden its analytical scope. 
 
1.2 The Argument 
This dissertation offers a more complete explanation of the origins and evolution of the 
global financial inclusion agenda. In so doing, I offer a novel theoretical perspective on the 
construction and intersection of ideas, agency, ambiguity, and global coalitions.  I 
introduce the concept of participatory ambiguity, which synthesizes insights from 
historical institutionalism, international norms, and political marketing. Participatory 
ambiguity helps us to understand how and why financial inclusion became a global priority. 
Yet, as Berman (2013, p. 229) argues, “[h]ow and why an idea rises to political prominence 
might not necessarily reveal anything about if or why it will prove able to become a durable 
or institutionalized part of political life. Furthermore, the factors that led to an idea’s rise 





Consequently, I also identify three specific mechanisms through which the global agenda 
and supporting coalition were sustained over time: quantification, layering, and 
coordination effects. 
 
1.2.1 Institutions, Ambiguous Ideas, and Coalitions 
The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation builds on two components: global 
coalitions as agents of change and the ideas that shape interests and unite coalitions. 
Drawing on historical institutionalism, I focus on the role of global coalitions and their 
capacity to effect institutional change and stability.3 From this perspective, “institutions 
are created by social coalitions composed of actors powerful in the relevant arena and 
persist only as long as they retain an ample supporting coalition, even if the composition 
of that coalition changes over time” (Hall, 2016, p. 40; Capoccia, 2016).  The creation and 
spread of the global financial inclusion agenda necessarily entailed the participation of 
multiple actors, whether viewed in the context of institutional creation and reform at the 
global level or changing policies and practices domestically. However, this formulation 
leaves open the question of what motivates actors to join: “At a basic level, the formation 
of new coalitions must involve a process in which multiple actors reinterpret their interests 
in ways that allow them to join together behind a common project and then assemble the 
power resources necessary to ensure that the views of the coalition are addressed” (Hall, 
2016, p. 40).  Consequently, ideas provide the necessary “glue” for coalition formation 
 
3 Institutions are broadly understood as “relatively enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms, 
procedures) that structure behavior and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously” (Mahoney & 





(Blyth, 1997, 2002). I begin with the extensive constructivist literature on ideas and how 
the concept of ambiguity has been used to explain the creation of new agenda, norms, and 
institutions. 
Clearly understood ideas and norms offer several benefits for their wider adoption. 
At a fundamental level, the power of ideas often stems from their capacity to provide clarity 
in crises or moments of uncertainty, thus providing blueprints for action (Baker & 
Underhill, 2015; Blyth, 2002, 2013a).  Norms scholars similarly stress the effects of clarity, 
arguing that clearly articulated norms enable actors to comprehend the “appropriate 
behaviour” invoked by norms, as well as identify and punish instances of norm violation 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Widmaier & Glanville, 2015). From a coalition perspective, 
clarity may foster greater group cohesion by ensuring that likeminded actors constitute the 
coalition. It is possible that coalitions with heterogenous members may be less capable of 
persuasion, negotiation, and collective bargaining (Chwieroth, 2007, 2010). 
 By contrast, research exploring international norms, European integration, 
international negotiation, and global finance demonstrates the utility of ambiguity. Of 
central importance is the effect of ambiguity on coalition size and composition. Ambiguous 
ideas are able to serve as “coalition magnets,” bringing together broad constituencies with 
heterogeneous interests.4 For instance, ambiguous norms are argued to “attract a wider 
array of supporters for a norm” (Widmaier & Glanville, 2015, p. 369), thereby 
“maximiz[ing] the number of actors agreeing to the norm” (Van Kersbergen & Verbeek, 
 
4 Beland and Cox (2016, p. 429) define coalition magnets as “the capacity of an idea to appeal to a diversity 
of individuals and groups, and to be used strategically by policy entrepreneurs (i.e., individual or collective 





2007, p. 221). The global gender equality norm provides a substantive demonstration of 
this mechanism. As Krook and True (2012, p. 105) argue, “[o]ur contention is that norms 
diffuse precisely because — rather than despite the fact that — they may encompass 
different meanings, fit in with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse 
actors.” To be clear, ideational ambiguity not only stands to increase the uptake or adoption 
of new ideas, but also extends through their implementation (Krook & True, 2012; Percy, 
2007; Sandholtz, 2008; Van Kersbergen & Verbeek, 2007; Wiener, 2007). Ambiguity 
ensures that norms “bend,” not “break” as they are put into practice (Widmaier & Glanville, 
2015).  
Of course, ambiguity is not a panacea when promoting new ideas. The “ideal” 
amount of ambiguity to maximize the coalitional benefits while minimizing its risks is an 
empirical question. To this end, Widmaier and Glanville (2015, p. 370) offer one approach 
for identifying when norms are too ambiguous: “Where they become divorced from any 
set of institutions, rules, and decision-making procedures, then they have become too 
ambiguous and should no longer be considered norms.” The risks of too much ambiguity 
extend beyond the link between norms and institutions, also affecting the process of 
coalition building. As Jegen and Mérand (2014, p. 183) contend, coalitions built through 
ambiguity carry risk: “Such coalitions tend to be fragile, a crucial factor explaining why, 
even though ambiguity is pervasive in social life, political entrepreneurs rarely design it as 
a conscious strategy.”  More specifically, this coalition fragility may stem from the multiple 
meanings or cognitive frames that ambiguity mobilizes. While ambiguity helps to expand 
the size and composition of a coalition, it can also backfire: “[D]ynamism is a double-





advocates to ‘lose control’ over their meanings and, in turn, over how new norms are 
implemented” (Krook & True, 2012, p. 109). 
Where do ambiguous ideas originate? In explaining the creation of ambiguity, 
“entrepreneurs” are often identified as the key architects of ambiguous ideas, norms, and 
agendas. From a public policy perspective, entrepreneurs work with others across different 
types of policymaking venues to “catalyse new forms of economic and social activity” 
(Mintrom, 2019, p. 2). As explained by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 896-897), 
entrepreneurs play an integral role in the stage of norm emergence, as they “call attention 
to issues or even ‘create’ them by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes 
them.” Moreover, such actors use ideas instrumentally to shape the interpretation of crises, 
delegitimize existing beliefs, and generate uncertainty that ultimately stimulates demand 
for new ideas (Blyth, 2002; Chwieroth, 2010; Jabko, 2006). While different intellectual 
traditions vary in their terminology when conceptualizing the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and ambiguity5, the shared insight is that entrepreneurs are often elite actors 
who use “strategic ambiguity” to assemble broad support for new ideas, agendas, and 
institutions, often through deliberate framing and language (Béland & Cox, 2016; Payne, 
2001). 
Importantly, however, the precise identity of entrepreneurs is fluid. The literature 
on constructive ambiguity typically focuses on the role of diplomats and negotiators. By 
 
5 The term “constructive ambiguity” is often used in research on international diplomacy (Crespy & 
Vanheuverzwijn, 2019; Jegen & Mérand, 2014; Shamir & Shikaki, 2005), building on Henry Kissinger’s 
definition of constructive ambiguity as “the deliberate use of ambiguous language in a sensitive issue in order 
to advance some political purpose” (Berridge & James, 2003, p. 51). “Strategic ambiguity” is a more widely 






comparison, scholarship on strategic ambiguity identifies a variety of entrepreneurs. 
Focusing on normative change within international organizations, scholars identify both 
“internal” (staff members) and “external” (epistemic communities, civil society 
organizations, etc.) entrepreneurs who use ideas to build support among key constituencies 
within the organization (Chwieroth, 2008; Park & Vetterlein, 2010). When the target of 
advocacy is the state, scholars demonstrate the role of transnational advocacy networks, 
international organizations, and international commissions in promoting human rights 
(Barnett & Duvall, 2005a; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Madokoro, 2018). Others identify 
businesses and think tanks as key advocates of neoliberal reforms (Blyth, 2002; Hall, 1993; 
Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). 
The following examples illustrate both the strengths and limitations of current 
conceptualizations of ambiguity. Exemplifying the use of strategic ambiguity, Jabko’s  
analysis of European integration persuasively demonstrates how the European 
Commission used the idea of the market to build a supporting coalition for the European 
Union (Jabko, 2006, pp. 5-6):  
Depending on the venue, they sold Europe either as a straightforward process of 
economic adjustment to new market conditions or as a more political and managerial 
approach to market globalization. They were thus able to build Europe without 
choosing clearly between these two very different rationales for the push toward greater 
European integration… This fundamental ambiguity was never clarified because it was 
the necessary glue for putting together a winning coalition in favor of European 
reforms. 
 
While compelling, this interpretation of events leaves unaddressed the agency of coalition 
members (labour and business) in the construction of the “market” as ambiguous; rather, 
such actors are the targets of the European Commission’s coalition building efforts. Jabko’s 





More specifically, his work raises questions about the extent to which ambiguity will be 
(or needs to be) resolved over time and the consequences this has on the supporting 
coalition. Insofar as coalitions are built through ambiguity, the implementation stage may 
jeopardize the continued backing of different constituencies. Further illustrating this point, 
Fischhendler (2008) examines the long-term dynamics of treaties built through ambiguity. 
Through a study of Israeli-Jordanian water resource negotiations and conflict, he contends 
that the process of clarifying ambiguity during the implementation phase endangered the 
support of coalition members and sparked conflict in related issue areas. 
 
1.2.2 Developing the Concept of Participatory Ambiguity 
Scholarship on strategic ambiguity provides considerable insight on how entrepreneurs use 
ambiguity as a tool for coalition building and ideational or institutional change. However, 
I argue that such perspectives may provide an incomplete explanation. First, they limit 
analysis by often focusing on ambiguity as a deliberate and “top-down” strategy. 
Ambiguity is frequently attributed to the strategic behaviour of centrally located elite actors 
seeking support for their idea or agreement. Second, analytical attention is often focused 
on how ambiguity operates among a bounded set of actors. When entrepreneurs use 
ambiguity to advance their cause, we assess the efficacy of ambiguity in securing support 
among a specific target audience, such as a single organization or within a profession 
(Dafe, 2020; Park & Vetterlein, 2010; Tsingou, 2015). Third, the composition of the 
supporting coalition secured through ambiguity is inadequately theorized. More simply, 
dominant understandings of ambiguity often stress its capacity to maximize the number of 





will presumably have implications for the likely success of the coalition. Moreover, the co-
production of ambiguity is directly related to intra-coalition politics and power dynamics 
that are masked by a focus on the relationship between ambiguity and coalition size. 
Drawing on the empirical evidence presented below, I present an alternative 
framework called participatory6 ambiguity, defined as the process by which entrepreneurs 
and coalition members construct multiple cognitive frames around a central idea.7  Rather 
than view ambiguity primarily as the product of strategic behaviour by elite actors, often 
within a limited or bounded set of relations, participatory ambiguity draws our attention to 
the different ways in which ambiguity is created by the community mobilized by the idea. 
We are thus better able to identify the ways in which ambiguity is constructed within and 
among a range of expert communities and substantive domains.8 Through this framework, 
we can interrogate the origins of ambiguity and its implications for both agenda-setting and 
policymaking. In shifting focus, I synthesize the large literatures on framing (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; Krebs & Jackson, 2007; Payne, 2001) and norm emergence (Gest, et al., 2013; 
Rosert, 2019) with more recent work on branding and political marketing (Busby & 
 
6 The term “participatory” is deployed in a range of other contexts. This includes “participatory development” 
(Nelson & Wright, 1995) and “Participatory Rural Appraisal” (Chambers, 1994) in international 
development, “participatory democracy” (Pateman, 1970) in democratic governance, and “participatory 
branding” in marketing (Ind & Bjerke, 2007). The choice of participatory in this application rather than, for 
instance, “networked” or “distributed,” is deliberate. In so doing, I draw on key insights developed in these 
related literatures about the potential power and agency of non-Western and/or non-state actors to shape 
broader ideas and agendas. This term also orients our analyses to the actors themselves and their actions 
rather than the shape or form of the wider constellation of actors. 
7 “Cognitive frames” is an umbrella term for distinct yet related types of ideas: “ideologies or shared belief 
systems, normative beliefs, cause-effect beliefs, and policy prescriptions” (Tannenwald, 2005, p. 15). 
8 Examples of expert communities include the transnational financial policy community and anti-money 
laundering regime (Tsingou, 2010, 2015). However, the wider community denotes actors who operate within 
the same domain but may not have access to or participate in specific expert communities (such as 





Cronshaw, 2015; Ind & Bjerke, 2007; Milewicz & Milewicz, 2014).  In particular, I 
identify how ambiguity is co-produced by both entrepreneurs and members of the wider 
community, who use language (or branding) and creative action to legitimate multiple 
policies and outcomes.  
 As suggested by the name, participatory ambiguity emphasizes the ways in which 
ambiguity is created through the participation of both entrepreneurs and members of the 
wider coalition. In other words, new global agendas are not produced only by powerful 
states and intergovernmental organizations, who may engage in “strategic ambiguity” to 
assemble support. Instead, civil society organizations and global South states can also play 
a key role in the co-production of ambiguity. As developed in literatures on marketing and 
branding, scholars have theorized the role of consumers in developing and enhancing 
corporate brands (Ind & Bjerke, 2007). Instead of solely viewing brands as the product of 
a firm’s marketing department or a team of consultants, brands can instead be understood 
as co-created by the firm’s customers who communicate their ideas about the brand to close 
relations (e.g., family and friends) and wider networks (e.g., social media). From this 
perspective, defining a brand is thus an ongoing and decentralized process between a firm 
and its consumers. It results from direct and indirect processes, including consultations (or 
focus groups) as well as the creation of social or online communities.  
Scholars have identified similar participatory dynamics outside the creation of 
commercial brands. For example, some focus on the construction of “place brands,” 
whereby residents of cities play an active role in forming and communicating the brand of 
that area (Zenker & Erfgen, 2014). The different ways in which residents represent their 





(2015) likewise argue the Tea Party brand was constructed through decentralized 
community gatherings, online forums, and public meetings. To be clear, however, 
participatory ambiguity does not suggest that entrepreneurs do not engage in some type of 
strategic framing; rather, it calls attention to the agency and power of diverse actors within 
the broader coalition in co-producing ambiguity, both intentionally and unintentionally.  
 As well established across multiple literatures, the language (text or words) used in 
communicating ideas also matters. Indeed, a central insight of the work on strategic 
ambiguity revolves around the active framing of ideas to improve their resonance with 
targeted audiences (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Jabko, 2006). For instance, work on 
“sustainability” and “sustainable development” demonstrates how the language is used by 
policy entrepreneurs in different ways (Béland & Cox, 2016). Beyond improving the 
resonance of ideas with different actors, language also has important implications for 
constructing communities around ideas. Here, we can draw a useful parallel with the 
literature on “cult brands.” A cult brand is “a brand for which a group of customers exhibit 
a great devotion or dedication. Its ideology is distinctive and it has a well-defined and 
committed community. It enjoys exclusive devotion and its members often become 
voluntary advocates” (Atkin, 2004, p. xix; Busby & Cronshaw, 2015). Language thus not 
only guides our beliefs and interpretation of the world (Krebs & Jackson, 2007; Lakoff, 
2014), but also helps to distinguish the committed community that is represented and 
mobilized by an idea. In turn, the language used to demarcate the community has 
consequences for the production of knowledge and the distribution of power among related 





community members.9 Given the implications of language for constituting communities 
and distributing power, it is important to avoid overestimating the control of entrepreneurs. 
While strategic framing is certainly an important aspect, the use of language is a dynamic 
process and can contribute to the agenda’s ambiguity. The active participation of coalition 
members extends to the establishment of the language used for communicating the agenda, 
including the relevant community of actors, the associated policies, and anticipated 
outcomes. 
 Finally, it is important to clarify what, exactly, is ambiguous. Some authors have 
identified ideas as ambiguous, insofar as they can be interpreted differently by different 
people (Widmaier & Glanville, 2015), while others have instead focused on how specific 
institutions (whether in the form of domestic institutions or international agreements) 
provide ambiguous rules for affected actors (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). I instead argue 
that we can systematically assess ambiguity through a focus on policies and outcomes. In 
other words, ideas are ambiguous insofar as different actors may associate a range of 
policies with a given idea and/or anticipate different outcomes. This understanding of 
ambiguity is closely related to the language used to communicate ideas since the specific 
language used to frame or brand an idea may deliberately or inadvertently legitimate a set 
of policies or outcomes. In addition to language, however, actors can also creatively 
develop, modify, or redefine their policies and programs to fit the broader agenda.10 In 
 
9 While an extended discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, related dynamics are also found in 
scholarship on the essentially contested nature of some concepts (Gallie, 1955) and repertoires of ideas 
(Carstensen & Hansen, 2019). 
10 Within the institutionalist literature, Herrigel (2010, p. 2) similarly explores the capacity of organizations 





turn, such creative actions may increase the degree of ambiguity by adding to the range of 
policies and programs associated with the agenda. The process of connecting policies and 
outcomes with ideas is thus not primarily determined by central entrepreneurs; instead, 
there is a significant participatory element whereby actors associated with the ‘committed 
community’ construct these ties themselves. While entrepreneurs may initially promote an 
idea that is relatively contained and clear, the participatory dynamics of the associated 
community may foster greater ambiguity.  
Crucially, this analytical distinction helps us to understand why different types of 
actors support new ideas. It may be the case, as Jabko (2006) illustrates, that a central 
entrepreneur strategically secures the support of critical actors by using ambiguous framing 
to appeal to their respective interests. Alternatively, however, it is also possible that critical 
actors come to support new ideas by associating policies or outcomes with the idea on their 
own in order to establish some degree of control and shape the purposes and direction of 
the coalition in favourable ways. In some ways, this resembles research on the process of 
norm translation and diffusion (Acharya, 2004; Girard, 2021; Zimmermann, 2017); yet, 
such approaches take an established norm as the analytical starting point. Participatory 
ambiguity, in contrast, identifies a unique framework through which a global agenda is 
established and evolves, as well as the basis upon which different types of actors join the 
supporting coalition.  Thus, not only does participatory ambiguity challenge us to consider 
the varied roles of supporting actors, but it also provides a framework for understanding 
the support of different actors beyond the strategic behaviour of entrepreneurs. 
Through the lens of participatory ambiguity, I provide a more complete explanation 





development of the idea certainly involved the strategic behaviour of entrepreneurs, such 
as the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), and the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (CGAP). But it also required the active participation of states, civil 
society organizations, consultancy firms, development agencies, and philanthropies 
operating internationally and throughout the global South. The language used to frame the 
idea – “financial inclusion,” as opposed to “inclusive financial sectors” or “banking the 
unbanked” – resulted from the deliberate framing of entrepreneurs (e.g., UNCDF) and the 
choices and behaviour of the broader coalition. Viewing the language of financial inclusion 
from the bottom-up reveals the distinct benefits of financial inclusion over its competitors, 
especially among the organizations and agencies charged with implementing the agenda. 
Some benefits are more readily apparent, such as the emotional appeal of “inclusion.” 
Others, however, reflect the power of “financial inclusion” to demarcate a community and 
legitimate certain practices and knowledge. In turn, the participatory construction of 
language also supported the incorporation of multiple cognitive frames around financial 
inclusion within the coalition. Existing scholarship readily notes the perceived links 
between financial inclusion, poverty alleviation, and economic growth; yet, the changing 
composition of the coalition in the 2000s was intimately connected to the inclusion of 
financial stability and financial integrity objectives. Incorporating the dynamic interplay 
between entrepreneurs and coalition members through language and ambiguity provides a 
more compelling explanation for how and why the global financial inclusion agenda 
emerged in the late 2000s. 
Crucially, participatory ambiguity does not speak directly to how coalitions built 





perceive the ambiguity to be a short-term step that will be reconciled in their favour. The 
implementation phase often requires discrete choices about policy and practice that may 
alienate key constituencies. Explaining how global agendas persist beyond their initial 
adoption requires us to consider additional factors and how they relate to the conditions 
that produced the agenda. As Berman (2013, p. 229) argues, “[w]hat is really being studied 
here, in other words, is how ideas become embedded in particular groups, organizations, 
or structures, thereby outlasting the initial conditions shaping their emergence.”  
Consequently, the remainder of this section considers how global agendas that originate 
through participatory ambiguity are sustained and evolve over time. In so doing, I outline 
and connect three key mechanisms: promotion through quantification, adaptation through 
layering, and reinforcement through positive feedback. While these mechanisms are 
interrelated, as demonstrated by the empirical chapters, each contributes to how the global 
agenda is diffused and sustained. 
 
1.2.3 Promotion Through Quantification 
Research on the use of numbers, indicators, and rankings to advance political aims 
illustrates the different ways in which these practices are more than apolitical tools of 
governance. The “objectification” (Erkkilä et al., 2016) or quantification of social 
phenomena often constitutes a practice of “governing from a distance.” This process is not 
neutral or apolitical but is instead deeply intertwined with power relations. As summarized 
by Broome and Quirk (2015, p. 815): 
This is a recursive process whereby complex and contested normative values are 
translated into simplified numerical representations, which in turn enables global 





foundation for initiating particular kinds of political conversations as well as 
potentially influencing the design of policy interventions and reforms. 
 
The use of (and research on) global performance indicators (GPIs)11 have exploded in 
recent years (Broome & Quirk, 2015; Cooley & Snyder, 2015; Kelley & Simmons, 2019). 
Kelley and Simmons (2019), for example, identify 159 GPIs, the vast majority of which 
were launched after 2000. The rankings cover a host of substantive domains, including the 
Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals (Clegg, 2015; Bisbee 
et al., 2019; Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019), the domestic business environment (Doshi et 
al., 2019), sovereign debt (Sinclair, 2005), human security (Homolar, 2015), human 
trafficking (Kelley & Simmons, 2015), and anti-money laundering and terrorist financing 
(Eggenberger, 2018; Morse, 2020). Moreover, these tools are not solely used by 
international organizations; rather, a range of international organizations, states, firms, and 
non-governmental organizations employ rankings and ratings to achieve their preferred 
outcomes. Reflecting the diversity of actors who employ such tools, their use has 
significant implications for the exercise of private authority12 and global governance more 
broadly. 
 Importantly, the politics of numbers does not only relate to composite indicators or 
rankings. More routine or direct processes of quantifying abstract concepts has political 
implications. Mugge (2016) argues that macroeconomic indicators, such as Gross 
Domestic Product, inflation, and unemployment rates, can be conceptualized as powerful 
 
11 Global performance indicators are defined as “regularized, public reporting routines that states, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or private actors use to 
attract attention to the performance of countries or other organizations” (Kelley & Simmons, 2017, p. 5). 
12 Private authority can be defined as “situations in which non-state actors make rules or set standards that 





ideas. The theories and values that inform the operationalization of these indicators solidify 
power relations and specific courses of action. Moreover, the institutionalization of 
indicators has lasting effects on the politics that surround them: “Institutionalizing a 
particular definition of a macroeconomic concept in an indicator gives that definition 
power, both because it becomes more consequential and because it elevates this definition 
to the universal one, obscuring that definitional choices had ever been made” (Mügge, 
2016, p. 412). Illustrating this dynamic, DeRock (2021) demonstrates how the individuals 
responsible for statistical data across several key international and domestic organizations 
reject the inclusion of unpaid household labour in GDP figures due to shared professional 
norms and ideas. In turn, such everyday statistics have important effects on our 
understanding of the economy and the scope of legitimate action. Indeed, as Kelley and 
Simmons (2015, p. 28) suggest, “[s]ome researchers have argued that the ‘collection, 
processing and dissemination of information’ itself shapes the cognitive framework of 
policymaking.” Consequently, I consider how the global financial inclusion agenda is 
quantified in a variety of forms. 
 Existing scholarship identifies several ways in which such indicators “matter” and 
the specific mechanisms through which they affect the behaviour of different actors. Many 
scholars stress the technocratic role of indicators, as they are seen to embody expert 
judgements or knowledge. Indicators thus serve as a productive form of power, as they 
“chang[e] understandings, meanings, norms, customs, and social identities that make 
possible, limit, and are drawn on for action” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005a, p. 56). The effects 
of indicators are variously attributed to the legitimacy, authority, and expertise of their 





the material consequences associated with poor performances (Eggenberger, 2018; Morse, 
2020; Sinclair, 2005); and the social pressures of shaming or status (Kelley & Simmons, 
2015, 2019). The use of indicators, however, can also create unintended consequences, 
such as the diversion of scarce resources towards areas included in indicators (Bisbee et 
al., 2019) and the illusion of compliance with global norms and agendas (LeBaron & Lister, 
2015). 
 The case at hand reveals an important assumption in existing work. Insofar as 
indicators reduce abstract concepts to more simple representations, quantification 
constitutes a process of “translating norms” and global agendas into a set of “measurable 
common elements” (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019, p. 6). Quantification can even aid in 
generating and communicating global norms (Airey, 2015). Yet, while recognizing the 
power dynamics associated with this process, which leads to the inclusion of some 
interpretations over others, the final product is assumed to be a more precise representation 
of the broader idea. Consequently, ambiguity is assumed to be reconciled through 
quantification, at least to some degree. This poses risks for the social coalition mobilized 
by the idea, since this process may alienate key constituencies by constructing indicators 
that exclude their interests or priorities. Aligning with the expectations of historical 
materialist explanations, we may also observe a process of quantification that benefits the 
preferences of global capital. This might indicate that the ambiguity of financial inclusion 
operates as more of a marketing tool than a meaningful feature. 
I empirically demonstrate that quantification is a crucial mechanism through which 
the global financial inclusion agenda is embedded in institutions and practices. Contrary to 





ambiguity to sustain the supporting global coalition. The global collection of data on 
financial inclusion requires decisions about what type of data to collect, creating 
opportunities to advance specific conceptualizations of financial inclusion. Nevertheless, 
global indicators continue to evolve to capture new forms of inclusion and practices, while 
domestic indicators are often tailored to the specific context rather than a single “ideal” 
model. Quantifying financial inclusion can thus shape the cognitive frames of 
policymakers and generate pressure to allocate resources towards the agenda. It can also 
stimulate incremental and cumulative changes, whereby the institutionalization and 
monitoring of indicators creates a commitment to achieve financial inclusion targets (as 
discussed in the next section). Failure to do so may not necessarily impose a direct material 
cost on a state or on civil society actors; rather, failure may instead generate social costs 
(such as status or reputation) and provide a means for transnational actors to exert pressure. 
As a result, the adoption of indicators creates an avenue for accountability (Evans 2018). 
 
1.2.4 Adaptation Through Layering 
To explain how ideas become “embedded” in groups, organizations, and structures, 
historical institutionalism offers a range of analytical tools. While we recognize that 
institutions are often resistant to change, given the “path dependent” effects associated with 
particular institutional arrangements (as discussed in greater detail in the next section), 
considering the development of institutions over time reveals multiple avenues through 
which institutions evolve and new institutions are created (Fioretos et al., 2016; Thelen, 
1999). The classic account of institutional change is one of critical junctures (or punctuated 





of time and the combination of permissive (structural constraints) and productive (the 
factors that shape initial outcomes) conditions weaken the institutional mechanisms of 
reproduction (Soifer, 2012). Within this context, there are new opportunities for coalition 
construction and reform efforts (Quaglia, 2012). Importantly, what constitutes a critical 
juncture does not necessarily extend to all institutions; rather, the “unsettled times” 
associated with a critical juncture may generate opportunities for reform among some 
institutions but not others (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). 
More recently, efforts to provide incremental accounts of institutional change have 
stressed several types of endogenous mechanisms. Rather than rely on the exogenously 
produced critical junctures or “crises,” social coalitions may instead produce meaningful 
change through gradual and incremental processes (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). One common 
typology identifies four mechanisms: the replacement of existing rules with new ones 
(displacement); the changed implementation of existing rules (conversion); changes in the 
effects of rules due to shifts in the external environment (drift); and the creation of new 
rules that coexist with existing rules (layering) (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009, pp. 15-16). 
Further, Mahoney and Thelen (2009) suggest that the type of incremental change is 
significantly conditioned by the characteristics of the targeted institution and the 
characteristics of the political environment. In their view, the existence of low or high 
levels of discretion in institutional interpretation and enforcement, combined with weak or 
strong veto opportunities, is likely to produce specific types of reform processes. 
In this dissertation, the second key mechanism I identify draws on scholarship 
within historical institutional work on incremental forms of change. More specifically, I 





global standards and domestic regulatory arrangements through the layering of new 
policies and objectives. Financial systems are known for their institutional durability (Deeg 
& Posner, 2016), despite the diversity of actors involved in the construction of financial 
regulation (Pagliari & Young, 2014). The pace and scale of reforms associated with the 
global financial inclusion agenda does not correspond with a focus on critical junctures13 
nor do the new policies and objectives reasonably conform with logics of “conversion” or 
“displacement.” Instead, the embedding process entails the addition of new policy 
instruments, rules, and coordinative mechanisms alongside existing rules and objectives. 
To be clear, this multifaceted approach to layering is consistent with existing 
scholarship, which identifies layering processes across a diversity of contexts beyond the 
domain where the concept was initially developed (state institutions). For instance, 
analyses of the European Central Bank and European Commission (Moschella, 2016), 
World Health Organization (Hanrieder & Zürn, 2017), the International Monetary Fund 
(Vetterlein & Moschella, 2014), and the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Solingen & 
Wan, 2017) illustrate how change agents secure reform through the introduction of new 
policies and procedures among existing arrangements.  Gready (2013, p. 1347) similarly 
extends this work to analyses of individual organizations, arguing: 
Organisations tend to evolve by taking on new ideas and philosophies without fully 
jettisoning the old. Thus incrementalism is more common than revolution, new 
approaches encounter established organisational cultures, histories and ways of 
 
13 Situating the analysis within a framework of critical junctures would require the identification of a clearly 
defined turning point in which a set of permissive conditions (factors that change the underlying context and 
increase the power of contingency) emerge and soon vanish (Soifer, 2012). The new institutional 
arrangements achieved during the juncture then become “locked-in” through processes of path dependency 
and “increasing returns” (outlined in greater detail in section 1.2.5). However, in considering the evolution 
of the financial inclusion agenda across both global and domestic contexts, there is no such universal critical 





working, and individuals with diverse personal histories and professional 
allegiances.  
 
Across these examples, a common theme is that layering provides an avenue for 
disadvantaged actors to secure reform. Yet, layering may also be perceived as a 
compromise or “insulation strategy” (Moschella, 2016) from the perspective of those who 
favour the status quo. Insofar as incremental change is, by definition, a long-term and 
cumulative process, it stands to reason that in the short to medium term, before incremental 
change has manifested itself, individual reforms are likely to be perceived differently; 
where some actors view a policy as a step towards greater transformations, others may 
view the same policy as diffusing pressure for more radical alternatives. This view of 
change also helps to make sense of the “bottom-up” dynamics associated with participatory 
ambiguity. Pressures for reform generated by those not favoured by the status quo may be 
channeled into smaller-scale layered reforms, which seem inocuous at first but may 
ultimately be transformative. In the meantime, they help to perpetuate the ambiguity that 
sustains the broader coalition through the introduction and legitimizaton of disparate 
reforms. 
As I demonstrate in the empirical chapters, the global financial inclusion agenda is 
adapted across multiple scales and contexts through different forms of institutional 
layering. A substantial portion of these activities involve the quantification of the agenda, 
as outlined previously. The collection and publication of cross-national data on financial 
inclusion is one instance of embedding financial inclusion among the existing policies and 
programmes within the World Bank. Across national contexts, we observe the 
establishment of coordinating mechanisms (National Financial Inclusion Strategies) which 





procedures. The adoption of financial inclusion components in the soft law governing 
global finance is readily observed at the Financial Action Task Force and other global 
standard-setting bodies, as is the development of financial inclusion policies among 
Western development agencies, civil society organizations, and public-private 
partnerships. Yet, in accordance with participatory ambiguity, the adaptation of various 
actors aligns with the participatory dynamic that gave rise to the agenda. Rather than follow 
a specific template or model, especially one imposed by powerful (capitalist) actors at the 
global level, reforms instead reflect a bottom-up approach that illustrates the continued 
ambiguity of the agenda and the agency and power of diverse actors. 
 
1.2.5 Reinforcement Through Positive Feedback 
Once created, new institutions can become more durable through a variety of mechanisms. 
Generally referred to as “path dependency,” institutions can become more resilient over 
time and alternative options less likely to supplant them. Pierson (2000), however, provides 
a more detailed articulation of this general pattern, focusing specifically on dynamic 
processes of positive feedback. This perspective draws heavily from Arthur (1994) and 
North (1990) in which four features of “increasing returns” are identified: large set-up or 
fixed costs; learning effects; coordination effects; and adaptive expectations. Large fixed 
costs create strong incentives to persist with the original choice irrespective of alternatives. 
Learning effects, also characterized as “cognitive mechanisms” (Hanrieder & Zürn, 2017), 
reinforces the institution by changing the knowledge and perceptions of actors, rewarding 
them for continued use of the institution. Coordination effects “occur when the benefits an 





(Pierson, 2000, p. 24). Finally, adaptive expectations refer to the self-fulfilling dynamics 
created by changes in how actors respond to new institutions and adjust their planning and 
future behaviour. Together, these mechanisms structure politics over time as to support 
institutional persistence and increase the difficulty of adopting alternative arrangements. 
 In this dissertation, the third important mechanism I identify draws on a tradition 
of historical institutionalist scholarship that is distinct from the work on incremental forms 
of change. I argue that positive feedback in the form of coordination effects helps to create 
new constituencies and expand the supporting coalition. Coordination effects, defined 
above, suggest that the benefits accrued through an institution depend on the behaviour of 
other actors. Of course, this is not to suggest that the creation of such effects is necessarily 
intended; as argued by Fioretos (2019, p. 1143), “[g]overnments may purposefully design 
institutions with the goal of producing positive feedback effects, but such effects may also 
be unanticipated and emerge spontaneously from government interaction.” In other words, 
coordination effects may emerge from practice, rather than through the deliberate design 
of an institution. 
 Coordination effects are a central component of global governance, principally 
through standard-setting (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, 2001; Büthe & Mattli, 2011). In global 
health governance, the World Health Organization (WHO) strongly benefits from such 
effects. The set of standards set by the WHO “facilitates information sharing, the 
compilation of public health statistics, and the development and trade of medicines, and in 
turn further strengthens the WHO’s role as the coordinating authority in global public 
health” (Hanrieder & Zürn, 2017, p. 99). Similarly, Auld’s (2014) analysis of social and 





emphasizes the importance of coordination effects for ensuring such programs are both 
effective and sustainable. 
 Institutions structure and inform the identities, ideas, and resources of groups, thus 
altering political struggles that follow periods of institutional change (Skocpol, 1995, p. 
58). Consequently, “a new policy or institution can cause the development of a 
constituency or client group with an incentive to push for the institution’s maintenance and 
expansion” (St. John, 2018, p. 24). More simply, new policies create new politics. Actors 
who may not have played a role in the construction of a new institution, or even opposed 
its creation, are likely to re-evaluate their position in light of the new institution. In turn, 
social coalitions underpinning institutions can shift. As such coalitions attract additional 
members, who are empowered by or benefit from the new institution, we expect the 
resiliency of the institution to be strengthened.  
 This mechanism is evident in Skocpol’s (1995) analysis of the development of 
American social policy. Her work demonstrates how such policies encouraged the 
development of new constituencies, which mobilized in support of the policies and 
advocated for greater concessions. Pierson’s (1996) work on welfare state retrenchment 
similarly emphasizes the capacity of new institutions to create new constituencies, arguing 
“the emergence of powerful groups surrounding social programs may make the welfare 
state less dependent on the political parties, social movements, and labor organizations that 
expanded social programs in the first place” (Pierson, 1996, p. 147). The creation of new 
constituencies does not, however, guarantee the reinforcement of an institution. As Hacker 
(2004) demonstrates in the context of social assistance for the poor, institutions may give 





retrenchment of the welfare state, the general dynamic has also been identified in 
international political economy scholarship. Exploring the rise of investor-state dispute 
settlement in global trade governance, St. John (2018, p. 41) argues that “[i]nvestor-state 
arbitration… gives rise to a strong, sophisticated, and politically mobilized constituency.” 
Similar dynamics are apparent with respect to global trade and intellectual property; 
according to Sell (2010), changes in U.S. domestic policy created a new coalition of actors, 
which resulted in more varied interests and ambitious objectives.  
Insofar as institutions are the product of underlying social coalitions (Capoccia, 
2016; Hall, 2016), I argue that the resultant coordination effects and creation of new 
constituencies has important implications for the size and composition of the coalition in 
support of financial inclusion. Importantly, this process is entirely consistent with 
participatory ambiguity. Identifying such coordination effects might occur through the 
strategic actions of central entrepreneurs seeking to incorporate key constituencies into the 
coalition. Alternatively, however, coordination effects may be identified by organizations 
outside of those who originally supported the agenda. In this case, coordination effects not 
only legitimate the support of a new constituency, but also alter the ambiguity of the agenda 
in unanticipated ways.  
Empirically, this dissertation demonstrates this dynamic by interrogating the 
expansion of the supporting coalition across different issue areas. From the provision of 
local water services in Ghana to the construction of refugee assistance programs across 
humanitarian contexts, the establishment of the global agenda alters the interests of actors 
outside the original coalition. By improving access to retail financial services, especially 





to the formal financial sector. As a result, new types of actors, operating at domestic and 
global levels, become invested in the success and continuation of the agenda. Yet, these 
connections are not always identified and used by financial inclusion advocates; rather, 
complementary links between financial inclusion and other objectives are also promoted 
by organizations outside of the original coalition. 
 
1.3 Research Design and Observable Implications 
The research design of this dissertation is structured as a “theory generating” project.14 
More specifically, I combine elements of both congruence analysis and inductive process-
tracing when evaluating the empirical evidence against the observable implications derived 
from my own and historical materialist accounts. Although both approaches are closely 
related and offer ways to draw inferences in within-case study designs, congruence analysis 
and process-tracing entail different procedures and aims. I discuss each in turn before 
outlining the key observable implications of each theoretical argument. 
 Congruence analysis is a widely used approach in international relations 
scholarship for evaluating the congruence (or lack thereof) between the empirical evidence 
of a case and the expectations or predictions derived from theory (Blatter & Blume, 2008; 
Blatter & Haverland, 2012; George & Bennett, 2005; Haverland, 2010). To be used 
effectively, congruence analysis depends on the identification of clear expectations for 
each theory and the capacity of evidence to discriminate between rival theories. Unlike the 
 
14 Alternatively, one might characterize the project as a theory-generating case study, in which the aim is to 
both explain the case at hand and produce an original theoretical perspective that may be used to explain 
other instances of agenda emergence in global politics. To this end, I further elaborate on the generalizability 





analysis of comparative case studies, the “main mechanism of control” is through the 
application of multiple theories to the case and evidence at hand (Blatter & Blume, 2008, 
p. 325). Despite the benefits of this approach, namely its flexibility and adaptability in 
evaluating a wide range of evidence against potential explanations15, some may question 
our ability to identify causal relationships and mechanisms through a strict reliance on 
congruence analysis. As such, process-tracing offers an important complementary 
approach to within-case analyses.16 
 As a ubiquitous tool in case study research, process-tracing has inspired a 
substantial volume of methodological research (Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Bennett & 
Checkel, 2015; George & Bennett, 2005). Bennett and Checkel (2015, p. 7) define process 
tracing as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events 
within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal 
mechanisms that might causally explain the case.” Although there are important 
differences between inductive and deductive process-tracing in principle, employing 
inductive process-tracing often involves frequent iteration between the application and 
development of theory.17 While process-tracing involves a greater evidentiary burden than 
congruence analysis in order to make claims about the operation of specific causal 
 
15 Blatter and Bloom suggest “central actors and structures, traces of motivational foundation of (inter)action, 
specific features of X and Y, co-variance among indicators of X and Y” all constitute possible areas of inquiry 
within congruence analysis (2008, p. 319). 
16 As argued by George and Bennett (2005, p. 184): “By invoking the superior standing of the theory 
employed or by resorting to process-tracing, the investigator may be satisfied that the within-case approach 
suffices and need not be buttressed by across-case comparisons. 
17 Trampusch and Palier provide a clear articulation of this point: “[I]nductive analysis of processes does not 
merely consist of naïve observations of empirical events from which theoretical ideas are derived, but rather 
forms a theoretically informed analysis (= decomposition) of processes that looks for causal chains between 





mechanisms, it is usefully combined with congruence analysis to strengthen the causal 
standing of an explanation (George & Bennett, 2005). 
 Using both congruence analysis and process-tracing, I consider a wide range of 
evidence and assess key processes that correspond with historical materialist and my own 
expectations. Empirically, this project draws on extensive primary documents and more 
than 70 interviews with people from (or with direct knowledge of) key actors associated 
with the global financial inclusion agenda, including international organizations, civil 
society organizations, private firms, development agencies, and financial regulatory 
authorities. I also collect and analyze an original collection of National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies (NFISs), described in greater detail in section 1.4. This project takes seriously 
the advice to “cast a wide net” when collecting evidence for congruence analysis and 
process-tracing and offers substantial original data in evaluating theoretical explanations. 
I provide a discussion of the specific observable implications in each empirical 
chapter, as the precise expectations of each theory varies across contexts. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to outline a broad set of observable implications that structure the overall 
project. First, historical materialist accounts of the financial inclusion agenda often 
emphasize its links with previous efforts to promote microcredit and microfinance, 
including both the substance of the agenda and the central actors involved. As such, there 
is a predominant focus on credit-based financial services and the roles of commercialized 
microfinance institutions, global financial firms, Western states and development agencies, 
and the World Bank (Bateman, 2010; Mader, 2015; Roy, 2010; Soederberg, 2013, 2014a). 
Moreover, class conflict is often understood to be the primary axis of political competition. 





entail the centrality of Western states and business in constructing the agenda and in its 
promotion, the primary role of credit-based financial services within the agenda, and the 
organization of political conflict around class structures. 
My own argument, by comparison, instead emphasizes the diverse actors that 
constitute the global coalition (especially state and non-state actors from the global South), 
the importance of a broader array of financial services beyond credit, and pluralistic forms 
of conflict. In contrast to historical materialist accounts, I reveal the dynamic co-production 
of ambiguity and the power of civil society organizations and states throughout the global 
South in shaping and implementing the agenda. Additionally, I distinguish my work from 
scholarship on “strategic ambiguity” by identifying how ambiguity is not entirely 
attributable to central entrepreneurs; rather, the creative actions by coalition members and 
the use of language to legitimate different policies and outcomes also shape the ambiguity 
of the broader agenda. To explain how the agenda and coalition are sustained over time, I 
also identify three key mechanisms: the use of quantification to build support while 
maintaining a degree of ambiguity, the layering of new rules and objectives among 
organizations and institutional arrangements, and the identification of coordination effects 
to expand the coalition. 
Reflecting the theorized operation of participatory ambiguity and the three 
associated mechanisms, I identify five general observable implications. First, the creation 
of ambiguity is a co-produced process involving the dynamic interaction between 
“entrepreneurs” and the members of the broader coalition. Second, the ambiguity itself is 
the result of the creative actions of coalition members and the use of language and branding 





tools, and objectives associated with the agenda are introduced within existing 
organizational structures or institutional arrangements through a process of layering. 
Fourth, actors use quantification strategies to shape and communicate the agenda (without 
resolving its ambiguity) and rally support. Fifth, coordination effects lead actors both 
within and external to the original coalition to link the agenda with a range of new 
outcomes, thus expanding the coalition through the creation of new constituencies. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as five empirical chapters, each of which interrogates the 
origins and evolution of the global financial inclusion agenda from a variety of  
perspectives. By considering not just the origins of the agenda and its evolution at the 
global level, but also its domestic implementation and its integration into new governance 
spaces, I subject historical materialist accounts and my own argument to empirical scrutiny. 
Collectively, these chapters provide substantial evidence in favour of participatory 
ambiguity and the theorized mechanisms of quantification, layering, and coordination 
effects. These chapters also reveal new opportunities for future research, which I return to 
in section 1.5. 
 In Chapter 2, I begin with an examination of the origins of the global financial 
inclusion agenda. By tracing the emergence of “financial inclusion” and the associated 
coalition through key turning points, including the 1997 Microcredit Summit, the 2005 UN 
Year of Microcredit, and the establishment of the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion (GPFI), I demonstrate how ambiguity was constructed and facilitated coalition 





the Poor and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion) and members of the wider coalition (like 
global standard-setting bodies and civil society organizations and states in the global 
South) used and contributed to the malleable branding of “financial inclusion.” This 
chapter further establishes the pivotal coalitional role of actors whose primary interests 
were financial stability and financial integrity.  
 Chapter 3 considers the evolution of the agenda beyond its initial global uptake. I 
demonstrate how the ambiguity of the agenda remained unresolved and even expanded 
through the identification of new types of coordination effects (through linkages with the 
Sustainable Development Goals and objectives like combatting modern slavery). In tracing 
the adoption of the agenda among global standard-setting bodies (SSBs), I reveal how the 
malleable language of “financial inclusion” facilitated the layering of new goals and 
guidelines on top of existing sets of standards. Further, both financial inclusion 
organizations and the SSBs themselves promoted perceived coordination effects between 
financial inclusion, financial stability, and financial integrity. Several new quantification 
projects were also created during this period (e.g., the Alliance for Financial Inclusion’s 
Maya Declaration and the World Bank’s Global Findex survey). Not only did these projects 
help rally support for the agenda while maintaining its ambiguity, but they helped shape 
related quantification efforts across domestic contexts (identified in subsequent chapters). 
Spanning both the uptake and subsequent evolution of the agenda at the global level, I find 
little empirical support historical materialist explanations that look to the centrality of 
credit-based financial services, structure of class conflict, and the co-optation of the agenda 





 Shifting focus away from the global level to processes of domestic implementation 
offers new opportunities to consider whether the ambiguity of the global agenda was 
resolved in a manner consistent with historical materialist expectations. Consequently, 
Chapter 4 uses an original collection of National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs) 
and quantitative text analysis to assess cross-national variation in the implementation of 
the agenda. The content of NFISs sheds light on the emphasis of national strategies on 
credit-based financial services and commercialized microfinance institutions. Further, the 
central role of the World Bank in historical scholarship on the Washington Consensus and 
contemporary historical materialist work on financial inclusion leads us to expect that the 
content of NFISs will co-vary with financial sector assistance from the World Bank. 
However, the analysis finds limited empirical support for such expectations, instead 
suggesting that the content of NFISs is more consistent with the ambiguous global agenda. 
Moreover, the NFISs provide extensive support for the use of quantification and suggestive 
evidence for the use of layering to embed the agenda among existing domestic regulatory 
arrangements. 
To complement the broad scope of Chapter 4 and better assess the causal 
mechanisms at hand, Chapter 5 narrows the analysis to a single country context. Reflecting 
the historical portrayal of Ghana as a Washington Consensus “success story” and the 
financing of the Ghanaian NFIS by the World Bank, I situate Ghana as a “most likely” case 
for historical materialist arguments. Empirically, I evaluate the changes in financial 
regulation between 2000-2020 and the associated political contestation. There is little 
evidence for the centrality of credit-based financial services and class conflict; instead, the 





involving the state, commercial banks, and telecommunications firms. This extends to the 
creation of the Ghanaian NFIS, which reflected the ambiguity of the global agenda and the 
domestic construction of the strategy (rather than the imposition of the strategy by the 
World Bank or Western states). This chapter also considers the implementation of the 
agenda from an “everyday political economy” perspective, wherein I find evidence for the 
power of local communities and civil society organizations to shape the financial inclusion 
agenda in favourable ways. 
Chapter 6 provides a final empirical assessment of the research question by 
interrogating the limits of my own argument. More specifically, I evaluate the integration 
of financial inclusion with humanitarian assistance as a “least likely” case for the 
explanatory power of participatory ambiguity. Both the immense practical obstacles to 
extending financial services to forcibly displaced persons and the conflicting interests and 
ideas among development and humanitarian organizations challenge the capacity of 
participatory ambiguity to facilitate coalition building. While prior shifts towards digital 
cash transfer programs in the humanitarian sector provided an entry point for financial 
inclusion, I demonstrate the importance of both advocacy by financial inclusion 
organizations and learning among humanitarian organizations. Efforts to codify the 
integration typically avoided formal policy prescriptions and embraced the ambiguity 
created by diverse organizations seeking to shape the agenda within this new context. 
Support for this integration process was further aided by the malleable branding of 
“financial inclusion,” the recognition of coordination effects between financial inclusion 
and humanitarian assistance, and the layering of new policies and goals within 







This dissertation offers theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of the 
global financial inclusion agenda, provides a new theoretical framework for explaining 
other cases of ambiguous agendas in global politics, and speaks to broader debates on 
changes in global economic governance. There are also several important policy 
implications related to the project. In contrast to historical materialist accounts, I provide a 
more complete explanation of the origins and evolution of the global financial inclusion 
agenda by focusing on its ambiguity and associated coalitional politics. By synthesizing 
insights from historical institutionalism, international norms, and political marketing, I 
develop the novel concept of participatory ambiguity. In distinguishing my approach from 
scholarship on “strategic ambiguity,” I theorize the co-production of ambiguity by 
disparate actors, who use creative actions and language (and branding) to legitimate a range 
of policies and outcomes. To further explain how the agenda and coalition are sustained 
over time, I identify three key mechanisms: quantification, layering, and coordination 
effects. In so doing, my work builds on and complements recent scholarship that explores 
the varied implementation of the agenda across domestic contexts (Dafe, 2020; Settle, 
2020; Singh, 2019). Together, my argument provides a more nuanced explanation of the 
global financial inclusion agenda that reveals the agency of civil society organizations and 
states throughout the global South.  
 Empirically, this project provides considerable original data in relation to the 
financial inclusion agenda. Through more than 70 elite interviews with individuals from 





organizations, firms, development agencies, and financial regulatory authorities, I provide 
new evidence on the interactions between and among diverse actors associated with the 
agenda. I also gather and analyze an original collection of National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies, which provides a unique cross-national perspective on the implementation 
process. Additionally, this dissertation offers one of the few political perspectives (to date) 
on the integration of financial inclusion in the context of humanitarian assistance. 
 In developing the original concept of participatory ambiguity, this dissertation 
offers a new framework for explaining other agendas in global politics. For example, this 
framework might generate new insights on the origins and evolution of agendas that are 
recognized as ambiguous. This includes sustainable development (Hadden & Seybert, 
2016), gender equality (Krook & True, 2012), and the protection of civilians in combat 
(Bode & Karlsrud, 2019). However, this framework may also reveal elements of 
participatory ambiguity in agendas that are not commonly theorized as ambiguous, such as 
the “Washington Consensus” (Babb, 2013).  
 This project makes an important contribution to ongoing debates in international 
political economy about shifts in global economic governance. In particular, the global 
financial crisis and the emergence of China as a global power have sparked considerable 
research on the future of the liberal international order. While some scholars maintain a 
view of continued dominance by the United States and existing institutional and ideational 
features (Blyth, 2013b; Fichtner, 2017; Helleiner, 2014; Underhill, 2015), others have 
identified important shifts in power across global finance, trade, and tax governance 
(Christensen & Hearson, 2019; Grabel, 2017; Hopewell, 2020). Within this broader 





shaped by the ideas and creative actions of global South civil society organizations and 
states. 
 Finally, there are key policy implications for both states and civil society 
organizations that stem from the dissertation. First, the participatory dynamics that 
characterize the construction and maintenance of the agenda suggest that global South 
states have considerable policy space. In contrast to policy agendas that are more narrowly 
or strictly defined, there are considerable opportunities to experiment with design of 
domestic strategies, policies, and regulatory arrangements. This flexibility extends to civil 
society organizations, who might similarly pursue innovative programs that are facilitated 
by the ambiguity of the agenda. Second, this project illuminates the importance of 
considering the relationship between ambiguity and the composition of the supporting 
coalition. When building new coalitions through ambiguity, the success of the coalition 
may ultimately be shaped by the specific constituencies incorporated through ambiguity 
more so than the size of the coalition. Consequently, both states and civil society 
organizations engaged in coalition building may benefit from considering how ambiguity 










2 The Emergence of the Global Financial Inclusion Agenda 
 
Amidst the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the nascent Group of 20 (G20) 
sought to chart a path forward for the global economy in 2009-2010. Alongside discussions 
of strengthening financial supervision, coordinating macroeconomic stimulus, and 
reforming global financial governance, “financial inclusion” also emerged as a focus of 
attention. On the one hand, discussions around financial inclusion caught some 
policymakers by surprise. A declassified email from the U.S. Director of Policy Planning 
in January 2010 notes the discord among U.S. officials (emphasis added; U.S. Department 
of State, 2010): 
On a completely different subject, my crew has been monitoring G20 preparations and 
the situation is going from bad to worse in terms of 1) the expansion of the g20 agenda 
into politics and 2) the degree to which we are getting closed out. One of the things that 
came out of Pittsburgh was a working group on “financial inclusion,” meaning 
microfinance, mobile banking, etc – all stuff [Hillary Clinton] has been deeply engaged 
with. We only found out about it more or less by chance in a phone call w/ lael – I have 
a v good person going to the meetings but Treasury runs the show. 
 
On the other hand, the ultimate embrace of financial inclusion by the G20 through the 
launch of the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion in December 2010 was indicative 
of the global uptake of the new agenda. 
 In this chapter, I examine the origins of the global financial inclusion agenda. 
Historical materialist accounts of the financial inclusion agenda provide important insights 
into the links between financial inclusion and previous agendas, namely microcredit and 
microfinance. Indeed, this is a key area of agreement between such explanations and my 
own argument. However, historical materialist explanations often emphasize the role of 
actors like Western states and development agencies, commercialized microfinance 





new agenda (Bateman, 2010; Bateman et al., 2018; Mader, 2015; Soederberg, 2013, 
2014a). Moreover, these accounts also focus predominantly on credit-based financial 
services within the agenda, with some scholars arguing that the more “holistic” framing of 
financial inclusion is entirely misleading (Bateman, 2012). 
 Through a re-examination of the origins of the financial inclusion agenda, I instead 
demonstrate the importance of ambiguity and coalitional politics in the agenda’s 
emergence. The ambiguity of the agenda, with respect to the range of policies and potential 
outcomes associated with the idea, helped construct broad support while avoiding potential 
conflict or disagreement. Further, in contrast to scholars who emphasize the strategic use 
of ambiguity by norm or policy entrepreneurs, I contend that the agenda’s ambiguity was 
co-produced by disparate actors within the coalition. As part of the process of coalition 
construction, members are likely to transform an idea in new and unique ways to establish 
some degree of control and shape the purposes and direction of the coalition in favourable 
ways. Participatory ambiguity thus directs attention to the wider set of actors who 
collectively shape the language and “branding” of the agenda, its accompanying policies 
and objectives, and the boundaries of the associated community. By empirically tracing the 
construction of the agenda and supporting coalition through the 1990s and 2000s, I reveal 
how ambiguity around financial inclusion was co-produced by diverse organizations and, 
ultimately, fostered the inclusion of actors whose support hinged on the perceived positive 
relationship between financial inclusion, financial stability, and financial integrity.18 
 
18 Financial integrity refers to the transparency of the financial system and legality of activities within it, 
specifically in relation to transnational organized criminal activity, money laundering, terrorist financing, and 





This chapter treats the establishment of the G20 Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion (GPFI) as a critical indicator of global support.19 By combining purposive elite 
interviews20 (Tansey, 2007) with primary documents available publicly or acquired 
through freedom of information requests21, I unpack the sequence of events that preceded 
the establishment of the GPFI. In so doing, I consider the observable implications of 
historical materialist arguments, namely the dominant roles of Western states and 
businesses, the primary of credit-based financial services, and class-conflict as the main 
axis of political conflict. I also evaluate the extent to which the construction of the financial 
inclusion agenda and origins of the agenda’s ambiguity are attributable to central 
entrepreneurs, consistent with research on “strategic ambiguity.” By comparison, the 
observable implications of participatory ambiguity at this stage of the agenda’s evolution 
include the co-production of the agenda’s language and ambiguity by both entrepreneurs 
and the wider coalition. Additionally, the identification of coordination effects will enable 
the expansion of the coalition to incorporate new constituencies. 
This chapter proceeds in four sections. I first evaluate the creation of the original 
global coalition around microcredit and, subsequently, microfinance. Both documentary 
evidence and interviews suggest ambiguity played a greater role than is often 
 
19 In the absence of a formal treaty, this form of institutionalized support has served as the analytical focal 
point of other scholars (Soederberg, 2013, 2014a) and was identified in multiple interviews as a key point in 
the establishment of the global financial inclusion agenda. 
20 Interviews were conducted with officials from government finance ministries and development agencies 
(from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Brazil, and Ghana), as well as individuals from 
relevant international standard-setting bodies, intergovernmental organizations, financial firms, and 
nongovernmental organizations. Organizations or individuals were identified as potential participants based 
on primary documents or through interview responses. Many interviewees required anonymity or partial de-
identification to provide candid responses. 
21 Documents were requested from a total of eight departments or ministries across the United States, United 





acknowledged. Additionally, “outsider” organizations (including civil society 
organizations from the global South) were integral to the creation of ambiguity as they 
sought to secure space for their preferred understandings of microcredit and microfinance 
within the broader movement. In the second section, I demonstrate how a broad coalition 
of actors mobilized around financial inclusion as the idea was linked to the objectives of 
different constituencies. I also reveal how the branding of “financial inclusion” offered 
greater coalitional benefits than alternatives (such as “banking the unbanked”) as it was 
more malleable (to accommodate different actors, policies, and outcomes) and more 
emotionally appealing. Further, the language and branding was produced through both the 
strategic efforts of entrepreneurs and the actions of the wider coalition. In the third section, 
I unpack the dynamics that led to the creation of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), 
a key South-South knowledge sharing and advocacy organization, and the G20’s Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion. The final section concludes. 
 
2.1 Constructing a Transnational Coalition: The 1997 
Microcredit Summit 
In this section, I trace the early development of the microcredit and microfinance agendas 
and the “turning point” for the creation of a global coalition through the 1997 Microcredit 
Summit. Although the ideas of microcredit and microfinance are well-documented in 
existing scholarship, I provide new evidence on key dynamics surrounding the coalition 
building effort. Moreover, this section provides an important foundation from which to 
understand how later efforts to link financial inclusion to poverty alleviation and economic 





Yet, despite broadly similar appeals to goals like poverty alleviation, organizations 
mobilized by the microcredit and microfinance agendas often had distinct understandings 
of who should be targeted with these programs and how these programs should be designed. 
In turn, these differences contributed to the ambiguity of these earlier agendas in a manner 
inconsistent with scholarship about “strategic ambiguity.” 
The use of informal forms of financial services, like rotating savings and credit 
associations, specialized financial institutions, such as cooperatives and rural banks, and 
the early development of microcredit is well documented in existing scholarship 
(Copestake et al., 2016; Mader, 2015; Weber, 2002). In general terms, microcredit is 
understood as the provision of microloans to support entrepreneurial activity and income 
generation. while microfinance involves a wider range of financial services (including 
credit, savings, and insurance). By the mid 1990s, microcredit was increasingly featured in 
development discourse while also coinciding with the beginning of a gradual shift towards 
microfinance. Illustrating this point, a number of non-governmental organizations (such as 
the International Coalition on Women and Credit and Women’s World Banking) advocated 
for greater attention on the links between women’s empowerment and microcredit during 
the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995 (S. Jones, 2009). 
Additionally, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) was established in 1995 
as a multi-donor effort (with support from the World Bank, the Governments of the United 
States, France, the Netherlands and Canada, and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development) to support microfinance through financing and knowledge generation and 





 In the initial development of these ideas, we can identify several alternative 
interpretations of microcredit and microfinance that differed with respect to who ought to 
be targeted and why. For example, early policy debates within USAID focused on 
“microenterprises,” defined as “very small, informally organized, non-agricultural 
businesses” with a “threshold of ten employees” (United States Agency for International 
Development, 1995). Looking more broadly, Bennett and Cuevas (1996) summarize the 
practitioner debate at a “Finance Against Poverty” conference held in 1995. They note an 
extensive debate over terminology about the “poor,” “working poor,” “very poor,” and 
“core poor,” which has meaningful consequences: “The implications of adequately 
defining the target clientele are not only a matter of using the correct standards of 
performance for programmes and institutions, but obviously affect the selection of 
appropriate instruments and mechanisms in poverty alleviation and income enhancement 
efforts” (Bennett & Cuevas, 1996, p. 147). With respect to possible outcomes, they further 
highlight the contributions to “financial sector development,” “enterprise formation and 
growth,” and “poverty reduction” (Bennett & Cuevas, 1996, p. 145).  
The 1997 Microcredit Summit in Washington can be reasonably described as a 
turning point at which a transnational coalition in support of the idea was first organized, 
as it was “symbolic of the arrival of microfinance as a global phenomenon” (Copestake, et 
al., 2016, p. 280). Created by John Hatch, Muhammad Yunus, and Sam Daley-Harris, the 
Summit attracted nearly 3000 participants from 137 countries, including a contingent of 
political elites and state leaders (Davis & Khosla, 2007). The process of launching the 
Summit was intentionally designed to mimic United Nations processes, such that the first 





secure agreement among participants to a final declaration in advance of the Summit, a 
process which involved several rounds of consultations and revisions among all willing 
participants. 
Focusing on the empirical evidence related to the organization of the 1997 
Microcredit Summit demonstrates the crucial role of ambiguity in this early stage. It also 
refines important contributions from historical materialist perspectives that reveal the 
importance of credit and transnational finance (Soederberg, 2013; Mader, 2015) while 
potentially obscuring the agency and influence of global South actors in this process. 
Interview evidence from individuals directly involved with planning and organizing the 
Summit (Telephone Interview, January 2018) reveals how different organizations were 
brought together despite different understandings of microcredit and microfinance: 
I always had this image that we had a number of groups whose work wasn’t 
necessarily consistent with reaching the very poor, it was okay it just wasn’t 
consistent with that, where I always had the feeling that they were on the organizing 
committee or participating in the summit somewhat with their fingers crossed, or 
said another way, okay we’ll get through this summit and then we’ll change it 
afterward or something. (emphasis added) 
 
Further illustrating this dynamic, one prominent source of debate was the name of the 
summit; according to multiple interviewees (Telephone Interview, January 2018), while 
the organizers pushed for (and eventually secured support for) “microcredit,” participants 
took issue with the narrow scope implied by the term, especially given the developing shift 
towards microfinance.  These statements clearly point towards the way ambiguity enabled 
the construction of the coalition. From the perspective of participants, retaining their own 
interpretations of the agenda while supporting its broader aspirations allowed them to 
benefit from the attention, networks, and financial resources mobilized by the Summit 





this context ambiguity was not strategically crafted by the central entrepreneurs but was 
instead evident in how participants approached the idea. Support for the Summit and 
subsequent campaign thus provide ample room for organizations to reap the benefits of 
support, including publicity and access to material resources, while also pursuing their own 
preferred vision of microcredit or microfinance.  
It is also important to recognize the pivotal role of non-state actors from the global 
South in the early construction of the coalition. Both interview and documentary evidence 
emphasized the critical support of hundreds of individuals and organizations based in the 
global South. Moreover, evidence also suggests that established women’s empowerment 
organizations, an important group of development actors, were not necessarily aligned with 
the summit organizers or global South actors despite their advocacy for microcredit at the 
Beijing process a few years prior. In part, this was attributed to competing priorities for the 
newly formed coalition and potential resistance to perceived development ‘outsiders’ 
setting the transnational agenda (Telephone Interview, January 2018). 
 
2.2 From Microcredit to Financial Inclusion 
Notwithstanding efforts to build a global coalition around microcredit and microfinance in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the transition to financial inclusion marked a distinct change 
in the substance of the agenda and the composition of the supporting coalition. Following 
the 1997 Microcredit Summit in Washington, the coalition supporting microcredit and 
microfinance continued to expand. For example, the Microcredit Summit was recognized 
in two United Nations resolutions, the 2002 Financing for Development Conference 





United Nations launched the Year of Microcredit in 2005 (Davis & Khosla, 2007). To be 
clear, a select number of countries and regions (especially the United Kingdom, India, and 
European Union) were engaged in domestic debates about financial inclusion or exclusion 
during this period (Béland, 2007a; Carbó, Gardner, & Molyneux, 2005; Levitas, 2005; 
Leyshon & Thrift, 1995; Marron, 2013). Yet, the global adoption of financial inclusion by 
the end of the 2000s should not be attributed to the debates around financial and social 
inclusion in these specific contexts. As argued by one interviewee (Telephone Interview, 
February 2019): “Prior to around 2008, even before then, you know, there weren’t that 
many governments that were really embracing financial inclusion as a concept. But also, I 
should say they weren’t even necessarily embracing microfinance.” 
What caused the shift at the global level from a coalition built around microcredit 
and microfinance to one built around financial inclusion? In unpacking this transition, two 
dynamics become clear. First, many of the organizations involved with implementing or 
financially supporting microcredit and microfinance were integral to the construction of 
the financial inclusion agenda. However, the composition of the financial inclusion 
coalition expanded to include new non-state actors (such as those involved with 
telecommunications and mobile money) and regulators associated with the issue of 
financial integrity. This shift contributed to the ambiguity of the agenda and reflected 
changing ideas about the coordination effects associated with financial inclusion. Second, 
the shift in language and accompanying ambiguity of the financial inclusion agenda reflects 
the actions of a broad community of actors beyond any central entrepreneur. I outline each 






2.2.1 A Change in the Composition of the Supporting Coalition 
The financial inclusion agenda did not constitute an abandonment of microfinance as a 
mechanism through which financial services could be made more widely available. As 
noted by John Conroy in a report for the Foundation for Development Cooperation (2006, 
p. 9), “[t]he term ‘financial inclusion’ does not supersede the term ‘microfinance’ (even if 
it is designed to bury ‘microcredit’).” To expand access to financial services through both 
microfinance and new financial services programs, organizations operating in the 
development sector22 contributed to the construction and ambiguity of the FI agenda. Two 
empirical examples illustrate the connections between actors associated with the 
microcredit and microfinance coalitions and the subsequent financial inclusion coalition. 
They also demonstrate the growing emphasis placed on non-credit financial services and 
program experimentation, both of which built on similar dynamics associated with the 
microfinance agenda and contributed to the broader ambiguity of financial inclusion.  
The first example is the “Banking on Change” partnership between a global 
commercial bank (Barclays) and two international non-governmental organizations 
(CARE International UK and Plan UK). Launched in 2009, this unique partnership 
combined the collective expertise of each organization to develop new savings-led 
programs and facilitate linkages with formal financial institutions. Implemented across 11 
countries, the partnership worked with more than 500,000 people within three years (Plan 
UK, Barclays, and CARE International, 2013) and pioneered new potential programs for 
 
22 These actors include, for example, Western development agencies (e.g., USAID, DFID, GTZ), United 
Nations agencies (e.g., UNDP), and domestic and international civil society organizations (e.g., CARE, Save 





advancing financial inclusion.  Despite their starkly different interests in promoting 
financial inclusion (i.e., alleviating poverty versus expanding the customer base), the 
collaboration among these organizations created space for their individual interests while 
also adding to the (policy related) ambiguity of the financial inclusion agenda.23 In other 
words, an analytical focus on the material interests of financial firms and transnational 
capital explains part, but not all, of the coalitional politics underpinning the agenda.24 
A different example is the involvement of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 
After becoming active in the promotion of microcredit in the mid-2000s (Bruck, 2006), the 
scope of partners, projects, and financial services broadened as part of the shift to financial 
inclusion in the late 2000s.  In announcing a new effort to fund programs targeting payment 
and savings services, Melinda Gates described the activities of the Foundation and their 
partners as follows (Gates, 2010):  
[O]ur financial services partnerships may be the broadest, most diverse partnerships 
we have. Banks, microfinance institutions, mobile phone operators, regulators, 
retailers, and telecom companies. These are not sectors that typically work 
together... You are the people who will make the decisions that lead to financial 
inclusion. You can give poor families something very few of them have ever had: 
a tool that lets them use their own energy and talents to lift themselves out of 
poverty. You can give them savings.  
 
This again demonstrates the range of actors, interests, and programs that were brought 
together by “financial inclusion.” More specifically, both examples reveal the importance 
of non-credit related financial services and program experimentation by individual 
 
23 As noted in the program report (Plan UK et al., 2013, p. 23): “The Banking on Change partnership is 
committed to sharing its experiences with the Alliance for Financial Inclusion and central banks, to inform 
their thinking.” 





organizations (including private firms and civil society organizations) that helped to co-
produce the ambiguity of the global agenda. 
Notwithstanding the shifts occurring within the development sector, an additional 
departure from alternative theoretical explanations relates to the crucial changes occurring 
in the area of financial integrity. As well established elsewhere, the global anti-money 
laundering (AML) regime is central to global financial governance, albeit with outstanding 
concerns about its legitimacy and efficacy (Eggenberger, 2018; Sharman, 2011; Tsingou, 
2010; Vlcek, 2012). The power of the regime and the central global body, the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), is both discursive and material (Vlcek, 2012). In 2000, FATF 
first published a “blacklist” of “Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories” and 
encouraged compliance through a range of potential countermeasures (Eggenberger, 2018, 
p. 489). Notably, some of the FATF Forty Recommendations are tied to international 
criminal law and the Recommendations are included in the USA PATRIOT Act. The US 
Treasury department (and its AML bureau) are thus able to levy substantial financial 
penalties and sanctions against private firms and countries. Moreover, it is even possible 
to revoke a bank’s charter in the US when convicted of some money laundering offenses 
(Verdier, 2020, p. 32). 
During the transition from microcredit to financial inclusion in the 2000s, the 
relationship between the nascent global agenda and financial integrity was uncertain. Many 
elements of the AML regime, such as requirements for personal identification 
documentation, worked at cross-purposes to expanding access to financial services. To 
accommodate individuals who lacked adequate documentation, regulators experimented 





p. 366): “In a number of conference discussions, concerns were raised that these simplified 
measures eroded the quality of AML/CTF controls by providing criminals with backdoors 
into formal financial services.”  Indeed, this dynamic is aptly captured by the experience 
of South Africa during this period, where limited exemptions to domestic AML legislation 
were ineffective in reducing barriers to extending financial services (De Koker, 2006, pp. 
41-42). 
 In response to this uncertainty, a study was commissioned in 2005 to evaluate the 
relationship between financial inclusion and financial integrity in five countries (Indonesia, 
Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa).  After initially being circulated among officials 
at the FATF, its regional bodies, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2007, 
the final report was released in 2008. The first finding in the report states the following 
(Bester, et al., 2008, p. vi): 
The pursuit of financial inclusion and the pursuit of an effective AML/CFT regime 
are complementary and not conflicting financial sector policy objectives… Without 
a sufficient measure of financial inclusion, a country’s AML/CFT system will thus 
safeguard the integrity of only a part of its financial system – the formally registered 
part – leaving the informal and unregistered components vulnerable to abuse. 
Measures that ensure that more clients use formal financial services therefore 
increase the reach and effectiveness of the AML/CFT controls. 
 
This represents a significant change in perspective from the early 2000s, where the 
relationship between financial inclusion and financial integrity was viewed as more 
antagonistic.  
Importantly, changing ideas about the potential complementary relationship was 
not limited to researchers or bureaucrats. In a 2009 speech, the (2009-2010) President of 
the FATF, Paul Vlaanderen, delivered the following remarks (De Koker, 2011, p. 366):  
I do believe that the pursuit of financial inclusion and the pursuit of an effective 





sector policy objectives. Without a sufficient degree of financial inclusion, a 
country’s AML/CFT system will safeguard the integrity of only a part of its 
financial system – the formally registered part – leaving the informal and 
unregistered components vulnerable to abuse. 
 
These sentiments were echoed by his successor, Luis Urrutia Corral, who said the 
following at a 2010 speech (Urrutia Corral, 2010): “Over the years, signals have reached 
the FATF that the FATF Standard is in some ways an impediment to financial inclusion, 
and perhaps the aforementioned unique enforcement structure has encouraged regulators 
and legislators to follow the FATF standard strictly without taking into account the type of 
customers envisaged by the term ‘financial inclusion’.” In sum, the gradual incorporation 
of financial integrity into the agenda added to the outcomes already attributed to financial 
inclusion yet was not solely achieved through the use of strategic ambiguity by a central 
entrepreneur (such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor or the UN Capital 
Development Fund). Instead, the evidence suggests a learning process within the AML 
regime and a shift in beliefs about the complementarity between financial inclusion and 
financial integrity. Moreover, the power exercised by this constituency made it a critical 
addition to the coalition, a component of the larger process of agenda emergence that is 
often obscured by alternative historical materialist accounts (Soederberg, 2013, 2014a). 
 In summarizing the changes to the composition of the supporting coalition, an 
exhaustive record is not possible.25 However, to clarify the specific types of organizations 
that were mobilized around financial inclusion, I identify ten categories of actors and 
provide illustrative organizations in Appendix 1. These categories include: national 
 
25 Indeed, compiling a record of every organization during the 2000s that rhetorically supported financial 
inclusion or substantively supported the new agenda (through their program implementation, funding 





financial regulators; international and domestic non-governmental organizations; private 
firms; trade associations; private sector philanthropic foundations; development agencies; 
regional or global think tanks, initiatives, and advocacy organizations; multilateral 
financing and development organizations; United Nations agencies; and global standard-
setting bodies (SSBs). I also provide illustrative quotes from said organizations to 
demonstrate their motivating interests in financial inclusion.26 In addition to corroborating 
claims of broad support around the emerging financial inclusion agenda, this data also 
helps reveal how different organizations (and types of organizations) approached the 
agenda in different ways, ultimately contributing to the ambiguity around financial 
inclusion. For instance, the Banking with the Poor Network viewed financial inclusion as 
desirable for the advancement of economic development and human rights, the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development 
(UNSGSA) promoted links to poverty alleviation, women’s empowerment, and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the Bank of Namibia identified financial 
inclusion as integral to inclusive growth and financial stability. 
 
2.2.2 The Superiority of “Financial Inclusion” 
The second important dynamic underpinning the transition to the financial inclusion 
agenda is the shift in language and “branding.” The shift to financial inclusion cannot easily 
be attributed to the advocacy activities of any single actor. Indeed, in more than 30 
 
26 Although some organizations during this transition period continued to use the language of “microfinance,” 
their understanding of microfinance (as the use of a broad range of financial services) and the outcomes 
associated with the idea (poverty alleviation and economic development) are both consistent with and integral 





interviews with representatives from major international organizations, NGOs, private 
firms, and state agencies, the common response was some variation of, “you know, it’s sort 
of, one day we woke up and that’s what we were saying.” To be clear, this is indicative of 
the absence of a widely recognized central entrepreneur (as is often found in the creation 
of new norms or policy agendas) rather than a lack of agency on behalf of the actors who 
adopted the term.  
Even though the shift in language cannot be confidently attributed to a single actor, 
there is evidence of strategic framing by prominent organizations. For instance, one official 
(Telephone Interview, February 2019) noted the deliberate shift in language towards 
“inclusive financial sectors” during promotional activities by the UNCDF during the 2005 
Year of Microcredit. Secretary General Kofi Anan’s “tagline” for the year was prominently 
communicated in promotional activities: “The great challenge before us is to address the 
constraints that exclude people from full participation in the financial sector. Together, we 
can and must build inclusive financial sectors that help people improve their lives” (United 
Nations Capital Development Fund, 2006, p. 1). Subsequent reports (Helms, 2006; United 
Nations Capital Development Fund, 2006) echoed this shift in language while detailing the 
expansion of required retail financial services and broadening of the associated policies 
and organizations. In a speech recognizing these changes across the development sector, 
the United Nations Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance remarked (United Nations 
Secretary-General’s Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development, 2009): 
“This is why, where we used to talk mainly of ‘microcredit’ or ‘microfinance’, we now 
speak of ‘inclusive finance’. Inclusive finance means universal access, at a reasonable cost, 





In addition to credit, this range of financial services includes savings, mortgages, insurance, 
local and international money transfers, and so on.” 
Given the seemingly organic process by which actors were drawn to recognizing 
and adopting the language of financial inclusion during the 2000s, it is worth considering 
why alternative ideas and “brands” failed to generate such support. In other words, why 
financial inclusion and not “inclusive financial sectors,” “access to finance,” or “banking 
the unbanked”? The answer involves a combination of its emotionally appealing frame and 
the range of actors, activities, and outcomes that can be linked to the central idea.  As one 
interviewee (Personal Interview, Development Consultant, October 2019) explained: 
I do think that some of the other terms fell away in part, like I said, let’s look at it 
from a branding perspective. Financial inclusion flows off the tongue much better 
than, you know, banking the unbanked. And I think on that particular phrase, it’s 
not just about banking, and it’s not just the unbanked, it’s the underbanked. And, 
you know, I think that kind of fell by the wayside because it was too narrow and 
didn’t describe all of what we were trying to do. 
 
This precise rationale of financial inclusion constituting a more encompassing and 
malleable brand was later echoed in official reports from the Financial Action Task Force 
(which I discuss in Chapter 3).  
The language not only had implications for emotional appeal and targeted 
populations, but also the types of actors who could participate in the coalition. The tiered 
regulatory system in Ghana, for example, strictly manages which organizations could self-
identify as a “bank.” As one interviewee explained, the language or branding of ‘banking 
the unbanked’ could have unintended consequences: for those who were not legally 
recognized banks and were accustomed to strictly avoiding the “bank” label (lest they risk 
legal repercussions), “banking the unbanked” appeared to prevent their participation in the 





Ghana, August 2019). Similar dynamics are evident in the previous example involving 
Gates Foundation partnerships, where “financial inclusion” helped facilitate the 
involvement of mobile phone operators and telecommunications firms (among others). 
Notwithstanding the overlapping features across ideas (or “brands”), financial inclusion 
offered a preferable frame and incorporated a broader range of activities and outcomes.  
 Furthermore, the language used in communicating the agenda created ambiguity in 
the associated policies and anticipated outcomes. For instance, the preface for Building 
Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development (United Nations Capital Development Fund, 
2006, pp. iv-v) includes the following characterization of financial inclusion: “While there 
are areas of consensus, there are also many issues on which there are diverging views and 
different solutions in different countries. Individual countries need to design their own 
national strategies for financial inclusion.” As one interviewee (Personal Interview, 
Development Consultant, October 2019) argued: 
I think in the industry everybody would know what financial inclusion means. Um, 
I think to the extent that there is any deviation, it's more in the interpretation … I 
know what you mean by financial inclusion. That's the, you know, access to and 
provision of a diversity of financial services for people who are either under or 
unbanked. You would get some form of that definition from 999 out of a thousand 
people you talked to in the industry. I think where the deviation comes from is, 
okay, fine, but then what, to what end, right? 
 
This sentiment was echoed across interviews, albeit with differences in terms of the 
dimensions by which actors varied in their interpretation; while some individuals and 
organizations stressed differences in outcomes associated with greater financial inclusion, 
others noted differences with respect to specific policies or optimal regulatory approaches. 
Reflecting the apparent dissensus with respect to the interpretation of financial 





competing visions. Alternatively, perhaps an international organization or economically 
dominant state with enough authority or power might seek to impose a singular 
interpretation. Yet, during the 2000s (and continuing through its global adoption, as 
demonstrated in the following section), financial inclusion constituted a “broad church” 
(Personal Interview, Development Consultant, October 2019): 
I think that financial inclusion is a very broad church. Generally there aren’t a lot of 
fights in the church, not because everybody agrees, because … the church is so big. So, 
you might disagree with the guy up in the front, but you’re in pew 1000 at the back, so 
you don't know whether you disagree or not. … Not that everybody agrees, it's just that, 
you know, it has kind of become a catchphrase for a lot of things that don't necessarily 
conflict. 
 
This is not to suggest that central entrepreneurs are necessarily expected to have complete 
control over the agenda; rather, the ambiguity of the agenda was co-produced through the 
“broad church” and actions of civil society organizations and global South states. 
 
2.3 Achieving Global Adoption 
Notwithstanding the growing support for financial inclusion by the late 2000s among a 
range of development actors and within the AML regime, the establishment of the Alliance 
for Financial Inclusion (AFI) in 2008 and the G20 Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion (GPFI) in 2010 mark a significant turning point in the global recognition and 
adoption of financial inclusion. In addition, it reveals the importance of actors whose 
primary concerns were financial stability and financial integrity. The twin goals of stability 
and security were well established priorities in the governance of financial systems, in part 
due to the global implications of domestic failures. This section unpacks the processes by 
which the AFI and GPFI were created. It also reveals how ambiguity ensured that the 





these outcomes, were sufficiently integrated into the supporting coalition such that the idea 
of financial inclusion was globally embraced. 
 
2.3.1 Establishing the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) 
By the late 2000s, interview evidence suggests a recognition among global financial 
inclusion advocates (such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) that there was a 
need for greater inclusion of global South states in the coalition (Telephone Interview, May 
2018; Telephone Interview, February 2019).  Moreover, given the broad agenda of 
financial inclusion and its aim for some combination of institutional, regulatory, and policy 
reform, there was a clear need to ensure that policymakers supported the idea. From a 
coalitional perspective, this shift not only involved outreach to a constituency that may not 
share the same priorities as many of the global civil society organizations involved in the 
agenda at the time. It also served as an opportunity for state financial regulators and 
officials to shape the agenda in their favour.  The Alliance for Financial Inclusion was 
launched in 2008 with financial assistance from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
and a unique mandate of promoting financial inclusion among representatives of 
developing countries. In a brief press release celebrating the launch, the Gates Foundation  
noted that “nearly 100 central bankers and other financial policymakers” gathered for the 
launch of AFI and note that financial inclusion has been linked to “economic growth” and 
“financial stability” through increased access to “savings accounts and other financial 
services” (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009). 
Beyond its initial launch, the subsequent actions of AFI are instructive with respect 





earlier dynamics around microcredit and microfinance, support for financial inclusion 
entailed a broad set of policy or institutional reforms. A key function of AFI was serving 
as a knowledge sharing platform for policymakers and regulators, including the facilitation 
of large annual meetings and visits between members, as well as the tracking and 
publication of reform efforts (nearly 400 policy reforms were monitored and promoted by 
the organization, according to one interviewee; Telephone Interview, May 2018). This 
mission is aptly described by Yashwant Thorat, a senior AFI advisor (Groupe Speciale 
Mobile Association, 2009, p. 39):  
The most innovative and successful financial inclusion policies have originated 
from developing countries. The Philippines, for example, has pioneered mobile 
phone banking for the poor, while Brazil has made fantastic progress with agent 
banking. One of the problems, though, is that the knowledge and experience of 
these solutions is scattered across the globe. We need to bring together 
policymakers so they can share best practice and identify the most appropriate 
solutions for their countries’ individual circumstances. 
 
This understanding of AFI’s role and the nature of the financial inclusion agenda are 
illustrative in two ways. First, it highlights the source of ambiguity as a function of the 
disparate policies pursued by states throughout the global South rather than primarily as a 
strategic tool of AFI or other global entrepreneurs. Table 1 further corroborates this 
variation using contemporaneous survey results from 139 national regulators (Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor, 2009).27 Second, it also illuminates the North-South dynamics 
associated with the agenda. In other words, the construction of the agenda emphasized the 
agency and experiences of global South countries while also recognizing the need to further 
 
27 The specific policies identified in the survey provide a glimpse, rather than an exhaustive account, of 
policies associated with the agenda. For example, the survey provides little insight into policies related to 





tailor policies to specific country contexts. While AFI understood the value of 
accommodating diverse understandings of the policies and outcomes associated with 
financial inclusion, it was also the case that the agenda’s ambiguity was not strictly a 
product of AFI’s efforts to assemble global support. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Select Regulatory Policies Associated with Financial Inclusion 
(2009) 













to Open a Bank 
Account 
Proof of identity through 
government-issued 
identification 
83% 82% 84% 
Proof of identity through 
any identification 
29% 21% 33% 
Proof of nationality/legal 
status in country 
58% 50% 60% 
Proof of address 65% 55% 69% 
Proof of income 33% 11% 42% 
Proof of employment 36% 11% 46% 
Exception from 
requirements for low-
income applicants or small 
accounts 




Offer basic or low-fee 
account for low-income 
clients 
14% 21% 11% 
Encourage recipients of 
government transfers to 
open accounts 
29% 37% 26% 
Matched savings schemes 15% 32% 9% 
Tax incentive savings 
scheme 
29% 58% 19% 
Consumer 
Protection 
Limit on maximum interest 
rate 
29% 42% 24% 
Limit on maximum late 
payment penalty 





Limit on maximum 
maintenance fees 
14% 21% 12% 
Effective interest rate on 
loans must be disclosed 
76% 92% 70% 
Debit/credit account fees 
must be disclosed 
70% 89% 62% 
Reasons for denial of loan 
must be disclosed 
26% 21% 28% 
Change in terms 
unfavourable to account 
holder must be disclosed 
58% 82% 49% 
Plain language requirement 
must be disclosed 
44% 61% 38% 
Branch 
Banking 
Supervisor approval needed 
to open new branch 
65% 32% 78% 
Branches must operate a 
minimum number of 
working days per week 
32% 13% 40% 
Exceptions from 
requirements of bank 
security for poor areas 
10% 5% 12% 
Mobile branches permitted 55% 55% 54% 
Using Retail 
Networks 
Private operators can 
provide financial services at 
post offices 
27% 53% 17% 
Banks can formally contract 
companies as banking 
agents 
40% 47% 37% 
 
Note: Data from Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2009) survey of central bank 
officials with income classification manually assigned using historical World Bank country 
income classification (Bank fiscal year 2011, data for calendar year 2009). Percentages 
represent the percent of countries within that category with the policy. 
 
 
2.3.2 A Global Signal of Support: Creating the G20’s Global Partnership 
for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) 
The second pivotal development in the late 2000s was the endorsement of financial 
inclusion by the G20, culminating in the launch of the Global Partnership for Financial 





and transform the G20 into the lead entity in global economic governance, there was a 
recognized need among key members to also confront the perspective that the response to 
the crisis simply protected the interests of large corporations and financial institutions.  Led 
by the United States and others, financial inclusion officially landed on the G20 agenda in 
2009, which led to the creation of a “Financial Inclusion Experts Group” that consisted of 
a “SME Finance Sub-Group” and “Access Through Innovation Sub-Group.” According to 
officials with knowledge of the process (Telephone Interview, March 2019), this division 
represented an early example of a key conflict among participants: should financial 
inclusion efforts target small and medium enterprises or individuals? 
From the creation of the Financial Inclusion Experts Group in 2009 to the launch 
of the GPFI in 2010, additional points of debate or dialogue emerged. These often revolved 
around how to develop specific priorities for the work of the G20, given the particular 
organizational advantages of such a platform, the existing field of actors (i.e. not creating 
excessive overlap with existing work), and sifting through the range of potential policy 
interventions or institutional changes that might serve as the focal point for subsequent 
advocacy and action. To this end, interview participants acknowledged the influential role 
of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion (AFI) in helping to broaden the discussion around financial inclusion beyond 
more narrow interventions like microfinance or mobile banking. Further, participants 
sought to encourage an ongoing dialogue that would extend into the future and a set of 
policy or institutional changes that were context specific. Reflecting the novelty of the idea 
among many participants, middle income countries in the G20 were identified as a source 





experience with the idea of financial inclusion with respect to experimentation along a 
range of policy or institutional adaptations.  
The willingness to embrace a broad range of reforms and avoid strict definitions or 
policy prescriptions extended through the process to the final product, the GPFI Principles 
for Innovative Financial Inclusion (G20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group, 2010). 
Ambiguity was thus actively maintained and strongly contributed to the outcome 
(Telephone Interview, March 2019): 
[The Principles] were drafted in such a way that nobody would object to them and 
that there was no controversy. If they were instead drafted such that they were more 
practical, tangible, actionable, then people would have had to look at them in the 
context of their own countries and say, this works or this doesn’t work, they would 
have to bring those back to their respective governments, and have a real 
conversation about whether or not they were interested in applying those within 
their own government. And that’s where divisions would start to arise in the G20. 
… And so, staying at a high-level means that people were not offended and 
therefore did not really have to engage, it was sufficient for counties who didn’t 
really invest in the FI conversation to simply stay silent and let it happen, no harm 
done. Whereas again, if they were specific and actionable and relevant to their own 
countries, they may have had to intervene and take a more controversial view of 
them or confrontational view of them. 
 
The consensus-based nature of the G20 required broad agreement on the principles of the 
emergent agenda. By collectively constructing an ambiguous representation of financial 
inclusion, participants were able to avoid political conflicts that may have otherwise 
derailed the process. 
Not only did this process foster support for financial inclusion among G20 
participants, including key member countries and global standard-setting bodies, it did so 
in a manner that enhanced perceptions of the positive relationship between financial 
inclusion and key priorities, specifically financial stability and financial integrity. This was 





agenda. As argued in the previous section, for example, the global anti-money laundering 
regime exercises considerable power in the regulation of financial markets. Even if 
organizations associated with the regime do not constitute “entrepreneurs” of financial 
inclusion, their participation in the coalition is vital. According to one individual with close 
knowledge of the process, policymakers focused on financial integrity through the U.S. 
Treasury and, by extension, the Financial Action Task Force, were able to oppose or block 
development ideas if those ideas potentially conflicted with the objective of financial 
integrity (Telephone Interview, October 2019): “They were seen as the Darth Vaders in the 
room.” In other interviews (Telephone Interview, May 2018), the shifting relationship 
between financial inclusion and financial integrity was identified as a key factor 
underpinning European Union support for the idea at a global level.  
Consequently, the G20 process served as a crucial accelerator for this conversation, 
as multiple interviewees described how the process brought together both financial 
inclusion experts and newcomers, as well as individuals and organizations with different 
priorities or mandates.  This dialogue aided in linking financial inclusion with the goals of 
development, growth, integrity, and stability among key coalition actors at the global level.  
This is not to suggest, however, that there was a clear consensus among all participants 
about a strict hierarchy among objectives. In other words, some participants emphasized 
the link between financial inclusion and financial stability as more important for the 
elevation of the idea, while others stressed financial integrity. When compared to earlier 
efforts to mobilize a transnational coalition in support of microcredit and microfinance, the 
creation of AFI and the GPFI provide clear evidence about the importance of including 





stability – in order to achieve global adoption rather than simply maximizing the number 
of actors who support the agenda. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provide a more complete explanation of the origins of the global financial 
inclusion agenda than offered by extant historical materialist explanations. I rely on both 
interview and documentary evidence to evaluate rival theoretical expectations and trace 
key sequences of events over time and within organizations (such as the G20). In particular, 
I draw on interviews with individuals from or with direct knowledge of the 1997 
Microcredit Summit, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), the G20’s Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), Western and global South development 
agencies, financial regulatory authorities, and Ministries of Finance, and civil society 
organizations, commercial banks, philanthropic organizations, and global standard-setting 
bodies (SSBs). In addition to publicly available primary documents, I also make use of 
previously undisclosed documents acquired through freedom of information requests in 
Australia, Canada, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the United States. 
In contrast to historical materialist accounts of the emergence of the agenda, I 
demonstrate how ambiguity and coalitional politics were integral to the construction and 
global uptake of financial inclusion. More specifically, this chapter reveals how the 
construction of the agenda and global coalition cannot be attributed to the power of 
Western states and businesses, the dominance of credit-based financial services, or the 
underlying role of class conflict. Instead, I demonstrate that the creative actions and use of 





this ensured broad support and the inclusion of key constituencies (namely, those 
associated with financial stability and financial integrity) that produced a different and, 
ultimately, more successful coalition than those mobilized around microcredit and 
microfinance. While there is evidence of deliberate efforts by central entrepreneurs (such 
as the UNCDF) to broaden the language of the agenda, consistent with scholarship on 
“strategic ambiguity,” the resultant ambiguity cannot be entirely attributed to their actions. 
It is also evident that the emphasis by historical materialist accounts on the credit and a 
more narrow range of actors is not consistent with the diverse policies, outcomes, and 
actors associated with the agenda. Indeed, explanations of the construction of the agenda 
and its ambiguity must consider the agency of global South states and civil society 
organizations in the coalition building process. 
 By providing a more complete explanation of the origins of the financial inclusion 
agenda, this chapter addresses an outstanding question in the existing literature on the 
reasons for the ambiguity of the agenda (Dafe, 2020). However, the scope of this chapter 
leaves unaddressed important questions about the evolution of the agenda. More 
specifically, participatory ambiguity may provide a more compelling account of the 
agenda’s origins, but historical materialist explanations may instead provide greater insight 
into how the agenda has evolved over time. Indeed, the subsequent co-optation of the 
agenda by Western states or businesses would be entirely consistent with historical 
materialist accounts. Consequently, the following empirical chapters consider such 
possibilities from multiple perspectives by first examining how the agenda and supporting 





3 Embedding the Agenda Globally (2010-2020) 
 
While the creation of such entities as the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion 
(GPFI) and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) were key milestones in establishing 
the global financial inclusion agenda, their creation alone is insufficient to ensure the 
longevity of the agenda. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the nascent agenda might lose 
attention and support, leading to a quiet abandonment of financial inclusion as a global 
priority. Alternatively, it might be the case that the substance of the agenda is reshaped in 
ways that bears little resemblance to its creation in the 2000s. Consequently, it is important 
to consider the explanatory power of my argument beyond the initial uptake of the global 
agenda. 
 This chapter thus seeks to explain how the financial inclusion agenda and its 
supporting coalition was sustained beyond its origins. In so doing, I assess the extent to 
which participatory ambiguity and the mechanisms of quantification, institutional layering, 
and coordination effects provide a more compelling explanation than alternative accounts. 
On the one hand, historical materialist explanations emphasize the power and financial 
interests of Western states and businesses in shaping the substance of the agenda. As such, 
we would expect that even if the agenda was initially ambiguous, processes of co-optation 
may direct the agenda towards a greater focus on credit-based financial services.28 Further, 
the driving force behind the agenda following its adoption would be Western states and 
businesses rather than civil society or global South states. On the other hand, my own 
 
28 Illustrating this perspective, Soederberg (2014, p. 188) argues “that the G20 financial inclusion agenda is 
not a neutral project, but one that is aimed at constructing the dependence of the poor in the global South on 





argument places emphasis on the continued co-production of ambiguity and the facilitating 
role of language or branding in mitigating differences between coalition members. In 
addition, I expect the agenda to be consolidated through the use of quantification and 
benchmarking to rally support and communicate the agenda; the layering of new polices 
or guidelines among existing institutional arrangements; and the identification of 
coordination effects to facilitate the inclusion of new constituencies from outside the 
original coalition. 
 Empirically, the scope of the analysis in this chapter is limited to the evolution of 
the agenda in a global development context between 2010-2020. By limiting the analysis 
to the processes and actors interacting in the development space and at a global scale, I 
save a more rigorous assessment of the implementation of the agenda across national 
contexts and the integration of the agenda in new spaces for later chapters. I balance the 
insights gleaned from elite interviews with evidence gathered from primary documents 
when tracing the evolution of the agenda during this period. The interviews include 
individuals involved with or with direct knowledge of relevant intergovernmental 
organizations29, global standard-setting bodies (SSBs), civil society organizations30, and 
global North and South financial regulatory authorities. In some instances, especially in 
relation to global SSBs, interviews with officials involved in or knowledgeable of the 
 
29 Such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion 
(GPFI), and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI). 
30 Such as the Center for Financial Inclusion, the World Savings Bank Institute (WSBI), the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the World Economic Forum (WEF), CARE International, and 





internal dynamics of SSBs were required to be off the record. Consequently, I rely more 
heavily on the written record when presenting the evidence.  
The weight of evidence provides strong support for key elements of my own 
argument. The experiences and practices of global South countries helped shape the uptake 
of financial inclusion by the SSBs, especially the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), and the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF). Moreover, this “bottom-up” dynamic contributed to the 
ambiguity of the agenda (and lack of a single, comprehensive set of policy prescriptions). 
There is also strong evidence for the role of layering and the importance of coordination 
effects in relation to the incorporation of financial inclusion among the existing activities, 
standards, and guidance of the SSBs. The identification of coordination effects also helped 
expand the global coalition in new or unanticipated ways, namely through linkages with 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and objectives like combatting modern 
slavery. Further, there were widespread efforts to employ benchmarking and 
quantification, including (but not limited to) AFI and the World Bank. 
 The structure of this chapter proceeds in four sections. I first evaluate how the 
financial inclusion agenda was promoted to global SSBs and the response of organizations 
that are especially relevant to the agenda. Second, I consider how the agenda and its 
supporting coalition have evolved over time, revealing key tensions as well as the gradual 
incorporation of new actors and issues that are seemingly unrelated to financial services. 
In the third section, I demonstrate the integral role of benchmarking and quantification by 
both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The final section concludes 






3.1 Embedding the Agenda within Global Financial Governance 
An important avenue through which financial rules and norms become globally embedded 
is through the architecture, rules, and standards that constitute global financial 
governance31. Together, states, firms, international organizations, and epistemic 
communities write the rules that govern global financial markets. The processes that 
produce these rules are often described as transnational policy communities operating as a 
“club” (Gallagher, 2014; Lall, 2015; Tsingou, 2015) and through which ideas are promoted 
and exchanged (Blyth, 2013a; Grabel, 2017). Alternatively, scholars also identify how 
private interests “capture” regulation (Baker, 2010) and powerful states shape global 
regulatory efforts in favourable ways (Drezner, 2008; Posner, 2009). In this section, I argue 
that a pivotal step in consolidating the global financial inclusion agenda was its embrace 
by global standard-setting bodies (SSBs). Further, the uptake of the agenda by the SSBs is 
consistent with the framework of participatory ambiguity. I thus build on the argument 
offered in the previous chapter in which securing the support of the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) and officials associated with the anti-money laundering regime was crucial 
in first establishing the global agenda. 
It is important to acknowledge that some historical materialist scholarship has 
characterized the embrace of financial inclusion by the SSBs as a reflection of the material 
interests and power of transnational capital. For example, Soederberg (2014a, pp. 171-172) 
 
31 Germain (2001, p. 411) provides a helpful definition of key terms: “By ‘global financial governance’ I 
mean the broad fabric of rules and procedures by which internationally active financial institutions are 
governed, while the architectural element of governance I understand to be the public mechanisms by which 





argues: “Soft law has come to dominate most regulatory framings of financial inclusion in 
the neoliberal era… [S]oft law in the neoliberal era necessarily leads to the enhanced role 
of capitalists (individually as experts and collectively in epistemic communities) within 
public–private governance initiatives.” In contrast to this depiction of the SSBs and 
financial inclusion, this section instead demonstrates how ambiguity was partially co-
produced through the disparate regulatory arrangements and policy innovations often 
originating in the global South. 
Other scholars instead criticize the tepid embrace of financial inclusion by the 
global SSBs. Jones and Knaack (2019, p. 194), for instance, argue that existing approaches 
to financial inclusion fail to resolve tensions with other objectives while also 
disadvantaging the global South: 
We argue that the exclusive focus on financial stability has come, unnecessarily, at 
the cost of other important objectives, most notably that of financial inclusion. As 
with the two-tier system, the adverse consequences of the singular mandate of 
standard-setting bodies are felt most acutely by citizens of developing countries. 
This is most apparent in the area of anti-money laundering, where the 
implementation of international standards had negative repercussions for financial 
inclusion. Tension between financial stability and financial inclusion objectives has 
also emerged in the debate over how best to regulate non-bank credit 
intermediation, that is ‘shadow banking’. 
 
Importantly, however, this view of the uptake of the global financial inclusion agenda 
among SSBs is consistent with the argument advanced in this dissertation. On the one hand, 
the concept of participatory ambiguity directs attention to the co-production of ambiguity 
and its role in coalition formation and maintenance. In other words, the tensions observed 
by Jones and Knaack between financial inclusion and other objectives (specifically, 
financial stability and integrity) are mitigated through ambiguity. Disparate coalition 





(like the SSBs) but may not have a direct stake in financial inclusion, are thus able to secure 
space for their own interests and objectives within the broader coalition. On the other hand, 
the reform of the global architecture to better support financial inclusion32 need not only 
occur in the short-term; instead, processes of institutional layering that are currently 
situating financial inclusion among existing regulatory principles and rules may also 
produce long-term transformations. 
In the first subsection, I unpack the ways in which central organizations within the 
financial inclusion coalition – namely, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 
the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), and Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
(AFI) – advocated for greater recognition of financial inclusion among global SSBs. In the 
remaining subsections, I provide a more detailed account of the institutional evolution of 
three SSBs that are of greater relevance to the success of the agenda: the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure 
(CPMI)33, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
 
3.1.1 Promoting Financial Inclusion Among the Global Standard-Setting 
Bodies (SSBs) 
In the decade following the establishment of the global financial inclusion agenda, 
embedding the agenda among the work and standards of the global SSBs was a major 
 
32 Jones and Knaack (2019) suggest increasing the representation of developing countries in global SSBs or 
the creation of a new SSB with a focus on digital financial services and a dual mandate of financial inclusion 
and financial stability.  
33 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) was changed to the Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) in 2014 (Bank for International Settlements, n.d.). For the purposes of 





priority among organizations central to the financial inclusion agenda.  Five SSBs were of 
particular interest, although not all were equally relevant or impactful in the context of 
financial inclusion: the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS), the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI). During this period, CGAP, AFI, and the GPFI 
promoted the inclusion of financial inclusion as a complementary objective and, in many 
instances, sought the development of “proportionate”34 regulatory approaches and 
guidance. The activities of these organizations can be distinguished in three ways. First, 
GPFI established a dedicated sub-group at its creation to target regulation and standard-
setting bodies and it convened meetings, conferences, and workshops to facilitate 
coordination and collaboration on issues related to financial inclusion. Second, CGAP and 
AFI contributed to these collaborations by directly participating in meetings and through 
the production of advisory reports, guidelines, and white papers. Third, AFI used its 
position as a central body for national regulators throughout the global South to help 
provide country-specific evidence to the SSBs while also fostering knowledge sharing and 
learning among global South countries. I address each of these avenues in turn. 
 To encourage SSBs to engage with the financial inclusion agenda, the GPFI 
frequently organized opportunities for SSB officials to gather and receive input from each 
 
34 The concept of “proportionality” entails the balancing of costs and benefits of regulation while 
simultaneously promoting multiple objectives (e.g., financial inclusion, financial stability, and financial 
integrity). Regulatory arrangements that are designed to support one objective (e.g., financial stability) may 
hinder the concurrent pursuit of another (e.g., financial inclusion). What exactly constitutes “proportionate” 
varies by domain. For example, the waiving of certain anti-money laundering regulations for low-value 
transaction accounts or adjusting prudential regulatory requirements for new mobile money providers (United 





other and financial inclusion experts or organizations. These meetings were also a 
combination of well publicized events and closed-door meetings. While an exhaustive 
account of every meeting or event that occurred during the 2010s is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, the routinized nature and aim of the meetings are readily apparent.  For 
example, one summary of the events in the early 2010s reported (Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion, 2016a, p. 4): 
[T]hree closed-door meetings on financial inclusion, in 2011, 2012, and 2014, 
among the Chairs and Secretaries General of the SSBs covered in the 2011 GPFI 
White Paper (BCBS, CPMI, FATF, IADI, and IAIS), convened by the [UN 
Secretary-General's Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development] 
(Honorary Patron of the GPFI) and the Chair of BCBS. It also includes two GPFI 
conferences on standard-setting bodies and financial inclusion hosted by the 
Financial Stability Institute at the BIS in Basel, in 2012 and 2014, the latter in which 
IOSCO participated as well. 
 
To clarify, some of the meetings were part of a regularly scheduled series of conferences. 
More specifically, a biennial conference (GPFI Conference on Standard-Setting Bodies 
and Financial Inclusion) was launched in 2012. While the themes of each conference 
shifted, reflecting rapid changes in digital finance and financial technology, the 
overarching mission of fostering coordination and collaboration remained consistent. 
Further, these regular meetings helped maintain attention on the financial inclusion agenda 
while also reinforcing ideas about the complementarity between financial inclusion and a 
range of outcomes. Illustrating this dynamic, the first GPFI conference was acknowledged 
in the 2012 G20 Communique of finance ministers and central governors (Group of 20, 
2020) as follows: “We welcome the first GPFI Conference on Standard-Setting Bodies and 
Financial Inclusion as a substantial demonstration of growing commitment among 





explore the linkages among financial inclusion, financial stability, financial integrity and 
financial consumer protection.”  
 To support the activities of the GPFI and promote the financial inclusion agenda 
among the SSBs, both CGAP and AFI used their positions to shape the agenda through a 
variety of “state-of-practice” and technical reports.  In the first year following the creation 
of the GPFI, for instance, two projects were completed to highlight complementarities 
between financial inclusion and SSB mandates. Further, it was argued that each project 
“raises awareness and frames issues to inform ongoing work by the five SSBs to integrate 
financial inclusion into standards and guidance that can be effectively applied at the 
country level” (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2011, p. ii). First, AFI conducted five 
country case studies (Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, the Philippines, and South Africa) to 
communicate the unique regulatory approaches to financial inclusion across each context. 
Second, CGAP authored a report entitled Global Standard Setting Bodies and Financial 
Inclusion for the Poor – Towards Proportionate Standards and Guidance. It is important 
to recognize how the experiences and disparate practices across global South countries 
were amplified through this work. Further reinforcing the participatory dynamic observed 
during the initial uptake of the agenda in Chapter 2, the AFI report notes (2011, p. 19): 
Financial inclusion is one of the topics where the developed world stands to learn 
most from its developing counterparts. Financial inclusion therefore gives 
developing countries a voice on the international arena. Lessons from all the case 
study countries’ experiences to some extend feed into international platforms; at 
the same time regulators and supervisors watch whatever comes from the SSBs 
with interest to see if it can help them with the many regulatory and supervisory 






This dynamic – existing practices of global South countries informing the global agenda 
and contributing to (or co-producing) the agenda’s ambiguity – is also present in the work 
of the individual SSBs (discussed in greater detail below).  
 The production of such reports continued throughout the 2010s. For example, 
CGAP authored a follow-up report in 2016 entitled Global Standard-Setting Bodies and 
Financial Inclusion: The Evolving Landscape (Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, 
2016a). In addition to highlighting the embrace of financial inclusion by the SSBs since 
the first report in 2011, the 2016 report also emphasizes the new opportunities and 
challenges created by digital financial services and the need for greater attention to 
proportionate (or risk-based) approaches to regulation (both of which are discussed in 
greater detail in the following sub-sections). Through the publishing of such reports, in 
addition to direct engagement with SSBs and participation in the aforementioned meetings 
and conferences, CGAP sought to shape the incorporation of the financial inclusion agenda 
into existing SSB activities. In so doing, CGAP also sought to channel the experiences of 
countries throughout the global South into SSB discussions around financial inclusion. 
Figure 2 depicts CGAP’s own understanding of this “theory of change” in their activities 





Figure 1: CGAP Theory of Change (Global Policy Architecture Initiative), 2014-
2018 
 
Notes: The source of the figure is the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2018). The 
figure includes the following acronyms: Emerging Market and Developing Economies 
(EMDEs), Financial Inclusion, Stability, Integrity, and Protection (I-SIP). 
 
 
Finally, the AFI enjoyed a unique position insofar as its broad membership across 
the global South and direct access to SSBs enabled it to facilitate knowledge sharing in 
multiple directions. On the one hand, AFI gathered evidence from its diverse membership 
and channeled that information into SSB discussions, such as through the country case 
studies described above (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2011). Indeed, at a joint G24-
AFI meeting in 2013, global South participants called for greater collaboration between the 
SSBs and global South countries. Amando Tetangco Jr., Governor of the Central Bank of 
the Philippines and Chair of the AFI Steering Committee, stated (Alliance for Financial 





application, they were originally not established with financial inclusion as a consideration; 
which can lead countries to adopt conservative approaches that limit innovation. The SSBs 
themselves need to learn, in parallel with us, how to manage emerging and evolving risks 
that financial inclusion brings.” Tetangco Jr. built on this call for collaboration in his 
summary remarks, noting (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2013, p. 6): “There is a 
compelling case for peer learning between AFI and SSBs. At the onset, the end-product 
can be information sharing and advisory support, instead of actual issuance of more 
guidance papers.” Although there is ample opportunity to further strengthen the inclusivity 
of SSB policymaking processes, as argued by Jones and Knaack (2019), a key success of 
AFI remains its capacity to help bring global South knowledge and experiences into the 
discussion. 
 On the other hand, AFI also organized internal mechanisms to facilitate knowledge 
sharing among member states while simultaneously informing the SSBs. For the duration 
of the 2010s, a working group (Global Standards Proportionality Working Group 
[GSPWG]) within AFI facilitated peer learning, the creation of reports and guidance, and 
a dialogue with the SSBs. Although the working group initially focused primarily on 
financial integrity issues (and was known as the Financial Integrity Working Group from 
2010-2014), the remit expanded in 2014 to cover issues of proportionality across all 
regulatory domains. According to AFI (Newnham, 2020): “A key role of GSPWG has been 
in contributing AFI member perspectives into the global dialogue with SSBs… Elevating 
the global voice of AFI members led to FATF announcing in 2014 that de-risking actions 
were not consistent with the risk-based approach to AML/CFT, and the establishment of a 





should not be interpreted as conclusive evidence that the actions of FATF were solely 
attributable to the AFI working group), it usefully illustrates the role of AFI as an avenue 
for financial inclusion promotion among the SSBs. 
 Collectively, these three avenues generated two “waves” of activity among the 
SSBs in the early 2010s and then mid-2010s. These waves consisted of new guidance for 
regulators and financial services providers on how to incorporate financial inclusion 
objectives in the context of existing standards and regulations. The following sub-sections 
take a more detailed look at the activities of the three most relevant SSBs.  
 
3.1.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
As the main global standard setter for bank regulation and supervision, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has played a central role in global financial 
governance since its creation in 1974. Most noted for its development and promotion of its 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision35 and the Basel Capital Accord36, the 
primary mandate of the BCBS and national financial regulators is financial stability. 
Reflecting this focus, both the goal of financial inclusion and consideration of financial 
service providers most likely to be at the forefront of advancing financial inclusion were 
historically absent from the work of the BCBS. 
 
35 Typically referred to as the Core Principles, they have been updated several times since their creation, most 
recently in 2012. The Core Principles cover a range of issues, including the supervisory powers and actions 
of financial authorities and compliance with global standards of bank supervision (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2012). 
36 The Basel Accords have received substantial attention in the international political economy literature 
(Chalmers, 2017; Pagliari & Young, 2014; Young, 2012) and have gone through three iterations: their 
creation in 1988 (Basel), an update in 2004 (Basel II), and a major revision following the global financial 





The first attempt by the BCBS to consider financial inclusion in any manner 
formally began in 2008 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016). At that time, 
the International Liaison Group and Microfinance Workstream within the BCBS surveyed 
both member and non-member jurisdictions to better understand the range of regulatory 
practices employed to manage microfinance activities (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2015). In so doing, microfinance activities were evaluated through the lens of 
the 2006 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, which were intended to 
provide a “minimum standard” for appropriate prudential regulation and financial sector 
supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2019). The resulting report, 
Microfinance Activities and the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, was 
published in 2010 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). Notwithstanding the 
explicit (and arguably narrow) focus on microfinance, this report constituted “the first set 
of guidelines issued by the Basel Committee related to financial inclusion” (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015, p. 3). The general position of the guidelines are 
clear (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010, p. 1): “In general, microfinance 
oversight, whether over banks or other deposit taking institutions, should weigh the risks 
posed by this line of business against supervisory costs and the role of microfinance in 
fostering financial inclusion.” In line with the mandate of the BCBS, the assessment of 
microfinance activity focused predominantly on risk evaluations with respect to financial 
stability. Interestingly, a key finding of the guidelines was the lack of clear definitions of 
microfinance and microcredit, both internationally and even within the regulatory 
arrangements of surveyed countries (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). 





effective) application of regulatory standards (such as licensing regimes, the size and 
composition of loan portfolios, and capital requirements). 
 A more substantial effort to engage with the financial inclusion agenda occurred as 
part of the “second wave” of SSB activity. In mid-2013, a “Range of Practice Survey” was 
completed by 52 regulatory authorities37 to “capture the current regulatory and supervisory 
approaches towards financial institutions and activities that are relevant to financial 
inclusion” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015, p. 5). The subsequent report 
reflected the work of the BCBS Workstream on Financial Inclusion38, which included 
representatives from several central banks and national regulators (including the 
Philippines, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, and Saudi Arabia), the Association of 
Supervisors of Banks of the Americas, the World Bank, the BCBS Secretariat, and the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015, p. 57). The key takeaway from the survey was not a set of “best practices”; indeed, 
the authors of the report were explicit that their intention was not to formulate a set of best 
practices (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015, p. 4). Instead, the survey 
“revealed significant variation among respondents on the number of different categories of 
financial institutions reaching (or potentially reaching) unserved and underserved 
customers, the number of institutions in each category, and the number and type of 
 
37 The responding authorities were broadly distributed with respect to the level of economic development (13 
from the Americas, 13 from Europe and Central Asia, 2 from the Middle East, 12 from East Asia and the 
Pacific, 3 from Southern Asia, and 15 from Sub-Saharan Africa) and region (18 high income, 14 upper-
middle income, 14 lower-middle income, and 13 low income) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2015, p. 5). 
38 The Workstream on Financial Inclusion was created in 2013 to help the BCBS gain a better understanding 
of country contexts and cross-sectoral issues related to financial inclusion (Global Partnership for Financial 





supervisory authorities” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016, p. 4). In other 
words, the survey (and accompanying report) suggests significant cross-national variation 
in the regulatory arrangements and range of private firms and non-governmental 
organizations associated with expanding access to financial services. 
 Reflecting the insights from the survey, the BCBS issued official guidance on 
advancing the financial inclusion agenda while implementing the 2012 Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision39. More specifically, the guidelines addressed the 
implementation of 19 (of 29) Core Principles in relation to financial inclusion, spanning 
supervisory approaches and techniques, licensing and permissible activities, and prudential 
regulation and requirements. Central to the objectives of the guidelines was the role of 
“digital financial inclusion.”  
The guidelines sought to aid regulatory authorities in navigating the rapid 
development of digital financial services, including a host of new products and providers. 
Consider, for example, the role of new electronic money (“e-money”) that built on the 
widely heralded success of m-Pesa in Kenya (Tyce, 2020). As noted by the BCBS (2015, 
p. 30) report: “[T]he new digital transactional platforms that are emerging in many 
countries – and the additional financial services targeting poor and low-income customers 
that they can leverage – introduce new market participants and allocate roles and risks (both 
new and well known) in different ways.” In practice, some examples of this dynamic 
include the outsourcing of account management and processing by banks to third parties 
 
39 The 2012 Core Principles (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012) are an updated and revised 
version of the 2006 Core Principles and were adopted following extensive review and consultations in the 





or non-bank e-money issuers (such as mobile network operators or payment card issuers) 
providing direct services to customers while the customers’ actual funds are held by banks 
or other financial institutions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015, p. 16).  
In light of the increasing role of non-bank financial service providers in both the 
financial inclusion agenda and financial sectors more generally, the guidelines were 
intended to help regulators apply the Core Principles to non-bank financial institutions 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016, p. 2). New market participants and 
services “disrupted” financial sectors as well as traditional regulatory approaches and 
frameworks. Stated more simply, financial regulators must determine how to regulate firms 
that look and act like banks but may not fit the traditional “mold” of a bank. In turn, there 
are important consequences for advancing the financial inclusion agenda, especially as 
such “non-banks” are often at the forefront of expanding access to all types of financial 
services. Reflecting the view that advancing financial inclusion entailed a host of potential 
outcomes, the guidelines attempted to clarify how a proportionate application of the Core 
Principles could support greater financial inclusion while also ensuring financial stability, 
financial integrity, and consumer protection (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2016, p. 2). This final point corresponds with a crucial insight of participatory ambiguity 
and the broader argument of the dissertation. The co-production of ambiguity linked 
multiple outcomes (like financial stability and financial integrity) with the central idea of 






3.1.3 The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure (CPMI) 
Created in 1990, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure (CPMI) is housed 
within the Bank for International Settlements and is tasked with promoting, monitoring, 
and analyzing payment systems and high-value payments. In so doing, the committee 
supports efforts to ensure financial stability and serves as the primary global standard setter 
in this area. A number of guidelines and principles have been developed by the committee 
(often in coordination with other SSBs), including the Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems (2001), Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement 
Systems (2005), and Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (2012). As noted by 
the GPFI (2011, p. 3) white paper on SSBs, “[i]n principle, all the work of [CPMI] is 
potentially positively correlated with the goal of financial inclusion to the extent that 
implementation of relevant [CPMI] standards and guidance leads to a larger share of the 
population benefiting from better quality payment services at a lower cost.” In practice, 
some of the committee’s work in the 2000s was tangentially related to financial inclusion, 
such as the General Principles for International Remittance Services (jointly developed 
with the World Bank in 2007), but the CPMI more clearly joined the “second wave” of 
SSB activities on financial inclusion. 
 In light of the rapid development of mobile phone technology in the 2000s and the 
potential use of the technology to reach financially excluded populations, the CPMI formed 
a Working Group on Innovations in Retail Payments in 2010. This working group initially 
sought to catalogue and assess new technology and policy responses related to retail 





implications of retail payments for financial inclusion in detail.40 Their report summarizes 
the essential role of payment services in the financial inclusion agenda (Committee on 
Payments and Market Infrastructures, 2012, p. 16): 
Financial inclusion is increasingly a topic of political relevance for national 
governments and international forums. About one fifth of the reported innovations 
aim at financial inclusion, either under a government mandate or because of new 
business opportunities opened up by an untapped market. They tend to focus on 
mobile payments, innovations in the use of card payments and improvements in 
infrastructure and security (eg business correspondents/agents). Even if most 
reported innovations are designed for the domestic market, some might also be used 
for cross-border remittance payments. 
 
Further, the report also acknowledges two primary challenges to promoting financial 
inclusion from the perspective of retail payments. First, payment services for financially 
excluded populations have historically been an unprofitable business venture given the 
small value of such payments and the inability of customers to pay significant fees. Second, 
some solutions required payment service providers to comply with anti-money laundering 
regulations, which posed serious compliance costs. Notably, the analysis of the situation 
called for greater government involvement, as supporting financial inclusion (understood 
as access to payment services) constituted an issue of social welfare (Committee on 
Payments and Market Infrastructures, 2012, p. 34): “[I]t is not guaranteed that the market 
can provide such solutions [for financial exclusion]. A poor business case, or market failure 
 
40 In seeking to define financial inclusion, the report cites the “Blue Book” by UNDESA and UNCDF 
following the 2005 UN Year of Microcredit, identified in Chapter 2 as a critical point of transition in the 
global language around financial inclusion (Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, 2012, p. 
33): “The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (see Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development (the ‘Blue Book’ (2006)) 
define financial inclusion indirectly by defining an inclusive financial sector as one that provides access to 





or regulatory obstacles, might prevent the market from realising such developments. In 
such situations, there might be a role for government if it aims to increase welfare.”  
Follow up work by the CMPI further considered the role of non-banks in retail 
payment services (such as telecommunication firms). Reflecting the challenges outlined 
above, the report focused on how cooperation and competition between and among bank 
and non-banks can improve financial inclusion (Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures, 2014). Notably, the findings of the report both reflected the disparate 
circumstances and approaches across the world and avoided any “one-size-fits-all” 
recommendations: “Because the degree to which non-banks are involved in retail payments 
varies widely among jurisdictions, the report has not identified any single preferred 
approach central banks may take in relation to non-banks in retail payments” (Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion, 2016a, p. 23). As was the case with the BCBS “range 
of practice” surveys, the ambiguity surrounding how to think about and address the issues 
at hand were partially a function of the existing practices among global South countries. 
Further, the source of conflict identified within the report is primarily sectoral, as banks 
and non-banks (broadly defined) increasingly come into competition within the retail 
payments space41.  
 The CPMI subsequently engaged more directly with issues related to financial 
inclusion through joint work with the World Bank. The CPMI-World Bank Group Task 
Force on the Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion (PAFI) was launched in 2014 and 
their report, Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion (Committee on Payments and Market 
 





Infrastructures and World Bank, 2016), was intended to provide a holistic assessment of 
both the payment system and specific modalities (such as e-money). While the Task Force 
adopted a broad view of the types of services associated with financial inclusion, they also 
note that “practically all of these services (ie credit, savings and investments) are tied or 
linked to transaction accounts” (Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and 
World Bank, 2016, p. 4). The resulting “guiding principles” covered a range of issues 
identified by the Task Force as integral to advancing financial inclusion, targeting both 
governments and market participants. The principles include the use of sustained and 
explicit commitments42, greater regulatory support for both product innovation and 
consumer protection, improving payment infrastructure (and interoperability), and 
leveraging large or recurrent payments (like remittances, government-to-person payments, 
and company salaries and wages) to stimulate access to and use of financial services. 
Following the report, the Task Force was reconvened in 2018 to provide additional 
guidance on the application of the original principles, develop a measurement framework 
for quantifying and benchmarking progress, and consider new developments related to 
financial technology (fintech) (Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and 
World Bank, 2020a, 2020b). 
The evolution in thinking within the CPMI is illustrated by Agustín Carstens 
(General Manager, Bank for International Settlements). Speaking on the relationships 
between financial regulatory authorities, payments services, and financial inclusion, 
Carstens (2019) summarized the dynamic as follows: 
 
42 The Task Force called for greater use of benchmarking and quantification, but further discussion of this 





It is thus a necessary condition for financial inclusion that central banks fulfil their 
core mandate. Yet it is not sufficient… New technology can play a crucial role in 
breaking down barriers for both citizens and financial institutions. To foster this 
process, central banks and financial authorities must provide the right 
infrastructure. This includes hard or physical infrastructure such as payment and 
settlement systems, as well as soft or “contextual” infrastructure such as rules and 
guidelines that let the full benefits of the technology be captured while protecting 
its users. Central banks and innovators are vital partners: one cannot achieve 
financial inclusion without the other’s help. 
 
This statement is remarkable for two reasons. First, it suggests that the pursuit of core 
mandates – namely, financial stability and financial integrity – are necessary but 
insufficient for also promoting financial inclusion. In other words, regulators must consider 
the ways in which these goals are interconnected and the potential unintended 
consequences of different regulatory arrangements. Second, Carstens explicitly recognizes 
the coalitional nature of the agenda’s success; regulators and “innovators” must work 
together in some capacity to effectively achieve financial inclusion. Crucially, this 
collaboration does not require different actors to share the same interests and interpretation 
of the agenda.  
 
3.1.4 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
Through its support of the financial inclusion agenda in the late 2000s, the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) played an early and critical role in the agenda’s emergence. Indeed, as 
argued in Chapter 2, changing views about the relationship between financial inclusion and 
financial integrity (from a conflicting to mutually supporting relationship) featured 
prominently in the speeches made by FATF officials during this period. Moreover, the 
power of the global anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML-CTF) 





subsequent consolidation of the agenda. The GPFI white paper (Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion, 2011, p. 9) acknowledges this through evidence gathered from five global South 
country case studies: “All country case studies identified the FATF as the SSB with the 
most significant impact on regulatory innovation in relation to financial inclusion.” This 
statement is further corroborated by case studies presented later in this dissertation 
(specifically, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
 The embrace of financial inclusion by FATF featured prominently in the “first 
wave” of SSB activity. Most notably, the FATF guidance paper Anti-money laundering 
and terrorist financing measures and Financial Inclusion was published in 2011. As 
acknowledged in the paper (Financial Action Task Force, 2012, p. 8), it originated under 
the FATF Presidency of Mexico but followed interest in the issue by the Presidency of the 
Netherlands (Paul Vlaanderen, 2009-2010).  In developing the guidance paper, FATF 
relied on broad consultations with FATF members and non-member states, as well as a 
range of private sector firms and associations (such as the World Savings Banks Institute, 
World Council of Credit Unions, commercial banks, telecommunications firms, and 
microfinance institutions) and organizations closely associated with the financial inclusion 
agenda (CGAP, AFI, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). Both the intended 
audience of the guidance and its broad purpose was made clear in the paper (Financial 
Action Task Force, 2011, p. 9): “The paper primarily aims at supporting efforts among 
competent authorities, across sectors and across jurisdictions that promote the 
complementarity of AML/CFT and financial inclusion.” 
 The substance of the guidelines is instructive in several ways. First, the guidelines 





of language and branding, and the specific understanding of the agenda endorsed by the 
FATF (2011, p. 12): 
While there is a growing consensus regarding the importance of financial inclusion, 
the same consensus does not exist around its definition, which can vary depending 
on the national context and on the stakeholders involved. From “banking the 
unbanked” to “branchless banking,” a variety of catch phrases are sometimes used 
as near synonyms for financial inclusion, when in fact they describe specific aspects 
of a broader concept. In general terms, financial inclusion is about providing access 
to an adequate range of safe, convenient and affordable financial services to 
disadvantaged and other vulnerable groups, including low income, rural and 
undocumented persons, who have been underserved or excluded from the formal 
financial sector. It is also, on the other hand, about making a broader range of 
financial services available to individuals who currently only have access to basic 
financial products. Financial inclusion can also be defined as ensuring access to 
financial services at an affordable cost in a fair and transparent manner. For 
AML/CFT purposes, it is important that these financial products and services are 
provided through financial institutions subject to adequate regulation in line with 
the FATF Recommendations. 
 
Not only do the guidelines acknowledge the multiple understandings of financial inclusion 
that exist among coalition members (i.e., different countries or stakeholders), but they also 
describe the appeal of “financial inclusion” in terms of its broader framing (a point 
described in almost identical terms by an interviewee in Chapter 2). Further, the specific 
interpretation of financial inclusion adopted by the FATF focuses on the provision of 
financial services through institutions that are effectively regulated in line with FATF 
Recommendations43.  
 Second, the central thrust of the guidelines is to clarify how a “risk-based approach” 
(RBA) to implementing FATF Recommendations is conducive to simultaneously 
promoting financial inclusion and financial integrity. The fundamental idea behind an RBA 
 
43 As described in greater detail in Chapter 2, the FATF Recommendations are the global standards created 





is that the activities of both national regulators and financial service providers should be 
informed by different types of risk. For example, constructing and applying “Know Your 
Customer” policies (requiring customer identification and verification to conduct different 
types of transactions) may vary by the size and nature of the transaction (e.g., depositing a 
pay cheque to a bank account versus high value cross-border remittances). However, a lack 
of clarity around the definition of “low risk”, combined with the material (financial or 
criminal) consequences of running afoul of the AML regime, created an ongoing source of 
tension among financial regulators and financial service providers (Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion, 2011, p. 11). I further elaborate on this dynamic in section 3.3. 
 Throughout the 2010s and the “second wave” of SSB activity, the FATF continued 
to actively update its guidance to ensure the central AML-CTF standards could be 
implemented in a complementary fashion with financial inclusion objectives. Following a 
major update and expansion of the FATF Recommendations in 2012 (Financial Action 
Task Force, 2012), a similar update to its financial inclusion guidance was published in 
2013 (Financial Action Task Force, 2013). Additional supplementary guidance was also 
published in 2017 (Financial Action Task Force, 2017). These updates often focused on 
the changing nature of financial service provision (particularly new financial technologies 
and digital finance) and their implications for AML-CTF and financial inclusion. 
Notwithstanding the effort to ensure the financial inclusion guidance remained relevant 
and consistent with the broader anti-money laundering standards, the central message 
remained largely unchanged: financial integrity and inclusion are complementary 
objectives best achieved through the design and application of risk-based assessments 






3.2 The Evolution of the Global Agenda and Coalition 
In shifting attention beyond the original creation of the global financial inclusion agenda, 
a key consideration is the extent to which the agenda and the supporting coalition evolved 
over time. The previous section (3.2) partially addressed this dynamic through a focus on 
the global standard-setting bodies (SSBs). Notwithstanding the importance of the SSBs, it 
is crucial to interrogate the substance of the agenda and membership within the coalition 
which extends beyond such elite networks. To this end, I first evaluate an oft-cited source 
of tension and contestation as the financial inclusion agenda evolved: “de-risking” 
practices by global financial institutions. I then consider how the agenda and coalition 
expanded over time through a focus on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
the role of coordination effects.  
 
3.2.1 Tensions in the Coalition: The Challenge of “De-Risking” 
A recurrent theme throughout the emergence and evolution of the global financial inclusion 
agenda is the relative absence of open conflicts or opposition. Indeed, when inquiring with 
interviewees on who opposes the agenda and why, the typical response is one of confusion. 
Whether due to the branding (who could oppose greater “inclusion”?) or the ambiguity of 
the agenda, the fact remains that there is little evidence of organized opposition to the 
agenda itself. Importantly, however, this is not to suggest that the agenda is apolitical or 
without conflict altogether. Instead, the nature of conflicts often revolves around “de-
risking” practices at the global level and inter-sectoral regulatory conflicts at the domestic 





the benefits of ambiguity while also casting doubt on the explanatory power of historical 
materialism.44 
 First of all, what is de-risking? According to the Financial Inclusion Task Force 
(2014), de-risking can be understood as follows: 
Generally speaking, de-risking refers to the phenomenon of financial institutions 
terminating or restricting business relationships with clients or categories of clients 
to avoid, rather than manage, risk in line with the FATF’s risk-based approach. De-
risking can be the result of various drivers, such as concerns about profitability, 
prudential requirements, anxiety after the global financial crisis, and reputational 
risk. It is a misconception to characterise de-risking exclusively as an anti-money 
laundering issue. 
 
In practice, de-risking often takes the form of the reduction or elimination of correspondent 
banking relationships (CBRs). Correspondent banking is a service where customers with a 
bank in one jurisdiction can make use of financial services through a bank in another 
jurisdiction, with the customers’ “home” bank serving as the intermediary.45 As described 
previously (Chapter 2), the global anti-money laundering regime exercises significant 
material and symbolic power in global financial governance. The AML regime is capable 
of imposing significant financial and reputational harms on global financial institutions 
who violate the accompanying AML regulations through correspondent banking 
 
44 Given the analytical focus of each chapter, inter-sectoral regulatory conflicts are addressed in detail in the 
Ghanaian case study (Chapter 5). 
45 The International Compliance Association provides a useful example (Prentice, 2019): “[L]et’s say 
Company A holds an account with Bank B based in the UK. Company A decides to open a buying office in 
India and needs to pay suppliers and staff working in that office. As Bank B is in the UK and has no presence 
in India, it cannot provide the payment services required. However, it can open a correspondent account with 
Bank C based in Mumbai which will conduct the transactions required by Company A. In this example, 





relationships. For instance, HSBC was fined $1.92 billion (USD) in 2012 by the United 
States for its involvement in money laundering schemes (Viswanatha & Wolf, 2012).46 
 By the mid-2010s, de-risking became a major priority among global and domestic 
financial regulators, financial firms, and civil society organizations. In part, this reflected 
greater research and data on the extent to which global banks were engaging in de-risking. 
For example, a 2015 report by the World Bank found that 75% of surveyed financial 
institutions had reduced their correspondent banking relationships (World Bank, 2015). 
However, public attention was arguably more strongly driven by high-profile cases of de-
risking that garnered international media attention. 
Aptly illustrating this dynamic was the long-running conflict involving Barclays 
and remittances between the United Kingdom and Somalia. In 2013, Barclays announced 
it was terminating accounts with four Somali money transfer services, including the largest 
operator in the Somali regions (Hassan & Liberatore, 2016). This posed a considerable 
threat to people living in Somalia. According to one set of estimates, approximately 40% 
of the Somali population depended on remittances and roughly $2 billion (one-third of the 
GDP) comes from small money transfers (Tran, 2013). At the time, Tom Keating (a former 
banker) described the situation as follows (IRIN News, 2013):  
The amount of compliance work we had to do went through the roof. I counted up 
the number of terrorism finance and money laundering trainings I had to do over 
my last 18 months, and it was 15. We were told all the time, ‘Avoid any business 
that involves cash transfers. Avoid any business that involves third party 
involvement - in this case money going via Dubai to somewhere else.’… What’s 
happening now is collateral damage from a regulatory environment which has gone 
way out of control since 9/11. 
 
 





Further, in a press statement, Barclays cited the risk of being fined “many hundreds or 
potentially billions of pounds” as justification for their actions (IRIN News, 2013). Yet the 
decision was met with an immediate backlash in which the Somali diaspora community 
worked with trade associations, academics, and non-governmental organizations 
(including Oxfam) to pressure the UK government to intervene and Barclays to reverse 
course (Hassan & Liberatore, 2016). 
 The actions of Barclays and de-risking practices more generally intersect with the 
global financial inclusion agenda in several ways. First, an explicit focus of the global SSBs 
when endorsing financial inclusion was the development of proportionate regulatory 
guidelines. This was especially true for the Financial Action Task Force. Nevertheless, the 
ambiguous ways in which FATF (and other SSBs) provided guidance for applying their 
standards in a proportionate manner (i.e., using “risk-based approaches”) provided 
insufficient clarity for businesses to navigate the regulatory arrangements without 
jeopardizing financial inclusion objectives. Moreover, the cost-benefit analysis for many 
businesses was straightforward, given the steep financial penalties associated with the 
AML regime and the comparative minimal profits to be gained from providing financial 
services to populations that are traditionally excluded. In response, global SSBs, the G20, 
domestic regulators, and industry associations viewed de-risking as a “major imperative” 
and sought ways to mitigate de-risking practices without undermining the goals of financial 
inclusion, financial integrity, and financial stability (Woodsome et al., 2018). 
 Second, the nature of the conflict contradicts key expectations from historical 
materialist accounts. On the one hand, de-risking primarily involves financial services 





context, credit-based financial services have little bearing on the politics around financial 
inclusion. In addition, the scale of the problem (both in terms the number of global banks 
engaged in de-risking and the attention paid by domestic and global regulators, 
international organizations, and civil society organizations) makes it difficulty to 
characterize de-risking and payment services as of secondary importance to credit-based 
financial services. On the other hand, the conflict essentially entails civil society 
organizations seeking to ensure global banks continue to offer financial services to 
vulnerable populations. For instance, one Oxfam report on the issue describes the situation 
as follows (Durner & Shetret, 2015, p. 3): “In such clear instances of market failure, either 
government or the public sector must intervene to re-align market factors, either through 
incentive programs or through enhanced regulatory guidance.” Together, the evidence 
related to de-risking suggests a more theoretically nuanced approach is required to account 
for the politics at hand. 
 
3.2.2 Expanding the Agenda and Coalition 
The preceding section (3.2) provided detailed evidence of the incorporation of global 
standard-setting bodies into the financial inclusion coalition. Central to this process, both 
during the initial emergence of the agenda (Chapter 2) and then the period of consolidation 
in the 2010s, was the role of coordination effects. In other words, the recognition of 
mutually beneficial relationships between financial inclusion and other financial objectives 
enabled the expansion of the supporting coalition to include new constituencies. 
Summarizing these developments with the SSBs, Robin Newnham (Head of Policy 





progress has been made in aligning the goals of financial stability, integrity and inclusion 
to the mutual benefit of each policy objective.” However, this process was not unique to 
the SSBs. The expansion of the supporting coalition over the 2010s was similarly aided by 
linking financial inclusion to a host of new policies and outcomes. More specifically, 
organizations both central to the financial inclusion agenda (like the GPFI, CGAP, and 
AFI) and secondary or new constituencies within the coalition dynamically co-produced 
novel understandings of the agenda and created space for outside (and previously 
uninvolved) actors.  
 To provide analytical traction on the evolution of the financial inclusion agenda 
over the 2010s, the relationship between financial inclusion and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) provides a useful starting point. As described by Thérien and 
Pouliot (2020, p. 613), the SDGs were the “centerpiece of the 2030 Agenda adopted by the 
United Nations (UN) in September 2015 [and] constitute one of the most salient global 
policies of our time.” In charting a comprehensive roadmap for development from 2015-
2030, the SDGs were presented as the agenda for global development and have been 
subject to considerable interrogation and debate within international political economy 
(Fukuda-Parr, 2018; Thérien & Pouliot, 2020; Weber, 2017). To what extent did the 
financial inclusion agenda intersect with the SDGs? While a full analysis of this process is 
beyond the scope of the chapter, a brief overview sufficiently illustrates the central logic 
of coordination effects.47 
 
47 One potential source of advocacy for incorporating financial inclusion was the UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development, who collaborated with UN member states in the 
“Group of Friends of Financial Inclusion” (led by Peru, Tanzania, and Indonesia) and with the UNCDF, 





 Throughout the construction of the SDGs, there was considerable debate around 
whether financial inclusion should be included as one of the goals. After all, the SDGs 
were in many ways an “unscripted negotiation process” in which there was little 
understanding at the outset of what the final product would entail (Thérien & Pouliot, 
2020). As it relates to financial inclusion, there were competing views about whether it was 
preferable to interweave financial inclusion throughout other goals or to establish financial 
inclusion as a goal in its own right. As neatly summarized by Elisabeth Rhyne (Center for 
Financial Inclusion), the instrumental value of financial inclusion is far reaching (Leach, 
2014a): “Perhaps financial services are too utilitarian to inspire the kind of fervent hopes 
associated with many development goals. But when it comes to the practicalities, when we 
start to ask how to bring these hopes into reality, we will find ourselves turning to financial 
services again and again.” On the one hand, some argued that situating financial inclusion 
as a goal in the SDGs would help ensure sufficient attention and resources are dedicated to 
achieving universal financial inclusion. On the other hand, others emphasized the 
“enabling” nature of financial inclusion as a “means to an end” rather than a standalone 
objective. Common across both positions was the recognition that financial inclusion was 
linked to a broad range of outcomes beyond those articulated when the agenda was first 
established. Beth Porter, a UNCDF policy advisor closely involved with the development 
of the SDGs, argued (Leach, 2014b): “Greater financial inclusion contributes to poverty 
reduction, economic growth and jobs, greater food security and agricultural production, 
women’s economic empowerment, health protection through managing financial risks 
 
for Development, 2016). The available evidence, however, does not allow me to make any claims about the 





associated with prevention and cure.” Ultimately, financial inclusion did not appear as a 
goal in the final SDGs, but instead 7 of the 17 goals feature language on financial inclusion 
(Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme, n.d.c).48 By extensively including financial 
inclusion throughout the SDGs, complementarities with established and new outcomes 
were formalized. 
 Following the creation of the SDGs, there is evidence of financial inclusion 
organizations (like CGAP and AFI) deliberately exploring ways in which financial 
inclusion can be linked to the SDGs that did not contain explicit reference to the agenda. 
For example, a report published by CGAP shortly after the creation of the SDGs sought to 
clarify the ways in which financial inclusion was linked to the SDGs and the research 
supporting those links. However, the authors also recognized the lack of evidence 
connecting some SDGs with the financial inclusion agenda (Klapper, et al., 2016, p. 2): 
“SDGs not covered at all include goals 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 17, where the role of financial 
services is not directly evident. Additional research would be needed to reveal links 
between these goals and the SDGs.”  AFI similarly explored new linkages with the SDGs 
in collaboration with both member states and outside organizations. For instance, AFI’s 
Sharm El Sheikh Accord (2017) codified support for “green” financial inclusion and was 
followed by the Financial Inclusion and Climate Change (FICC) program to help 
implement the accord. AFI executive director Dr. Alfred Hannig described AFI’s embrace 
of environmental priorities as follows (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2018a): 
 
48 The goals featuring financial inclusion include: No Poverty (SDG 1), No Hunger (SDG 2), Good Health 
and Well-Being (SDG 3), Gender Equality (SDG 5), Decent Work and Economic Growth (SDG 8), Industry, 





“[P]olicymakers and regulators in the AFI network have acknowledged the dual threats of 
financial exclusion and climate change as key barriers to financial stability… Through peer 
learning and knowledge sharing, the FICC is providing AFI member institutions with a 
platform to share and exchange their experiences and knowledge on how to develop and 
implement green financial inclusion polices.” Not only does this illustrate how existing 
(financial stability) and new (climate change) objectives were interwoven with financial 
inclusion, it also highlights the collaborative process through which these ideas were 
developed. 
 Beyond the activities of organizations like CGAP and AFI, members of the broader 
coalition also sought to shape the agenda’s evolution in favourable ways while tying 
together their own interests, financial inclusion, and the SDGs. For example, the 
identification of coordination effects was aided by some organizations with ties to the 
original microcredit agenda but who may not feature prominently in the contemporary 
promotion of financial inclusion. Consider, for example, the actions of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO). As argued by Bernards (2016), the ILO is often overlooked in 
analyses of the financial inclusion agenda. While the primary mandate of the ILO is the 
promotion of labour standards and decent work, promoting financial inclusion has become 
one of its three themes of its Social Finance Programme49. In the early 2010s, there was a 
shift in thinking within the ILO that credit alone was insufficient, spurring a shift towards 
 
49 The Social Finance Program frames its work around financial inclusion as follows (International Labor 
Organization, n.d.): “The promotion of social justice is the foundation of the ILO. When applying a social 
justice lens to the financial sector, financial inclusion becomes an important objective, so that everyone, 






holistic approaches to financial services and emphasis on “protective agendas” (Personal 
Interview, Craig Churchill, Chief of the ILO Social Finance Program, March 2021).  
Reflecting the shift within the ILO, the links between financial inclusion and 
modern slavery, especially issues like child and bonded labour, emerged as one example 
of a unique space within the broader agenda that the ILO helped secure (Personal Interview, 
Craig Churchill, Chief of the ILO Social Finance Program, March 2021). To be clear, the 
ILO was not alone in pursuing this link. Consistent with the co-production of the agenda 
by disparate organizations, similar views are expressed in a briefing prepared for the 
Finance Against Slavery & Trafficking (FAST) Initiative (Cockayne, 2019, p. 3): “Yet the 
anti-slavery argument for expanded financial inclusion is not limited to reducing risks to 
potential victims: increased financial inclusion targeted at populations that are at 
heightened risk of modern slavery is likely to also have significant spill-over or ‘systemic’ 
effects.” In thus pursuing their priorities within the financial inclusion agenda, the ILO 
both emphasizes the links to the SDGs50 and the importance of working with a broad 
coalition of global standard-setting bodies, domestic regulators, financial institutions, 
labour unions, and non-governmental organizations (Personal Interview, Craig Churchill, 
Chief of the ILO Social Finance Program, March 2021).  
The evidence presented in this section reveals the integral role of coordination 
effects in expanding the agenda and supporting coalition over the 2010s. Importantly, the 
 
50 For example, the 2019 annual report for the Social Finance Programme states (International Labor 
Organization, 2020, p. 7): “Financial inclusion is a high priority for the development community. Indeed, it 
is one of the targets of Sustainable Development Goal 8. But it is important to consider the purpose it is 
intended to achieve. Financial inclusion is a means to an end. For the ILO, that end includes creating jobs 
and improving working conditions. Efforts to promote financial inclusion need to take a systemic approach, 





ambiguity of the agenda was dynamically co-produced by central organizations (such as 
CGAP and AFI) and the creative actions of disparate international organizations, states, 
and civil society organizations. By linking the agenda to diverse outcomes, such as the 
SDGs and modern slavery, new constituencies were created in support of financial 
inclusion without reconciling potential conflicts at the global level. In other words, 
financial inclusion was adapted to advance diverse objectives in a manner that cannot be 
solely attributed to either the strategic actions of a “central entrepreneur” or the financial 
interests (i.e., credit-based financial services) of transnational capital. 
 
3.3 Quantifying and Benchmarking the Global Agenda 
As previously outlined in the introductory chapter, there is a rich literature on the use of 
quantification and benchmarking as tools in global politics. By seeking to translate broad 
or complex concepts into more easily understood and communicated numerical 
representations, a wide variety of non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations, states, and firms are able to achieve their preferred outcomes (Broome & 
Quirk, 2015; Cooley & Snyder, 2015; Kelley & Simmons, 2019). Such tools help actors 
draw attention to issues or agendas, rally support, and communicate ideas to a broad 
audience. In unpacking the origins of the global financial inclusion agenda in Chapter 2, 
my theoretical focus was on the role of participatory ambiguity in first assembling a global 
coalition and constructing the new agenda. However, in interrogating the evolution of the 
coalition and agenda over the 2010s, it is apparent that techniques of quantification and 





 I am not alone in asserting that these tools were a critical component in the 
consolidation of the global financial inclusion agenda. Indeed, two examples clearly 
corroborate this argument. First, the joint task force between the Committee on Payments 
and Market Infrastructures and the World Bank (discussed in detail in section 3.2.3), which 
was responsible for the development of guiding principles for the construction of payment 
systems that advanced both financial inclusion and stability, noted the following in their 
report (Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and World Bank, 2016, p. 11): 
To complement the guiding principles, the CPMI-WBG Task Force also stresses 
the importance of tracking progress in achieving the underlying financial inclusion 
goals. A strong consensus has emerged among the many institutions involved in 
financial inclusion efforts on the importance of implementing robust measurement 
methods for identifying obstacles, demonstrating results, efficiently allocating 
resources, and in general for making evidence-based policy decisions. In this 
regard, many countries are already quantifying their national financial inclusion 
objectives and commitments and progress achieved to date. Notably, these efforts 
have yielded certain important by-products. For example, the process of designing 
a national measurement framework has often generated meaningful dialogue 
among and between public and private sector stakeholders on issues such as 
priorities, coordination and capacity. Likewise, the design of specific indicators and 
targets has proved useful for rallying stakeholders, creating accountability and 
reinforcing national policy objectives. 
 
Not only do the authors recognize the global “consensus” around measuring, tracking, and 
reporting financial inclusion goals, but they also identify a range of outcomes associated 
with benchmarking (including facilitating dialogue, rallying stakeholders, and creating 
accountability). In other words, benchmarking can expand and strengthen the supporting 
coalition and generate momentum behind the agenda. 
 A second example is found in the G20 High Level Principles for Digital Financial 
Inclusion (Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, 2016b). The original G20 Principles 
for Innovative Financial Inclusion laid the foundation for the creation of the Global 





technologies and digital financial services prompted the creation of a second set of high-
level principles in 2016. Both the principles themselves and interview evidence with an 
individual who had knowledge of their creation (Telephone Interview, December 2020) 
reveal the importance of benchmarking in how the principles were constructed. More 
specifically, Principle 8 is “Track Digital Financial Inclusion Progress”. Although this 
principle does not provide specific recommendations about what should be tracked, it does 
share a set of illustrative actions that might be pursued (such as establishing national key 
performance indicators and disaggregating data by demographic criteria) (Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion, 2016b). 
 Since the appeal of quantification and benchmarking is uncontroversial and clearly 
recognized by actors at the global level, the remainder of this section will instead focus on 
empirically demonstrating who engaged in quantification or benchmarking at the global 
level and how such efforts support the argument of this dissertation rather than historical 
materialist expectations. In particular, I focus on such efforts within the Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion (AFI), the creation of a triennial global financial inclusion survey (the 
Findex) by the World Bank, and benchmarking projects by the “Global Microscope” team 
and the Brookings Institute. 
 Since its creation in the late 2000s, the use and promotion of benchmarks features 
prominently in how AFI advances financial inclusion among its members and the 
international community. Most notably, AFI launched the “Maya Declaration” at its annual 
Global Policy Forum in 2011. As described by AFI (n.d.): 
[T]he Maya Declaration represents AFI’s core values and the first global and 
measurable set of commitments by developing and emerging country governments 
towards advancing the financial inclusion agenda. A public commitment to the 





to a range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including goal 1 (no 
poverty), goal 5 (gender equality), goal 8 (decent work and economic growth) and 
goal 13 (climate action). 
 
Interestingly, while the Maya Declaration was conceptualized and adopted prior to the 
creation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), AFI now advertises the linkages 
between financial inclusion (through the Maya Declaration) and a range of SDGs. 
 At a more concrete level, the declaration itself abstains from any specific policy 
recommendations or commitments. The declaration frames financial inclusion as involving 
a range of financial services and suggests financial inclusion has a critical role in 
“empowering and transforming the lives of all our people, especially the poor, … in 
improving national and global financial stability and integrity and [contributes] to strong 
and inclusive growth in developing and emerging market countries” (Newnham, 2020, p. 
35). This framing, of course, closely mirrors the initial construction of the agenda (as 
argued in Chapter 2). Rather than prescribe a specific set of actions, the Maya Declaration 
instead operated as an aspirational document and focal point around which AFI members 
identified specific goals and commitments. To be clear, this process of benchmarking 
operates as a “bottom-up” process in which AFI members set their own targets. Since 
launching the Maya Declaration, AFI reports that 71 countries (nearly 80% of its 
membership) had made 837 financial inclusion targets (as of 2020), visualized in Figure 2 
(Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2020a, p. 3). The targets themselves vary enormously, 
covering the targeting of specific groups (e.g., youth, women, rural individuals, SMEs etc.), 
the availability or use of different financial services (transaction accounts, payment 
services, credit, insurance), and the implementation of new policies or regulations (e.g., 





finance” policies, etc.).51  Illustrating support for this benchmarking process and how it 
operates, Dr. Francis Chipimo (Acting Governor, Bank of Zambia) suggests (Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion, 2020a, p. 4): “The progress achieved, and the breadth of the enabling 
financial inclusion policies in Zambia would not have been possible without our affiliation 
with AFI. The Bank of Zambia will therefore continue to set targets under the Maya 
Declaration and integrate these targets in both the Bank’s and national financial inclusion 
strategies.” 
Figure 2: Countries with AFI Maya Declaration Strategies 
 
Notes: The source of the data is AFI (2020a). The Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique 
de l’Ouest (BCEAO) is included as an institution with a Maya Declaration commitment, 




Building on the success of the Maya Declaration, AFI facilitated several additional 
accords and collective statements. These include (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, n.d.): 
the Sasana Accord (supporting evidence-based financial inclusion policies; 2013), the 
 
51 In 2016, AFI created an Online Data Portal (ADP) that collects and publicly disseminates information on 





Maputo Accord (supporting SMEs; 2015), the Denarau Action Plan (supporting women’s 
financial inclusion; 2016), the Sharm El Sheikh Accord (supporting linkages between 
financial inclusion and green finance to combat climate change; 2017), and the Sochi 
Accord (supporting proportionate regulatory approaches to financial technology; 2018). 
The use of benchmarking by AFI thus provides clear evidence in support of my own 
argument while also casting doubt on historical materialist explanations. Not only is 
benchmarking indisputably a favoured tool of AFI, but the “bottom-up” construction of 
targets by member countries and the breadth of topics incorporated across targets and 
benchmarks closely aligns with the expectations of participatory ambiguity. Further, the 
language around the Maya Declaration plainly connects financial inclusion to the disparate 
outcomes identified in Chapter 2 (namely, poverty alleviation, economic development, 
financial stability, and financial integrity) while also seeking to link the agenda to new 
outcomes (like the SDGs) that gained prominence in the 2010s. In considering the use of 
benchmarking by AFI, the available evidence does not suggest that the financial inclusion 
agenda was driven by Western states or financial interests, nor does the construction of 
benchmarks reflect a narrowing or repurposing of the agenda to focus predominantly on 
credit-based financial services. 
 A second important area of quantification at the global level was the creation of the 
triennial Global Findex. Prior to the establishment of the global financial inclusion agenda, 
there was a lack of systematic, cross-national data on the access to and use of retail financial 
services. Of the few examples prior to the 2010s, data collection efforts often consisted of 
questionnaires circulated to financial regulators, yielding aggregate information on topics 





number of bank accounts per capita (Beck et al., 2007). While new data collection projects 
were created in the late 2000s, such as the IMF Financial Access Survey and the CGAP 
Financial Access report, these too produced aggregated data that focused on supply side 
dynamics (e.g., the number of bank branches) or coarse measures of individual access (e.g., 
the number of bank accounts per capita).  
 The lack of high-quality, cross-national data on financial inclusion that could be 
used to support and promote the financial inclusion agenda prompted the creation of a 
global survey called the Global Findex. In celebrating the new initiative, Her Royal 
Highness Princess Máxima of the Netherlands (the UN Secretary General’s Special 
Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development) remarked (World Bank, 2012b): “Good, 
comparable national data is so important for the development of effective policies. I hope 
policy makers will use this research to help make sure everyone, everywhere, has access 
to financial services.” The survey itself was funded through a 10-year Gates Foundation 
grant and was implemented through a collaboration between the World Bank and Gallup, 
Inc. The scope of the project is remarkable. Every three years (beginning in 2011), the 
project administers nationally representative surveys across more than 140 countries and 
including more than 150,000 people (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). 
 Two points are especially salient in explaining the consolidation of the financial 
inclusion agenda over the 2010s. First, the range of questions administered as part of the 
Findex is related to the substantive meaning of the agenda itself. In other words, the way 
in which the global survey “quantifies” the agenda is an opportunity to shape and 
communicate popular understandings of the agenda and accompanying policy responses. 





focus the agenda on the central role of credit-based financial services. Empirically, this 
would entail the administration of survey questions that either exclusively or 
predominantly focus on credit. Importantly, however, the evidence is quite the opposite. 
Notwithstanding slight adjustments to the survey over time, the Findex includes 
approximately 50 questions spanning access to and use of an array of financial services 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). While questions about credit-based financial services are 
certainly part of the survey, they account for fewer than 10 questions across each survey. 
Further, the increasing prominence of financial technology and digital financial services 
over the 2010s is reflected in the survey questions. For example, greater emphasis is placed 
on access to and use of mobile money in later iterations of the Findex. 
 Second, the Global Findex became a key element of both global and domestic 
efforts to promote the agenda. Indeed, the report accompanying the 2017 survey suggested 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018, p. xv): “The Global Findex database has become a mainstay 
of global efforts to promote financial inclusion. In addition to being widely cited by 
scholars and development practitioners, Global Findex data are used to track progress 
toward the World Bank goal of Universal Financial Access by 2020 and the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals.” While it may be unsurprising that the creators of the data 
claim it is widely used, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I present corroborating evidence for the 
importance of the Findex in informing and aiding national policies in the implementation 
of National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs). This also further demonstrates the 
linking of the SDGs with the financial inclusion agenda in the late 2010s. 
 Finally, there were a select number of projects to construct cross-national 





(EIU) Global Microscope project and the Brookings Institute Financial and Digital 
Inclusion Project (FDIP) both sought to categorize and rank cross-national policy 
responses to the financial inclusion agenda with the purpose of influencing practitioners 
and policymakers. Of the two, the Global Microscope was larger both cross-nationally 
(approximately 55 countries versus 21 countries) and temporally (approximately 2007-
2020 versus 2015-2017). Nevertheless, both are instructive in terms of how benchmarking 
was used to promote the agenda after its initial creation. 
 The Global Microscope reports are generally assembled by a team at the Economist 
Intelligence Unit and in consultation with such organizations as the Multilateral Investment 
Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the CAF-Development Bank of Latin 
America, the Center for Financial Inclusion at Accion, and Citi Microfinance (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2014). The first report was produced in 2007 and focused much more 
narrowly on Latin American and Caribbean countries and the regulatory environment for 
microfinance, whereby microfinance was understood as the provision of microcredit52.  
From 2007-2013 the report expanded in geographic coverage while retaining a focus on 
microfinance (albeit with gradual incorporation of savings products). However, the 2014 
report shifted its focus to the “enabling environment for financial inclusion” (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2014). The report describes the shift as follows (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2014, p. 6):  
Taking a cue from evolving financial-inclusion efforts and initiatives in the 
microfinance and international development sectors, the Microscope 2014 has 
evolved in its own right. As a wide range of institutions (including banks, non-bank 
 
52 The report defines microcredit as “loans to non-salaried workers which are typically less than or equal to 






financial institutions (NBFIs), businesses and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs)) look to expand their financial offerings, they are reaching out to 
traditionally underserved populations through non-traditional channels. This 
process, known as “financial inclusion”, aims to provide universal access to, and 
use of, innovative financial products and services to traditionally underserved or 
excluded populations, so as to encourage economic growth and development in 
emerging economies, and equip individuals with the tools necessary to improve 
their lives. Building on previous editions of the Global Microscope on 
Microfinance, the Microscope 2014 is the first edition that focuses on financial 
inclusion, evaluating the conditions and enablers of expanded access to finance to 
establish a benchmark across countries.  
 
Reflecting the broader range of policies, financial services, and actors associated with 
financial inclusion, the EIU similarly updated the ways in which it evaluated countries. Not 
only does the benchmarking methodology expand its focus away from an exclusive 
emphasis on microcredit, but it takes into account government efforts to implement 
financial inclusion policies or strategies, the efficacy of financial regulatory authorities in 
promoting financial inclusion, and the incorporation of digital financial services (like 
electronic money).  
  A second benchmarking initiative was the Brookings Institute Financial and 
Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP). With financial help from the Gates Foundation, the 
project aimed to document the diversity of domestic approaches to promoting financial 
inclusion and communicate this information to policymakers and the public (Personal 
Interview, Robin Lewis, Brookings Institute but speaking in her personal capacity, 
Washington 2019): 
One of the hopes that I think we had for the report was that we could do a much 
more global analysis of the ways that different countries were trying to approach 
progress toward financial inclusion. And really just create a resource for anyone 
who is looking at some of the different policy approaches that had been attempted 
and then also see some of those corresponding supply and demand side data related 
to those countries. Because I think resources like the Global Findex are just 
immensely helpful in so many different ways for seeing the results of countries' 





tended to be for specific countries. So just getting a sense of how regionally diverse, 
economically diverse, politically diverse countries were trying to map different 
approaches and learn from each other. It seemed like it would be helpful to have 
one resource for people to explore. 
 
Not only is there a clear recognition of the multiple policy approaches associated with the 
agenda, but it is also worth noting the connection to the Global Findex (evaluated above). 
Notwithstanding the intent to document the disparate approaches to financial 
inclusion, some might reasonably question whether the actual benchmarking reflects this 
objective. After all, benchmarking inherently involves rankings based on some evaluative 
criteria. Nevertheless, close inspection of the methodology underpinning the benchmarks 
produced by the FDIP reveals that the criteria reflect a country’s commitment to the agenda 
more so than any policy paradigm. The four components of the 2014 benchmark include 
(Villasenor et al., 2015): the “country commitment” (e.g., national targets, implementing a 
National Financial Inclusion Strategy), “mobile capacity” (e.g., the existing of mobile 
infrastructure, the availability of mobile money), “regulatory environment” (e.g., support 
for non-bank financial service providers, proportionate application of anti-money 
laundering regulations), and “adoption” (access to and use of different types of financial 
services). Simply put, there is little evidence that the benchmarking practices of the 
Brookings Institute are adequately explained by historical materialist accounts. Instead, the 
evidence corresponds with the co-production of the agenda’s ambiguity through the diverse 
practices of global South countries, the incorporation of a variety of financial services and 







Since its establishment in the late 2000s, the global financial inclusion agenda experienced 
ongoing support within the international community. However, the continued existence 
and popularity of the agenda to this day was not a foregone conclusion. It was possible that 
the participatory ambiguity that facilitated the creation of the agenda might have quickly 
succumbed to intra-coalition conflict or, alternatively, co-optation by Western business 
interests. In this chapter, I interrogate the processes through which the financial inclusion 
agenda and the supporting coalition were consolidated and expanded in the 2010s. In so 
doing, I present compelling evidence that participatory ambiguity and the mechanisms of 
quantification, institutional layering, and coordination effects provide a more compelling 
explanation of events than alternative accounts. 
 To assess the strength of evidence underpinning my own and historical materialist 
expectations, I rely on both extensive primary documents and elite interviews with 
individuals involved with or knowledgeable of international organizations, global 
standard-setting bodies (SSBs), civil society organizations, and global South and North 
state financial authorities. Further, I focus analytical attention on the incorporation of 
global SSBs into the supporting coalition, the evolution of the coalition through the lenses 
of financial “de-risking” and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the creation 
of diverse global benchmarks. Together, the evidence reveals the dynamic co-production 
of the agenda over time.  
While organizations central to the financial inclusion agenda (such as CGAP and 
AFI) undoubtedly played a role in promoting the agenda and identifying potential 





Instead, the broader coalition, such as the global SSBs and the ILO, also actively secured 
space for their interests within the agenda. Further, as explicitly acknowledged by the 
Financial Action Task Force, “financial inclusion” proved to be a more comprehensive and 
malleable brand than potential alternatives (like “banking the unbanked”). Some 
coordination effects (such as complementarities with financial integrity and financial 
stability) were acknowledged during the agenda’s emergence and were solidified during 
this period. Others, such as those related to the SDGs, were entirely new and helped to 
build new constituencies in support of financial inclusion. Finally, organizations including 
AFI, the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Brookings Institute engaged 
in different forms of quantification and benchmarking to help rally support for the agenda 
and shape its interpretation and implementation. 
Throughout the chapter, I consider the extent to which the evidence corresponds 
with historical materialist expectations and find limited support. To be clear, both Western 
states and businesses are certainly part of the global political process and the agenda does 
not exclude credit-based financial services altogether. However, there is ample evidence 
that the creative actions of global South states in advancing financial inclusion contributed 
to global actions and discourse. There is also a clear emphasis on a much broader range of 
financial services, especially bank accounts and payment services, than is typically 
considered within historical materialist accounts. In turn, key conflicts within the agenda’s 
evolution reflect sectoral divides (such as competition between commercial banks and 
financial technology or telecommunication firms) rather than class divisions. Moreover, 
one of the few instances in which financial inclusion incited global contestation involved 





organizations advocated for their continued business operations in service of financially 
excluded populations. 
Notwithstanding the weight of evidence presented in this chapter, it remains 
possible that historical materialist accounts provide greater insight as the global agenda is 
translated into domestic contexts. In other words, the interests and power of Western states 
and financial firms might shape the implementation of the agenda far more than its 















4 The Cross-National Adoption of National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies (NFISs) 
 
This chapter considers the domestic implementation of the global financial inclusion 
agenda. In so doing, I evaluate the adoption of National Financial Inclusion Strategies 
(NFISs), focusing on both the plausible pathways linking global advocacy efforts to 
domestic adoption and the content of such strategies. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, the establishment of the global agenda in 2008-2010 did not necessarily ensure 
its continued support. The creation of global bodies, like the G20’s Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion (GPFI) and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), provided 
important institutional platforms. Additional steps were needed to embed the agenda in the 
global standard-setting bodies through the layering of new guidelines among existing sets 
of standards and the identification of key coordination effects. Coordination effects also 
facilitated the linking of financial inclusion with new objectives (such as the Sustainable 
Development Goals) and, in turn, the incorporation of new constituencies. Further, several 
initiatives to quantify the global agenda in different ways effectively maintained the 
agenda’s ambiguity while helping to rally support for the agenda. 
Importantly, however, the empirical evidence at the global level leaves open the 
possibility that the agenda remains symbolic rather than substantive. It might be argued 
that widespread support among countries and global civil society organizations for the 
financial inclusion agenda is primarily rhetorical. After all, there are no formal treaties and 
associated enforcement mechanisms underpinning its implementation. There is analytical 
value in considering the transformation of global norms into concrete policies or 





is a policy persona of a norm, and consists of a set of policies with a legal or organizational 
basis that can be adopted by an actor as a means of working toward the regulative or 
prescriptive goals of a norm. It is programs, not norms themselves, which actors adopt or 
join.” In the absence of formal international agreements, operationalizing “adoption” 
through NFISs enables the examination of its determinants and features. 
Why focus on National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs)?  I argue that NFISs 
are an empirically distinct type of domestic policy reform that is increasingly recognized 
among global actors as a “best practice.”  Consequently, NFISs are a type of domestic 
policy instrument that can be clearly identified and compared cross-nationally.53 By 
investigating the adoption of NFISs, this chapter subjects the observable implications of 
dominant historical materialist explanations and my own theoretical framework to 
empirical scrutiny from a cross-national and domestically-oriented perspective. 
First, if the ambiguity of the global agenda simply masks the power and priorities 
of Western states and businesses, we would expect to observe NFISs that reflect this 
dynamic. In other words, NFISs that are consistent with historical materialist accounts 
should prioritize specific financial services (credit) actors (commercialized microfinance). 
I also consider the extent to which a historical materialist “ideal type” of NFIS is associated 
with World Bank lending practices. Notwithstanding the shifts in policy norms within the 
World Bank in recent years (Güven, 2018; Park & Vetterlein, 2010),  the  World  Bank 
remains one of the few global actors (state or international organization) with the capacity 
 
53 This approach resembles the empirical strategy of research on the diffusion of human rights norms. In this 
literature, some scholars have used National Human Rights Institutions as the empirical focal point. This 






to coercively impose development ideas. Moreover, some historical materialist accounts of 
financial inclusion argue that the World Bank is at the forefront of the global agenda and 
its underlying focus on expanding credit-based forms of capital accumulation (Bateman et 
al., 2018; Soederberg, 2014a). World Bank lending practices thus constitute a “most likely” 
source of coercive diffusion within historical materialist explanations. Of course, if such 
“models” are promoted through ideational means (consistent with a historical materialist 
account), focusing on World Bank lending practices would be insufficient. This specific 
pathway is considered in greater depth in the Ghanaian case study presented in Chapter 5. 
Second, I consider the extent to which my own theoretical framework provides a 
more compelling account of the adoption of NFISs. If it is the case that the ambiguity of 
the global agenda enables diverse forms of adoption, this should be reflected in the features 
of NFISs. Rather than a singular focus on credit and commercialized microfinance, for 
example, we should instead observe the incorporation of a range of financial services, 
actors, and associated outcomes. Importantly, however, the NFISs themselves might be 
considered symbolic instead of substantive. As additional empirical tests of my argument, 
I consider the extent to which NFISs provide evidence of quantification and institutional 
layering. I also further probe this scenario in detail through the Ghanaian case study. 
Collectively, the diverse empirical evidence provides clear support for this 
dissertation’s argument. The ambiguity that characterizes the global financial inclusion 
agenda extends through the establishment of NFISs. As a global best practice and through 
their cross-national adoption, NFISs are not consistent with historical materialist 
expectations. In contrast to such arguments, NFISs rarely focus on credit provision and 





incorporate a wide variety of financial service providers, financial services, and anticipated 
outcomes. This pattern exists across regions and levels of development, even when 
accounting for the extent of World Bank development financing. Closer examination of 
NFISs finds evidence consistent with the proposed mechanisms of quantification and 
institutional layering. Many existing NFISs incorporate a combination of global 
benchmarks, indicators, and commitments (e.g. the Alliance for Financial Inclusion Maya 
Declaration) alongside domestic targets. Further, the institutional reforms associated with 
NFISs operate as an incremental form of change, often producing novel governmental 
bodies and mandates within the domestic regulatory structure. 
The chapter is organized as follows. I first unpack the production of “best practices” 
in global governance. I then demonstrate how NFISs partially constitute global best 
practices and can be traced to the deliberate efforts of four central actors: the Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion (AFI), the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), 
the World Bank, and (to a lesser extent) the Pacific Financial Inclusion Program (PFIP). 
Second, I outline the observable implications of both my theoretical framework and those 
of historical materialist explanations. Third, I introduce an empirical strategy for 
comparing 49 NFISs (47 countries and 2 regional organizations) and present the results of 
the text analysis. Finally, I identify evidence of the role of global and domestic 






4.1 National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs) as Global 
“Best Practice” 
Best practices are a unique tool of global governance. As defined by Bernstein and van der 
Ven (2017, p. 537) best practices are “purposive efforts by global political actors to 
authoritatively steer a defined group towards some goal(s) through reference to lessons that 
are ostensibly apolitical, replicable, and learned through experience.”  Best practices have 
the appearance of a broad consensus54 and typically “emphasize procedural matters over 
specific substantive criteria” (Bernstein & van der Ven, 2017, p. 539). Their origins within 
global governance are variously attributed to “process standards” and quality management 
in the 1980s (Murphy & Yates, 2009), international financial institutions in the 1990s 
(Best, 2014), and the promotion of human rights by the United Nations (Ruggie, 2014). 
Theoretically, best practices fit within a larger body of scholarship in International 
Political Economy on the role of expertise, professions, and knowledge as a source and 
form of power (Haas, 1992; Hannah et al., 2015; Tsingou, 2015). Instead of viewing best 
practices as a form of objective or neutral knowledge produced by experts (as might be the 
case with epistemic communities), it is important to instead interrogate the underlying 
power dynamics. The construction of best practices is an avenue through which 
organizations can exert indirect power over others. After all, determining what “counts” as 
a best practice is not an apolitical process. Those who are responsible for articulating best 
 
54 Indeed, best practices often imply far more extensive evaluation than is likely to have occurred:  “The very 
act  of labelling a set of principles ’best practices’ connotes widespread agreement, as if all existing practices 
have been evaluated against some objective criteria and a particular subset has emerged as superior” 





practices are well-positioned to exert control over what practices are considered or 
excluded from discussion. 
However, even if best practices are widely viewed as a tool to be wielded against 
others, differences remain across theoretical perspectives. For example, a neo-Gramscian 
view of best practices situates their use within a broader analysis of material structures and 
power. As an instrument for legitimation, they are likely employed by the “intellectuals” 
tasked with promoting and sustaining the “collective images of social order” (Cox, 1996, 
p. 99). Alternatively, as Best (2014, p. 129) argues in her analysis of international financial 
institutions, best practices can be understood through Foucault’s work on disciplinary 
power: 
The standardizing practice that underpins the turn to benchmarks, standards and 
best practices shares with the structural adjustment era a disciplinary logic, as it 
sorts economies into normal and abnormal. But it also increasingly relies on a more 
governmental form of power, focusing on managing circulations around the norm 
(rather than drawing lines between what is normal and what is not), and seeking to 
foster a more active, self-disciplining kind of subjectivity among the bureaucratic, 
market and civil society actors that it enrolls. 
 
While the above examples consider the different ways in which best practices are used 
between actors, they are also used within organizations. As Pouliot (2020) demonstrates, 
best practices can be employed as a tool in intraorganizational conflict. In this context, 
challengers can leverage best practice narratives to problematize existing policies or 
practices. 
There is significant potential overlap between the conceptualization of best 
practices and ambiguity. Broome and Seabrooke (2012, pp. 11-12) view the concept of 
ambiguity as a specific and deliberate feature of best practices: “[T]he political dynamics 





principles and ‘best practice’ regulatory norms often involve the deliberate use of 
ambiguity in order to paper over actors’ conflicting interests.” Yet, the “deliberate” element 
of ambiguity in best practices should not be overstated. As a set of guidelines or lessons, 
best practices contain a degree of ambiguity by definition. Moreover, the ambiguity is not 
necessarily a deliberate feature. Ambiguity may also result from the creative actions of 
stakeholders or community members who interpret best practices in ways amenable to their 
preferred policies. This view is consistent with the perspective of Bernstein and van der 
(2017), who acknowledge the participatory element of best practice construction. In their 
work, however, the focus is on how participation produces greater legitimacy (Bernstein 
& van der Ven, 2017, p. 544). 
 
4.1.1 What is a National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS)? 
The creation of a National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) is increasingly viewed as a 
type of “best practice” among countries supporting the global agenda. While no universal 
definition exists, the definitions provided by the World Bank and the Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion (AFI) provide a useful starting point. As outlined by the World Bank (2012a), an 
NFIS is a “road map of actions, agreed and defined at the national or subnational level, that 
stakeholders follow to achieve financial inclusion objectives.” A more detailed definition55 
is provided by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2018b, p. 4): 
A national financial inclusion strategy (NFIS) is a comprehensive public document 
that presents a strategy developed at the national level to systematically accelerate 
the level of financial inclusion. An NFIS is developed through a broad consultative 
 
55 It is worth noting that this definition was developed by AFI member states in the Financial Inclusion 
Strategy Peer Learning Group (FISPLG). AFI member states are exclusively from the global South and the 





process involving, among others, public and private sector stakeholders engaged in 
financial sector development. Typically, a NFIS will include an analysis of the 
current status of, and constraints on, financial inclusion in a country, a measurable 
financial inclusion goal, how a country proposes to reach this goal and by when, 
and how it would measure the progress and achievements of the NFIS. 
 
These definitions highlight several important features of NFISs. Fundamentally, NFISs are 
an opportunity for countries to formally define “financial inclusion.” It also enables 
countries to identify a specific plan of action for achieving a set of associated targets and 
goals. Further, they establish an institutional structure that both facilitates the creation of 
the strategy and ensures its successful implementation. Also apparent from these 
definitions is a focus on the procedural, rather than substantive elements of NFISs. 
Crucially, this leaves open the possibility that NFISs may mirror the ambiguity within the 
global financial inclusion agenda or, alternatively, chart a more constrained and specific 
understanding of the agenda and how to fulfill it. 
Despite the increasing prominence of NFISs in global discourse, there remains 
inadequate comprehensive data on their adoption. While the World Bank, for instance, 
provides a list (and digital copy) of NFISs through their online Financial Inclusion 
Resources Center (World Bank, 2019), the list remains partial. Turning instead to the 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion, their “NFIS State of Practice” reports (2015a, 2018b) 
provide another valuable, albeit incomplete, resource. Table 2 presents an overview of 
NFIS adoption by AFI member states as of 2015. Notable is both the concentration of 
NFISs in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the 
variation in lead institutions between central banks, ministries of finance, and other 
government institutions. A more recent and comprehensive survey of NFIS adoption is 





(World Bank, 2017), the results of which are presented in Table 3. Although it only 
provides data for a single year, it nevertheless conveys a sense of the extent of NFIS 
adoption, disaggregated by both geographic region and income group. In both cases, there 
is limited guidance to distinguish between countries that do not have an NFIS versus 
countries that did not provide data to the World Bank or AFI. 
 
Table 2: Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) Members with a National Financial 
Inclusion Strategy (as of 2015) 
Region NFIS Exists NFIS in Development 
Country Lead 
Institution 






Asia and Pacific 
Solomon 
Islands 
CB 2010 Bangladesh CB 
Malaysia CB 2011 Bhutan CB 
Indonesia MoF & CB 2012 Cambodia CB 
Papua New 
Guinea 
CB 2013 China Other 
Vanuatu CB 2013 Fiji CB 
India MoF 2014 Mongolia Other 
Pakistan MoF & CB 2015 Nepal CB 
Philippines CB 2015 Samoa CB 








Liberia CB 2008 Congo Other 
Malawi MoF 2010 Ethiopia CB 
Namibia MoF & CB 2010 Mozambique CB 
Madagascar Other 2012 Swaziland MoF 
Nigeria CB 2012 Sierra Leone CB 
Rwanda Other 2012 Senegal MoF 
Tanzania CB 2013 Uganda CB 
Burundi Other 2014   
 
 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Morocco CB 2008 Egypt CB 
   Jordan CB 
   Palestine CB 




Mexico Other 2007 Bolivia Other 










Ecuador Other 2013 Costa Rica Other 
Colombia MoF 2014 Dominican 
Republic 
Other 
Haiti CB 2014 El Salvador CB 
Paraguay CB 2014 Honduras Other 
Peru Other 2015 Nicaragua Other 
   Panama Other 







Russia Other 2008 Armenia Other 
Tajikistan Other 2012   
Belarus CB 2013   
Turkey Other 2014   
Note: Data from the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2015a). Data sources include the 
AFI Financial Inclusion Strategy Peer Learning Group (FISPLG), the AFI Pacific Islands 
Regional Initiative (PIRI), and the World Bank Financial Inclusion Strategies Resource 
Center. Lead institutions include: Central Bank (CB), Ministry of Finance (MoF), and 
other or non-listed institutions (Other). 
 
Table 3: National Financial Inclusion Strategies in Comparative Perspective 
Jurisdictions/Income/Regional 
Group 
NFIS Exist NFIS In 
Development 
All 27% 23% 
High income 8% 8% 
Upper middle income 38% 22% 
Lower middle income 29% 44% 
Low income 55% 27% 
Europe & Central Asia 
(excluding high income) 
12% 12% 
East Asia & Pacific 
(excluding high income) 
64% 36% 
Latin America & Caribbean 
(excluding high income) 
44% 28% 
Middle East & North 
Africa (excluding high income) 
11% 67% 
South Asia 14% 57% 
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding 
high income) 
52% 22% 
Note: Data from the 2017 Global Financial Inclusion and Consumer Protection Survey 
(World Bank, 2017). The survey includes 121 countries and three regional groups: 





and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Listed percentages are 
calculated as the percent of respondents. 
 
4.2 Global Promotion of National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies (NFISs) 
Prior to the establishment of the global financial inclusion agenda, National Financial 
Inclusion Strategies existed among a small number of countries.  As noted in Chapter 2,  
the ideas of “financial inclusion” or “financial exclusion” were especially salient in the 
United Kingdom and India, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s. Reports by HM Treasury 
in the United Kingdom in 2004 (HM Treasury, 2004) and 2007 (HM Treasury, 2007), for 
example, can both reasonably be classified as early instances of NFISs. The 2004 strategy, 
Promoting Financial Inclusion, included the following features: the creation of a £120 
million Financial Inclusion Fund (2005-2008); the prioritization of access to banking 
services, affordable credit, and free financial advice; and the creation of an independent 
Financial Inclusion Taskforce to oversee the strategy and advise the government (HM 
Treasury, 2007, p. 7). Yet, such strategies were the exception, not the rule, prior to the 
2010s. 
In the period following the establishment of the global agenda, reports produced by 
central actors at the international level reveal that NFISs were initially embedded within 
more general discussions of domestic policy change. For instance, the G20 Principles for 
Innovative Financial Inclusion, produced by the G20’s Access Through Innovation Sub-
Group of the Financial Inclusion Experts Group, include the following vague statement 
describing government leadership and policy: “The governments of the most successful 





commitment to expanding financial inclusion as a critical component of their national 
growth and development strategies” (G20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group, 2010, p. 14). 
Indeed, there is no explicit advocacy of NFISs in the main text. Nevertheless, the 
importance of such strategies was noted by the Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya and 
the Deputy Head of the Department of International Affairs (Central Bank of Brazil) in 
meetings preceding the launch of the G20 Principles.56 As demonstrated in detail below, 
subsequent global discourse around NFISs shifted markedly. As recently summarized by 
the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2020b), “[p]olicymakers in the AFI network have 
reached a consensus that National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFIS) are essential in 
coordinating financial inclusion policies and ensuring they are based on sound data and the 
impacts are robustly monitored.” 
 


















Financial No No Yes Yes 
Technical No No Yes Yes 
Knowledge Yes No Yes No 
Coordination Yes Yes No No 
 
In the global promotion of National Financial Inclusion Strategies, not all actors are 
equally involved, exercise similar geographic reach, or draw upon the same power 
 
56 Specifically, the G24/AFI Roundtable at IMF/WB Spring Meeting, 22 April 2010 (G20 Financial Inclusion 





resources. I argue that four organizations in particular - the G20’s Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion (GPFI), the Pacific Financial Inclusion Program (PFIP), and Alliance 
for Financial Inclusion (AFI), and the World Bank (WB) - occupy central positions 
(summarized in Table 4). These organizations vary considerably in terms of their age, 
membership, geographic coverage, organizational mandate, formal institutional structure, 
and resources (financial, human, and knowledge). Nevertheless, each organization has the 
capacity to exercise power in the global promotion of the financial inclusion agenda 
through the tool of NFISs.  
Insofar as NFISs constitute a “best practice” for the domestic adoption of the 
agenda, each organization helps to identify and legitimate behaviours that count as “best 
practices” (Finnemore & Barnett, 2004, p. 7). Their credibility to do so stems, in part, from 
their technical expertise and epistemic authority (Zurn et al., 2012).   Of  course,  how  this  
happens also matters. As Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2012) argue, the capacity to integrate 
countries into networks of exchange is a critical mechanism through which power can be 
exercised. In addition to ideational forms of power, one of these organizations (the World 
Bank) also possesses considerable material resources. The “compulsory” or coercive 
(Barnett & Duvall, 2005a) power associated with the World Bank’s development financing 
has traditionally provided the organization with additional leverage in promoting its 
preferred domestic agendas (Best, 2014). While each organization is exceptionally well 
positioned to promote distinct interpretations of the agenda, through NFISs, they also reside 
in a closely intertwined global network. As the following analysis makes clear, the 
emergence of a “consensus” on the importance of NFISs as a distinct tool required 






4.2.1 The Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) 
Within the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, there was an early effort to promote the 
development of NFISs. The 2010 Global Policy Forum, for instance, included a panel on 
creating strategies, which the AFI (2010a, p. 11) report summarized as follows: 
Strategies for financial inclusion are usually a direct outcome of leadership from 
financial sector policymakers. While national strategies may differ in approach, 
they demonstrate that financial inclusion is not a “one-off” effort, but rather an 
ongoing process that requires informed policy interventions, revisions, and new 
additions. Setting an appropriate and evolving financial inclusion agenda through 
continuous, formalized engagement between policymakers and stakeholders 
(where relevant) would provide great support to these initiatives. 
 
Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, a key moment in the global promotion of the 
financial inclusion agenda was the establishment of the AFI Maya Declaration. Launched 
in 2011 at the 2011 Global Policy Forum, the Maya Declaration explicitly affirmed the 
commitment of member states to the global financial inclusion agenda, the development of 
national policies to enhance financial inclusion domestically, and the use of evidence-based 
policy and measurable commitments. The Maya Declaration thus constitutes a form of 
“voluntary-based, transnational regulatory framework” for the global financial inclusion 
agenda (Soederberg, 2014a, p. 97). While it did not create binding national commitments 
or a specific set of policy prescriptions, it did aid in mobilizing greater attention and 
resources towards the agenda. 
In the year following the Maya Declaration, a survey of AFI members at the 2012 
AFI Global Policy Forum revealed that “97 percent considered a national financial 
inclusion strategy vital to accelerating financial inclusion, but only 21 percent of AFI 





In conjunction with the Maya Declaration, the survey results contributed to the creation of 
the Financial Inclusion Strategy Peer Learning Group (FISPLG) in 2013. The FISPLG was 
designed to facilitate peer learning and knowledge sharing for the purposes of developing 
NFISs. Substantively, the FISPLG agenda was meant to focus on outreach to private sector 
actors, coordination among government bodies, and identifying context-specific obstacles 
to improving financial inclusion. This learning group thus facilitated the promotion of 
NFISs in two distinct ways. First, as a platform devoted to peer learning on this topic, it 
provided a specific forum through which member states could share information and 
develop the capacity to adopt NFISs. As described by Governor Barry Whiteside (Reserve 
Bank of Fiji), the FISPLG “brings synergies to strategy and learning on financial 
inclusion... and is a golden opportunity to learn, establish and exchange ideas on financial 
inclusion” (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2014, p. 22). Second, as an established group 
within the AFI, the FISPLG is equipped with the organizational resources to conduct 
member surveys, document country experiences, and prepare and disseminate reports and 
briefs (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2014). 
Shortly after the creation of the Financial Inclusion Strategy Peer Learning Group 
(FISPLG), four sub-groups were created in 2014 to better address specific issues related to 
NFISs: financial inclusion strategy toolkits; national leadership and coordination; public-
private engagement; experience and perspectives of Francophone countries (Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion, 2014). By 2015, the FISPLG had expanded to 52 member institutions 
(across 44 countries) and had identified several priority areas for learning group 
engagement, including public-private partnerships for financial inclusion, national target 





Financial Inclusion, 2015b). Mirroring activity within the broader AFI, the FISPLG 
gradually adopted sub-groups focusing on youth, green finance, gender, the informal 
sector, and rural areas. By 2020, the FISPLG had expanded to include 62 member 
institutions (across 57 countries) and produced 13 documents or reports on different 
elements of NFISs (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2020b). 
As a forum for the promotion of NFISs, the construction of support for such 
strategies through AFI is consistent with key elements of my argument. The emphasis on 
peer-to-peer learning and dialogue among global South states (in an organization with 
exclusive global South membership) suggests greater global South agency than expected 
with historical materialist accounts. Additionally, the expansion of their work on NFISs to 
include diverse areas of focus (e.g., green finance and gender) also points towards the role 
of coordination effects in tying disparate outcomes to financial inclusion. Insofar as shared 
understandings around NFISs remained ambiguous (due to a lack of specific policy 
prescriptions and the ever-growing list of sub-groups and priority areas), the creation of 
ambiguity is more congruent with participatory dynamics and creative action than it is 
“strategic ambiguity” employed by a central entrepreneur. 
 
4.2.2 The Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) 
While the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion was initially quiet with respect to the 
adoption of NFISs, this changed in 2012. Two years after the creation of the GPFI, the 
Mexican G20 Presidency devoted considerable attention to the global financial inclusion 
agenda. At this point the G20 began encouraging wider adoption of NFISs and created a 





Peer Learning Group became an implementing partner. The G20 Leaders Declaration 
included the following statement (Group of 20, 2012): 
We acknowledge the efforts of those G20 and non-G20 countries committed to 
national coordination platforms and strategies for financial inclusion under the 
“G20 Financial Inclusion Peer Learning Program” and encourage similar efforts to 
advance effective implementation of the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial 
Inclusion such as the commitments to concrete actions to promote financial 
inclusion made by developing and emerging countries under the Maya Declaration, 
recognizing the ongoing efforts and the support by the World Bank Group and the 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion, and other stakeholders including the United 
Nations (UN), and bilateral donors to foster financial inclusion. 
 
While the GPFI lacked the capacity to provide direct financial or technical support for 
countries developing NFISs, it instead leveraged its authority as a leading global forum for 
the financial inclusion agenda in other ways. More specifically, it mobilized the world’s 
major economies, international organizations, and global standard-setting bodies around 
NFISs, helping to construct the tool as a form of “best practice”. 
 
4.2.3 The World Bank 
In addition to supporting the global financial inclusion agenda through initiatives like the 
Global Findex, as outlined in Chapter 3, the Bank also plays a prominent role in the 
promotion of NFISs. At the request of the G20 Mexico Presidency (2012), the Bank 
prepared a NFIS Reference Framework (World Bank, 2012a).57 As a systematic review of 
existing NFISs, including strategy components, financial inclusion indicators, supporting 
state institutional structures, and specific public sector policies and initiatives, the 
 
57 The Framework was prepared with input from government representatives (Mexico, Malaysia, and 
Philippines), international organizations and philanthropy organizations (AFI, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, CGAP, GPFI), and World Bank and IFC experts. It builds on previous work completed by the 





Framework was integral to shaping global discourse around NFISs. Moreover, the 
Framework contributed to the development of World Bank capacity to support individual 
country adoption. 
Within the Bank, the creation of the Reference Framework was followed by the 
establishment of the Financial Inclusion Support Framework (FISF) in 2013. With funding 
from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs ($25 million) and the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation ($6.7 million), the initiative was designed to accelerate country reforms 
in line with the global financial inclusion agenda (World Bank, 2021). The initiative 
consisted of two programs: country support and knowledge creation. The county support 
programs consisted of multi-year technical assistance projects, combining support for 
NFIS creation and implementation with complementary data collection, analytics, and 
capacity building. Country support programs were created in 2014 (Rwanda, Indonesia, 
and Mozambique), 2015 (Ethiopia and Zambia), and 2016 (Pakistan, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Vietnam). The knowledge creation program focused on the provision of research notes, 
blogs, and diagnostic studies (and their dissemination), focusing on “key underserved 
areas” (such as agriculture dependent households, women, and financial technology). At 
the launch of the FISF, World Bank Managing Director Sri Mulyani Indrawati stated: “We 
will bring our knowledge, expertise and financing to bear in support of governments and 
regulators, leading to reforms that will unlock private sector investment and innovation” 
(World Bank, 2013). 
The FISF is not the only initiative housed within the World Bank’s Finance, 
Competitiveness & Innovation Global Practice that contributes to the global promotion of 





financial inclusion agenda, of which National Financial Inclusion Strategies is only one. 
The remaining areas58 all have direct connections to the design and implementation of 
NFISs. Consequently, the World Bank has provided technical assistance and financing for 
the adoption of NFISs far beyond the FISF initiative; indeed, according to the World Bank, 
the World Bank Group is involved with more than 20 countries in the adoption of NFISs 
(World Bank, 2019). This figure should be interpreted as a conservative estimate of the 
World Bank’s involvement. Not only do we lack a centralized collection of NFISs, but 
there are also inconsistencies in how the classification of an NFIS is used compared to the 
creation of general financial sector or national development strategies that contain a 
financial inclusion component (as discussed in greater detail below). 
It is also important to recognize the more indirect sources of leverage that might be 
exercised by the World Bank. For instance, the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) is a joint program with the International Monetary Fund, which enables both 
organizations to exert influence over (primarily) global South countries through the formal 
surveillance of their financial sectors (Lombardi & Woods, 2008; Mosley, 2010). Further, 
as illustrated in the following section, the World Bank provides considerable financing for 
financial sector development across the global South. These development projects may not 
contain an explicit focus on adopting NFISs, yet they nevertheless provide the Bank with 
leverage to achieve its preferred set of institutional and policy reforms. Consequently, it is 
 
58 The nine areas include: (1) National financial inclusion strategies, (2) Modernize retail payment systems 
and government payments, (3) Reform national payment systems, including remittance markets, (4) 
Diversify financial services for individuals, (5) Leverage technology for financial inclusion, (6) Strengthen 
competition and expand access points, (7) Financial consumer protection, (8) Financial capability, and (9) 





necessary to consider the multiple direct and indirect mechanisms through which the World 
Bank can promote the adoption of NFISs. 
 
4.2.4 The Pacific Partnership for Financial Inclusion (PFIP) 
Finally, the Pacific Partnership for Financial Inclusion (PFIP) was launched in 2008 
through the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and EU Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Microfinance 
Framework Programme (EU/ACP) (Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme, 2014). 
Compared to the AFI, GPFI, and World Bank, the PFIP has a very limited geographic 
reach.  The PFIP only operates in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Vanuatu (Pacific Financial Inclusion Programme, n.d.b). In 
addition to providing funding for more than twenty private sector initiatives59, the PFIP 
also provides substantial technical support and capacity building for the development of 
regulation and government policy. 
A program review conducted by an independent consultant sheds light on how the 
PFIP shapes the adoption of the global financial inclusion agenda. The report includes a 
selection of stakeholder interviews, management notes, and the reviewer’s analysis. For 
instance, a representative of the Fijian Ministry of Trade speaks favourably of the power 
balance between PFIP and domestic governments: “They give you ownership and you 
drive the agenda,  it  is a very collaborative approach with national partners in the driver 
 
59 These projects focused on new technologies for reaching individuals who lacked access to financial 
services, including digital savings tools, mobile money systems, microinsurance, and micropensions (Pacific 





seat” (Huber, 2017, p. 5). Moreover, the Assistant Governor of the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea explicitly acknowledges the transmission of ideas: “PFIP has helped us opening up 
for new ideas” (Huber, 2017, p. 5). The management notes (Huber, 2017, p. 23) included 
in the review also speak directly to the role of the PFIP in the adoption of NFISs across the 
region: 
PFIP has assisted all of the countries in developing their national financial inclusion 
strategies and task forces. We are convinced that this work has contributed to the 
rapid mainstreaming of financial inclusion as a national policy objective, and 
accelerated conversations with other public sector entities to play their respective 
roles. We believe that first generation efforts have created momentum that will 
carry the task forces and strategies for years to come. 
 
While the financial resources of the PFIP pale in comparison to the World Bank, and the 
geographic reach is far more limited than all three of the other organizations, the PFIP 
nevertheless plays a central role in the adoption of NFISs among Pacific countries. 
Among these four organizations, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion thus stands in 
stark contrast to others, particularly the World Bank. As both a source of expert knowledge 
on NFISs while also operating as a central coordination body to facilitate the exchange of 
ideas between and among global South states, it is especially well suited to facilitate the 
participatory construction of ideas around NFISs. After all, as demonstrated in previous 
chapters, the AFI was created to perform exactly this function.  Yet, unlike the World Bank 
(which also generates expert knowledge on NFISs), it lacks the coercive leverage generated 
through development finance activities. By comparison, the World Bank possesses unique 
material and ideational resources in the promotion of NFIS and financial inclusion more 
generally. While the above overview of the World Bank’s work on NFIS does not point 
towards an especially narrow conceptualization of financial inclusion, it does illustrate the 






4.3 Observable Implications and Empirical Strategy 
In this section, I outline the specific observable implications associated with both historical 
materialist accounts of the global financial inclusion agenda and my own theoretical 
framework. As described in the introduction of the dissertation, I rely on congruence 
analysis to evaluate the extent to which the observed evidence aligns with our theoretical 
expectations (Blatter & Blume, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005).  To this end, I identify the 
precise empirical expectations associated with each theoretical explanation as they relate 
to the content of National Financial Inclusion Strategies and plausible global sources of 
their cross-national adoption. 
In the following two sections, I present empirical evidence that, collectively, 
provide compelling support for the theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation. 
First, I employ “text as data” techniques (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013) using an original 
collection of 49 National Financial Inclusion Strategies. This approach is premised on the 
conceptualization of NFISs as comprehensive public documents that follow a similar 
structure (and communicate similar types of information). It follows that the text contained 
within an NFIS can be systematically studied to identify key themes and patterns in how 
the global financial inclusion agenda is translated across contexts. Further, we can compare 
the (dis)similarity of strategies across countries through scaling techniques that measure 
the position of countries on a latent dimension. While this general approach is commonly 





strategy can be employed here.60 As a second step, I evaluate the extent to which NFISs 
align with the mechanisms proposed in my own theoretical framework that help to sustain 
the agenda over time. More specifically, I identify evidence of both institutional layering 
and the incorporation of quantification practices. 
 
4.3.1 Expectations Associated with Historical Materialism 
The financial interests of businesses and advocacy of the agenda by Western states, 
businesses, and intergovernmental organizations are central to historical materialist 
accounts of the global financial inclusion agenda. Even if we accept that the global agenda 
appears ambiguous, it remains possible that these factors shape the agenda in crucial ways 
as it is implemented domestically. In her analysis of the G20 and its Principles for 
Innovative Financial Inclusion, Soederberg (2014b, p. 169) argues, “[I]nsomuch as the G20 
Principles represent non-binding legal framings (i.e., ‘soft law’), they assume the 
appearance of neutrality while serving to reinforce underlying class-based power relations 
in the community of money.” When interrogating the adoption of National Financial 
Inclusion Strategies, two dimensions are relevant: the substance of the NFISs and the 
pathways linking the global to the domestic. 
Underpinning much of these power relations are debt-led forms of capital 
accumulation. Indeed, while more recent scholarship has investigated new technologies 
and financial infrastructures associated with financial inclusion, a recurrent focus is on 
 
60 Similar quantitative text analysis strategies have been used as part of the Comparative Manifestos Project 
(Merz et al., 2016). For a broad overview of the use of “text as data” in political science, see Grimmer and 
Stewart (2013). For an overview of such techniques in comparative politics, see Lucas et al. (2015) and De 





formal and commercialized credit within the financial inclusion “ideology” or “trope” 
(Soederberg, 2012, p. 564):  
In short, debtfare states, through regulatory and legal mechanisms, seek to 
guarantee, normalize, and reproduce the deepening and extension of debt-led forms 
of accumulation through a variety of means such as monetary and fiscal policy 
formation, prisons, courts, as well as through ideological strategies such as the 
mantra of financial inclusion as popular market-led strategy for poverty alleviation.  
 
Even accounts that ground their analysis in frameworks of governmentality and the use of 
digital technology (as part of “digital” financial inclusion) often retain a focus on lending: 
“The practices of digital-based FI delineate ‘at-risk’ populations into categories of 
borrowers, incorporating the poor into global strategies of capital accumulation through 
digital footprints, a project particularly apt for (chaotically) shaping financial(ised) 
subjectivities” (Gabor & Brooks, 2017, p. 424). Consequently, on the substantive 
dimension, such accounts focus our attention on the primary role of credit and 
commercialized financial relations enabling their provision (through commercialized 
microfinance institutions, formal banks, financial technology platforms, etc.) NFISs that 
align with historical materialist explanations should thus primarily focus on the extension 
of credit-based financial services and the associated private sector actors necessary in that 
process. 
The pathways linking global promotion efforts to domestic adoption are likely to 
be centered around the activities of the World Bank. An expansive literature frequently 
identifies the World Bank as a key actor in the global promotion of neoliberalism and 
microfinance (Bateman, 2010; Roy, 2010; Soederberg, 2014a). Indeed, some scholars, 
such as Bateman et al. (2018, p. 4) argue that the World Bank has played a central role in 





While a sense of confusion eventually gripped the international development 
community over the failure of the microcredit revolution, a new narrative, led by 
the World Bank operating in close coordination with the US government’s aid 
assistance arm, USAID, has, more recently, imbued the microcredit model with a 
new sense of purpose. This new purpose is to enlarge the extent of ‘financial 
inclusion’, thus redefining microcredit as but one component of a much wider set 
of mutually supportive finance-related interventions to address the ‘unmet needs’ 
of the poor. 
 
To be clear, this re-packaging of microcredit as financial inclusion, and the accompanying 
expansion to a wider range of financial services, is viewed as a rhetorical device that helps 
legitimate a continued focus on credit-based forms of financial services. This is also not to 
suggest that other global actors are unimportant in historical materialist explanations. 
Instead, the World Bank is uniquely positioned in the global development architecture and 
features prominently in historical materialist scholarship explaining the promotion of the 
global financial inclusion agenda. 
How might the World Bank play such a central role? On the one hand, the World 
Bank has considerable capacity to construct and shape knowledge related to National 
Financial Inclusion Strategies. This view of ideational power grounded in class relations is 
demonstrated throughout scholarship on neo-Gramscian International Political Economy 
(Cox, 1983, 1996; Gill, 1993, 2008). For instance, in her analysis of the World Bank’s role 
in promoting microfinance, Roy (2010, p. 5) argues: “Indeed, it is the World Bank that 
controls the portals of knowledge, establishing the norms, metrics, rankings, and best 
practices of microfinance. World Bank training workshops, texts, and reports disseminate 
such authoritative knowledge, investing some experts with the authority to be microfinance 
experts and denying others legitimacy and significance. In short, what is at work is a 





agenda promoted by the World Bank operates as a superficial re-packaging or rebranding 
exercise (Soederberg, 2014a) masking the underlying class-based power relations.  
On the other hand, the World Bank is relatively unique among global development 
actors due to the financial resources also at its disposal. To better understand the potential 
sources of material coercion the World Bank can leverage, we can consider the existence 
and distribution of Bank development projects. After collecting data on all financial sector 
development (FSD) projects between 2004 and 201961, I created two separate datasets: all 
FSD projects and FSD projects with a financial inclusion focus.62 It is worth considering 
both perspectives due to the uncertainties associated with correctly identifying all financial 
inclusion projects; consequently, evaluating all FSD projects provides a more conservative 
assessment. The more conservative approach using all FSD projects is presented in this 
chapter, while data using FSD projects with a financial inclusion focus are provided in 
Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. To reiterate, if it is the case that the World Bank is a central 
actor in the promotion of a dominant model of NFISs, one that privileges the interests of 
transnational capital through debt-led forms of capital accumulation, we would reasonably 
expect the use of development financing by the World Bank to be a key mechanism 
connecting the international to the domestic. 
Focusing on the global distribution of all financial sector development projects and 
financing provides a useful frame of reference for the potential influence of the World Bank 
 
61 Data acquired from Projects & Operations, The World Bank. 
62 Projects with a financial inclusion focus were identified using “key word” searches of “financial inclusion” 
within the financial sector development projects. While a “financial inclusion” classification exists within 






in the design of NFISs. Figure 3 presents the data from 2004-2019 in three separate maps, 
as follows: 
1. (Blue) The total number of FSD projects during this period for each country. 
2. (Red) The total financing (in Billion USD) of FSD projects during this period for 
each country. Countries coloured grey received zero financial sector development 
projects. 
3. (Purple) The total financing (in Billion USD) weighted as a proportion of each 
country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2018 (measured in current USD). Countries 
coloured grey received zero financial sector development projects. 
While the total number of projects and financing provide insight into the scope of World 
Bank projects cross-nationally, they should also be interpreted cautiously. According to 
both measures, for example, India is a leading recipient of World Bank financial sector 
support, in terms of the total number of projects and the absolute amount of financing. This 
fails to account for the size of the Indian economy. A more reasonable approach is to weight 
the total financing by the size of the economy. Using this measure, the general pattern of 
involvement across the global South remains consistent but we can also see the larger 











Taken together, the data on World Bank financing helps to refine the observable 
implications of historical materialist explanations. If it is the case that the Bank is 
leveraging its financial resources to coercively impose a model of NFISs, it is more likely 
to occur in countries where they have established projects to support financial inclusion or, 
more conservatively, general financial sector development projects. This is especially 
likely to be the case when the financing provided to a country is large, relative to the size 
of its economy. To be clear, this does not preclude the possibility of the World Bank 
promoting a specific vision of NFISs through less coercive means; rather, the observable 
implications of ideational and material avenues must be assessed. 
 
4.3.2 Expectations Associated with Participatory Ambiguity, 
Quantification, and Layering 
In contrast to historical materialist accounts, I argue that the ambiguity of the global 
financial inclusion agenda extends to the domestic level. A key feature of ambiguity is the 
flexibility it enables as global agendas and norms are translated across domestic contexts 
and the disparate coalitions it can mobilize. Consequently, the implementation of the 
agenda at the domestic level is likely to retain a significant level of ambiguity to maintain 
broad support beyond transnational business. In other words, the need for ambiguity around 
the agenda is reinforced through the domestic implementation process, where policy 
conflict and disagreement are more likely to occur than when constructing the global 
agenda. Empirically, this suggests that National Financial Inclusion Strategies are likely to 





interests and credit-based financial services; instead, NFISs will continue to legitimate a 
wide range of policies, actors, and outcomes associated with financial inclusion. 
While historical materialist explanations often emphasize credit-led forms of 
accumulation, the theoretical framework I advance recognizes the multiple policies and 
outcomes that are associated with the agenda. To be clear, the expectation derived from 
my argument does not reject the existence of lending as part of the financial inclusion 
agenda. Lending (and the various private sector actors who engage in and support it) are 
simply part of a much broader agenda. As a result, the text contained in NFISs should 
incorporate not only lending, but also a variety of other financial services (bank accounts, 
payment services, insurance, etc.). Moreover, ambiguity does not entail a rejection of the 
private sector but instead incorporates a variety of firms, civil society organizations, and 
the state, many of whom may have limited or non-existent ties to credit practices. 
An additional substantive dimension of the NFISs is the extent to which they reflect 
the mechanisms posited to sustain the global agenda, especially the use of quantification 
and institutional layering. After all, it is possible that the strategies themselves are only 
symbolic. On the one hand, the previous chapter demonstrated how the global financial 
inclusion agenda is quantified and benchmarked in multiple ways, albeit at the global level. 
Close evaluation of NFISs should reveal the use of global benchmarks and indicators in 
domestic strategies, as well as the development of country or region-specific targets (and 
associated data collection procedures). 
Further, institutional layering involves the “active sponsorship of amendments, 
additions, or revisions to an existing set of institutions” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b, p. 24). 





2011; Streeck & Thelen, 2005a; Thelen, 2003). The creation of new institutional elements 
on top of existing arrangements offers a “conservative” avenue of policy and regulatory 
reform.  As Beland (2007b, p. 30) argues in the context of welfare reform in the United 
States: “[L]ayering is an instrument of conservative policy change that favors the 
promotion of specific policy ideas aimed at convincing citizens and interest groups that it 
is in their interest to support Social Security privatization and the related financial 
paradigm.” Given the recognized durability of institutional arrangements in financial 
systems (Deeg & Posner, 2016), it follows that embedding the global financial inclusion 
agenda (in the absence of a critical juncture) is more likely to use this pathway. 
 
4.4 A Cross-National Comparison of National Financial 
Inclusion Strategies (NFISs) 
To use text analysis methods on the collection of National Financial Inclusion Strategies, 
I first collected as many NFISs as possible from the World Bank Financial Inclusion 
Resource Center (World Bank, 2019), individual country government websites, and direct 
communication with development agencies. In total, 49 strategies were collected, of which 
two were from regional bodies (the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)) instead of individual countries. 
Each NFIS was then manually “cleaned,” meaning that all extraneous text (such as 
headers/footers, bibliography, appendices, executive summaries, etc.) were removed, 
leaving only the main body of text for analysis. Using the statistical software environment 





cleaning.63 The final document frequency matrix is a table, where each row is an individual 
NFIS, each column is a unique word, and the cell value is the frequency with which that 
word appears in the corresponding NFIS. As a final preparatory step, I limited the 
document frequency matrix to include only words that appear at least ten times (across all 
NFISs) and appear in at least three NFISs. This step ensures that rarely used and 
substantively unimportant words do not bias the analysis. For example, several countries 
have adopted two NFISs, each of which is separately included in the collection of 
strategies. By setting the minimum number of strategies in which a word occurs to three, 
it prevents a unique word from two NFISs (e.g., from the same country) from biasing the 
results. 
After collecting and cleaning the NFISs, I use an automated scaling model called 
Wordfish (Goet, 2019; Lauderdale & Herzog, 2016; Proksch & Slapin, 2010; Slapin & 
Proksch, 2008) to evaluate the underlying structure of the NFISs. Wordfish is an 
unsupervised method which scales documents along a single latent dimension by modeling 
the word frequency matrix associated with the documents. In other words, it organizes the 
documents along a single dimension (like ideology) using the relative frequency of 
individual words in each document. To estimate the model, an important step is the 
identification of two “anchor” points. To be clear, as will be empirically presented below, 
the anchor points should not be understood as “bookends.” In other words, the anchors do 
not need to be the most extreme document at each end of the spectrum. Using ideology as 
an example, if we were to estimate the ideology of a collection of politicians from their 
 
63 This includes removing numbers, punctuation, stopwords (such as “the”, “and”, “a”) and identifying 






speeches, we would identify a liberal politician and a conservative politician to serve as 
anchor points for the model. By situating these politicians on each side of the spectrum, 
the position of the remaining politicians is then estimated relative to those two points. This 
is a necessary step statistically (in order for the model to be identified) but also has 
substantive benefits; using domain specific knowledge to identify the documents for each 
anchor point ensures that the resulting dimensions captures the intended concept. 
An alternative approach might be to create a “dictionary” (which would be 
considered a “supervised” text analysis method). This would involve the manual 
identification of a set of words or phrases which are sorted into specific classifications. To 
continue with the ideology example, we could identify words and phrases corresponding 
with liberal and conservative positions. By comparison, the method used here (Wordfish) 
does not rely on the explicit identification of words corresponding with any NFIS “model.”  
Instead, I measure the position of documents along the latent dimension through the 
selection of the two document anchor points. The method then exploits variation in 
language across documents to situate each document along the latent continuum (Grimmer 
& Stewart, 2013). As illustrated below, this method effectively disregards words that are 
commonly used across all documents (which therefore provide little information about 
their relative positions or differences). Instead, words that are uncommon across documents 
but frequently used in specific subsets of documents are much more informative.64 
 
64 A dictionary approach would also be problematic due to the specific observable implications of each 
argument. For example, words like “credit,” “loans,” or “debt” are not uniquely indicative of an NFIS that is 
consistent with historical materialist expectations since my own argument suggests credit-based financial 






In the absence of an explicitly constructed dictionary, the selection of the two 
document anchor points requires careful attention and justification. To this end, I use the 
Madagascar NFIS (2013) as the “left” anchor and the Jamaica NFIS (2016) as the “right” 
anchor.65 While the left/right orientation is unimportant and has no substantive meaning 
(i.e., it should not be interpreted in the same way as ideology), these two NFISs allow me 
to situate the dimension from a historical materialist “ideal type” (Madagascar) to my 
alternative, ambiguous “ideal type” (Jamaica). These two documents were selected through 
a qualitative assessment of each strategy in the dataset, guided by the theoretical 
expectations described in previous sections. 
Madagascar stands out among NFISs with respect to its emphasis on 
commercialized microfinance and reliance on private sector development to ensure broad 
access to financial services, especially consumer credit. Indeed, the coordination body 
created to implement the NFIS is aptly named “The National Coordination of Microfinance 
(CNMF).” Moreover, the first listed justification for the NFIS is to spur “the development 
of the economy and the fight against poverty,” which strongly mirrors the historical 
framing of microfinance as tool to combat poverty alleviation and promote economic 
development. The NFIS emerged as the successor to the National Microfinance Strategy 
(2008-2012), which was interrupted by political crises (2009-2013) (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2014). Historically, microfinance was a central feature of government 
planning. In the early 2000s, the government of Madagascar identified microfinance as a 
 






key tool for reducing poverty and committed to creating opportunities for low-income 
households to obtain credit for entrepreneurial activities (Andrianasolo, 2008). 
On the other hand, the Jamaican NFIS substantively aligns with the expectations of 
my own theoretical framework. The strategy not only identifies a wide range of relevant 
financial services and immediate policy issues, including digital payment and savings 
services, insurance, retirement products, credit (MSME, agriculture, housing), and 
consumer protection, but also acknowledges the diversity of actors necessary for the 
planning and implementation of the NFIS. For example, the NFIS “Vision” states: 
In order to deliver on this vision for 2020, the Government and its agencies, the 
financial services industry, civil society, development partners and other 
stakeholders need to all work together to implement a coordinated and well-
sequenced Action Plan to be executed by 2020. As such, a highly participatory 
implementation process, involving all stakeholders, under the auspices of a 
Financial Inclusion Council, is necessary (Jamaica NFIS 2016, 8). 
 
Moreover, the broader goals associated with financial inclusion extend beyond poverty 
alleviation and economic development: “Financial inclusion and financial integrity 
(through AML/CFT requirements) are internationally recognized as mutually supportive 
and complementary objectives” (Jamaica NFIS 2016, 14). It thus stands to reason that using 





Figure 4: Contribution of Individual Words to Estimated NFIS Position 
 
Note: The beta estimate corresponds to the informativeness of the word, or how well it 
distinguishes between documents at different ends of the spectrum. The psi estimate 
corresponds to the frequency of the word. Typically, the more frequently a word is used 
across documents, the less we can use it to distinguish between documents. Words 
highlighted in blue are on the negative/left side of the spectrum (associated with the 
historical materialist ideal type), while  words highlighted in red correspond with the 
positive/right side of the spectrum (associated with the ambiguous ideal type). 
 
 
The results of this analysis consist of two parts. First, we can assess the contribution of 
each individual word to the estimated position of each NFIS along the latent dimension. 





on the frequency of each unique word across NFISs to estimate the position of each strategy 
along a single dimension. Consequently, each word varies in terms of its capacity to 
distinguish strategies across the spectrum. The beta estimate is the statistical manifestation 
of this feature; words that are more informative, with respect to distinguishing between 
texts, will have beta estimates farther from 0 (corresponding with the end of the spectrum 
that they help to identify). On the other hand, the psi estimate relates to the frequency of 
the unique word, with greater values corresponding with more frequently used words. As 
a result, Wordfish models rely on a trade-off: the more frequently a word is used (the psi 
estimate), the less it can distinguish between documents (the beta estimate). When plotting 
all words used in the model, the result is an inverted-V shape. Figure 4 also includes several 
highlighted words to facilitate interpretation and ensure that the model is capturing the 
intended theoretical dimension. Blue words distinguish strategies on the negative/left side 
of the spectrum, which corresponds with the historical materialist ideal type (using 
Madagascar as the anchor point). Red words, on the other hand, help to identify strategies 
on the positive/right side of the spectrum, corresponding with the ambiguous ideal type 
(with Jamaica as the anchor point). For illustrative purposes, “financial inclusion” is 
highlighted in black; as a term that is ubiquitous across National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies, it has a large psi estimate and a beta estimate of approximately zero. 
The results in Figure 4 strongly support the argument that we can distinguish 
between historical materialist and ambiguous ideal types along a single dimension. Five 
blue words, which aid in identifying strategies on the historical materialist side of the 
spectrum, are highlighted: commercialization, professionalization, refinancing, credits, and 





expectations of historical materialist accounts. Insofar as NFISs focus on commercialized 
microfinance institutions and credit, we would expect these words to be uniquely 
associated with this end of the dimension. By comparison, the six red words corresponding 
with the ambiguous end of the spectrum are: mno (Mobile Network Operator), kyc (Know 
Your Customer), integrity (i.e. financial integrity), dfs (digital financial services), stability 
(i.e. financial stability), and payments. Each of these words, albeit in different ways, 
conforms with our theoretical expectations. Both “kyc” and “integrity” speak to the 
anticipated connections with financial integrity, anti-money laundering, and counter-
terrorist financing, while “stability” relates to the ties with financial stability. As argued 
throughout this dissertation, financial integrity and stability are both critical outcomes 
associated with the global financial inclusion agenda and reflect the interests of important 
constituencies that are tangentially interested in poverty alleviation. Moreover, “mno,” 
“dfs,” and “payments” reflect the broader focus around multiple types of financial services 





Figure 5: Estimated Latent Position of Each National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
 
 
The second part of the analysis involves the estimated positions of each National 
Financial Inclusion Strategy along the latent dimension, the results of which are presented 
in Figure 5. Here, the point estimate and associated 95% confidence interval (horizontal 
lines) are displayed for each NFIS, while the two “anchor” points (Madagascar and 
Jamaica) are highlighted in red for ease of interpretation. These results provide clear 
evidence of the distribution of NFISs with respect to the historical materialist and 
ambiguous ideal types. The vast majority of the NFISs are clustered around Jamaica (the 





Madagascar than Jamaica. Importantly, however, we can further interrogate these results 
along three dimensions: time, country income level, and geographic position. However, 
disaggregating the results along these dimensions produces no discernable pattern in the 
distribution of NFISs along the latent dimension (see Appendices 5-7). In other words, 
there is little evidence at this stage of the analysis for the clustering of certain types of 
NFISs at certain points in time, among countries at a given level of economic development, 
or in certain regions of the world. 
Returning to the observable implications outlined previously, the results presented 
thus far provide strong evidence against claims that National Financial Inclusion Strategies 
broadly correspond with a historical materialist ideal type. Even when disaggregating the 
individual NFIS position estimates by year, country income, and region, the evidence 
weighs against historical materialist arguments. As a final piece of evidence, Figure 6 links 
the text analysis conducted in this section to the data on World Bank financing presented 
in the previous section. More specifically, the two plots contained in Figure 6 compare the 
relationship between World Bank financing and the estimated latent position of each NFIS. 
The top half of the figure provides a more conservative approach, as it uses all World Bank 
financing for financial sector projects (2004-2019), while the bottom half uses financing 
for financial inclusion projects (2004-2019). Each measure of World Bank financing is 
weighted by country Gross Domestic Project (2018). In addition, the top half includes 
significantly more of the National Financial Inclusion Strategies (n=42) than the bottom 
half (n=25), which is unsurprising given the more narrowly focused measure of World 






Figure 6: Comparing Estimated Latent Positions of National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies to World Bank Financing for Financial Sector Projects 
 
 
Note: The top panel of the figure uses World Bank financing of all financial sector projects 
(2004-2019), weighted by the Gross Domestic Product (2018) in each country. The bottom 
panel of the figure uses World Bank financing for all “financial inclusion” projects (2004-
2019), weighted by Gross Domestic Product (2018) in each country. 
 
 
The results in these two plots fit the same pattern described previously. Regardless 
of the specific measure of World Bank financing, we can see that there is little evidence of 
a relationship that fits the theoretical expectations of historical materialist arguments. If it 





(financing) to promote a model of National Financial Inclusion Strategies conducive to the 
interests of global capital, we should observe the majority of observations in the bottom 
right corner of each plot (low NFIS position estimate, high World Bank financing). This is 
clearly not the case; indeed, the only country that arguably fits this expectation is 
Madagascar (when using the financial inclusion projects measure). 
To conclude this section, the empirical evidence generated through text analysis of 
National Financial Inclusion Strategies enables us to evaluate the observable implications 
of both historical materialist accounts of the global financial inclusion agenda and my own 
theoretical framework. Although the collection of NFISs is not exhaustive (N=49), it is 
sufficient to provide a broad perspective on how the global agenda is translated across 
domestic contexts. The results of the analysis are congruent with my own theoretical 
framework. Not only are most NFISs clustered around the ambiguous ideal type, but these 
results persist even when disaggregating by year, country income, and geographic position. 
Further, when contrasting the estimated position of each NFIS against World Bank 
financing, we find little evidence that greater levels of financing are associated with NFISs 
that are closer to the historical materialist ideal type. The continued effort to accommodate 
a wide range of financial services, actors, and outcomes across NFISs is consistent with 
my expectation that the ambiguity of the global agenda remains unresolved as it is 






4.5 Embedding the Global Agenda Through Quantification 
and Institutional Layering 
As argued throughout this dissertation, the participatory ambiguity that led to the 
establishment of the global financial inclusion agenda was insufficient to embed the new 
agenda in global practices and institutions. To explain how the agenda is supported and 
sustained over time, I identify three central mechanisms: the quantification and 
benchmarking of the agenda; the institutional layering of new policies and programs; and 
the identification of coordination effects. In this section, I situate the adoption of National 
Financial Inclusion Strategies in relation to these mechanisms. More specifically, I argue 
that the adoption of NFISs provides evidence of how global quantification and 
benchmarking practices shape changing domestic practices. I also find suggestive evidence 
of different forms of institutional layering through NFISs. 
 
4.5.1 Explaining the Role of Quantification Practices in National 
Financial Inclusion Strategies 
The use of quantification and benchmarking at the global level enables several central 
organizations to both attract attention to the global financial inclusion agenda (thus 
facilitating interest and increasing available resources) and construct a form of social 
pressure to induce behavioural change among countries. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, tools like the World Bank’s Global Findex, a global survey of individuals on their 
access to and use of financial services, shape the understanding of policymakers, civil 





a form of power and of governance; few actors have the capacity and authority to construct 
benchmarks and quantify the agenda in such a way that it alters the behaviour of others. 
Importantly, however, the use of quantification and benchmarking extends to the 
domestic adoption of the agenda through the deliberate use of global tools (like the Findex) 
and new national targets and data collection efforts. In part, this can be attributed to global 
promotional activities and efforts to establish more concrete commitments to the agenda. 
As noted by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2018b, p. 15): “[I]t is clear that the Maya 
Declaration, announced by AFI in 2011, and the Sasana Accord of 2013, have strongly 
encouraged many member countries to make specific measurable commitments and 
incorporate them into their national strategies as concrete targets.” This is also a reflection 
of the construction of National Financial Inclusion Strategies as a type of “best practice” 
and the way in which global organizations, like the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 
facilitate the construction of common knowledge and understandings. Through 
institutional bodies like the Alliance for Financial Inclusion’s Financial Inclusion Strategy 
Peer Learning Group (and similar entities through the World Bank and G20’s Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion), ideas about the use of national targets are widely 
circulated among relevant domestic policymakers. 
Notwithstanding the construction of shared knowledge and socialization 
mechanisms that occur globally, it is also important to consider the domestic factors that 
facilitate the use of quantification and benchmarking in NFISs. To this end, Dr. Nimal 
Fernando, an associate of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, argues (Fernando, n.d.): 
Why is setting national targets in financial inclusion critically important? One of 
the most important factors is that they generate a powerful set of incentives to 
achieve the stated outcomes. The ownership factor is of paramount importance 





their achievement is a matter of national pride for the country and for the major 
stakeholders actively involved in the task. Secondly, national targets show in very 
clear terms what exactly is to be achieved by when, thus providing clear goal posts 
for all relevant stakeholders. Third, if the national targets are set through a bottom-
up, consultative approach, the process itself can energize stakeholders and 
strengthen their commitment to achieve the targets. 
 
This statement aptly links the use of national targets to the theoretical framework of the 
dissertation. Not only does he acknowledge the integral role of targets in mobilizing diverse 
stakeholders, but he also emphasizes the domestic ownership of targets (rather than their 
imposition by, for example, the World Bank). Moreover, the “bottom-up, consultative 
approach” he identifies is both reasonably common across countries (as discussed in 
greater detail below) and consistent with participatory dynamics central to my argument. 
To what extent do global benchmarks and quantification inform the construction of 
National Financial Inclusion Strategies? Using the NFISs collected for the text analysis 
(described in the previous section), 28/4766 (60%) of strategies make explicit use of the 
World Bank’s Global Findex. In so doing, the Findex is typically used in two different 
ways. On the one hand, many of these strategies use the Findex to explicitly compare their 
current position to other countries. Illustrating this use, Figure 7 is reproduced from the 
Uganda National Financial Inclusion Strategy (2017, p. 6).  We can see how the Global 
Findex results from 2011 and 2014 are used to make explicit comparisons between Uganda 
and neighbouring countries (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Burundi). The specific 
indicator used for this comparison is the extent of bank account ownership. This use of the 
Findex is reflective of the power of global quantification and benchmarking. Not only does 
 
66 This excludes Liberia (2009) and Malawai (2010), as these strategies were completed before the first 





this type of quantification enable “non-experts to make simplistic comparisons of relative 
performance regarding complex phenomena at a transnational level” (Broome & Quirk, 
2015, p. 815), but it also shapes general beliefs about “successful states and appropriate 
policies” (Kelley & Simmons, 2019, p. 498). 
Figure 7: Uganda National Financial Inclusion Strategy (2017), Cross-National 
Benchmarks 
 
Note: This figure is reproduced from the Uganda National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
(2017, p. 6). The data used to create the figure were drawn from the World Bank’s 
Global Findex (2011 and 2014). 
 
The other way in which we see the Global Findex integrated into National Financial 
Inclusion Strategies is through the setting and measurement of specific national targets. As 
noted in a 2018 review of NFISs by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2018b, p. 15), 
only recently have countries started to include specific sub-targets and associated indicators 
rather than only including a general “headline” target (e.g. reducing the financially 
excluded adult population by X percent by a specific year). As countries have included 





example, the Liberian National Financial Inclusion Strategy (2019) includes 27 sub-targets, 
of which 7 make use of data from the Global Findex.67 Taken together, the use of the Global 
Findex to draw comparisons between countries or to measure specific national targets are 
indicative of the salience of such global quantification and benchmarking practices at the 
domestic level. 
We can also see the importance of these types of practices in the construction of 
country specific benchmarks, targets, and indicators. This can take the form of identifying 
a specific peer-group of countries, which participants in the creation of the NFIS deem to 
be appropriate points of comparison. For example, the Jordanian (2018) National Financial 
Inclusion Strategy contains an explicit discussion of how it constructed its own peer-group 
benchmarking system. Using three criteria (population, country income, financial sector 
depth), policymakers identified a peer-group of 11 countries.68 They then used this peer-
group to inform their NFIS targets: “For each financial inclusion indicator observed, the 
average of the three best-in class countries’ levels on each indicator is set as a long-term 
vision and, based on this, medium-term benchmarks for the time horizon of this NFIS 
(2020) are then calculated” (Jordan NFIS, 2018, p. 66). Less systematic examples of this 
are common across NFISs. The Gambian NFIS (2020) describes a step in its strategy 
construction as follows: “[I]t is imperative to learn from experiences of other countries 
especially those that have made head way in financial inclusion for international 
 
67 These include: (1) % of population with an account, (2) % of women with an account, (3) % of youth with 
an account, (4) % of rural residents with an account, (5) Percent of account holders with dormant account 
(no deposit/withdrawal in past year), (6) % of population with a mobile money account, and (7) % of 
population making or receiving a digital payment. 
68 These countries are: Tunisia, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Bulgaria, Serbia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 





benchmarking purposes. Such inter alia, include Malaysia, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Nigeria and Brazil. This will help in developing a strategy that will be comprehensive and 
realistic” (emphasis added). Pacific island countries, for instance, frequently frame their 
strategies and identify areas of success and improvement in relation to each other. 
Yet, as discussed above, the practice of setting specific national targets is an 
increasingly common feature of NFISs. Notwithstanding efforts to define the financial 
inclusion agenda and set priorities within NFISs more generally, national target setting is 
arguably the most explicit manifestation of how the agenda is understood. After all, a 
strategy might include discussion of multiple types of financial services, actors, policies, 
and objectives. However, if all that is measured is the number or volume of loans provided 
to individuals and businesses, then it stands to reason that the NFIS aligns with the 
theoretical expectations of historical materialist arguments. Moreover, as noted previously, 
such targets call attention to the agenda and can serve to mobilize stakeholders around it. 
This dynamic is well-understood by global policymakers. As summarized within a briefing 
note for the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor and the International Finance Corporation, 2013, pp. 1-2): 
Global goals could provide direction, but national targets are the tools to translate 
the ambition of goals into practical outcomes. When well-defined, publicized, and 
monitored, targets can have a rallying effect—creating a sense of urgency and 
focus, improving transparency, and strengthening accountability. Targets can also 
provide strong incentives that galvanize collective action by national governments, 
development partners, and the private sector toward shared goals. 
 
The practice of setting national targets is thus a form of quantification and benchmarking 
that is distinct from related efforts at the global level. 
In surveying the National Financial Inclusion Strategies included in the text 





the specificity of these targets varied significantly. For some countries, like Brazil (2012), 
objectives are identified in the NFIS but specific targets or indicators are not. In the 
Brazilian case, one of the eight objectives outlined in the NFIS is to improve the 
methodology and selection of indicators related to financial inclusion in Brazil.69 In such 
cases, it is unlikely that the use of general objectives will mobilize a supporting coalition 
without additional follow-up from the NFIS coordination bodies. Yet, for many others, 
detailed and extensive targets are identified within the strategy. Typically, these targets 
align with specific thematic areas. The Belize NFIS, for example, outlines four thematic 
areas (Tailored Financial Products and Services, Innovative Distribution Channels, 
Financial Education and Capability, and Financial Consumer Protection) with 13 
associated targets/indicators. Insofar as countries include specific targets, every country 
includes a range of targets covering multiple types of financial services, financial service 
providers, and policy areas. In other words, there is not a single example of a country 
limiting its measurable commitments to primarily credit-related financial services. 
 
4.5.2 Evidence of New Institutional Arrangements Through Layering 
I argue that the adoption of National Financial Inclusion Strategies also serves as an 
instrument for embedding the global agenda through the layering of new policies and 
reforms among existing institutional arrangements. Given the cross-national scope of this 
chapter, evidence of layering is necessarily restricted to the observed changes in policies, 
 
69 The specific goal is to “strengthen the methodology used to measure and monitor the state of financial 
inclusion in Brazil, broadening its scope in order to provide better evidence-based support to design financial 





rules, or institutional arrangements associated with NFISs. The coalitional politics and 
shifts that underpin the layering process are investigated in greater depth in the following 
chapter on Ghana.70  
Of course, layering might not best describe the reform processes associated with 
NFISs. Two potential rival types of incremental change include conversion (changing the 
implementation of existing rules) and displacement (the replacement of existing rules with 
new ones) (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009).71 Insofar as the observed reforms correspond with 
expectations of conversion, we would expect to see efforts to deliberately repurpose 
existing rules to accommodate new goals around financial inclusion. Alternatively, we 
would expect existing rules to be replaced by the introduction of new regulatory 
arrangements that compete with “old institutions” and erode support for the older system. 
However, both forms of change are more likely to occur when institutional arrangements 
are characterized by weak concentrations of power and entrenched interests (Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2009). As argued by Deeg and Posner (2016), financial systems are known for 
their durability and existing financial regulatory authorities and financial firms are well 
positioned to resist change. 
By comparison, my focus on layering as the operative mechanism of change 
stresses the use of small-scale and innocuous reforms that secure broad support. In turn, 
these reforms may be viewed as diffusing pressure for more radical change or achieving 
 
70 This complementarity between the use of congruence analysis (to assess the fit of observed evidence with 
rival theoretical expectations) and process-tracing (to uncover causal mechanisms and help substantiate 
causal claims) is further justified in the introductory chapter. 





incremental steps towards greater transformations. Importantly, the evidence available 
through a broad review of NFISs is constrained with respect to the motivations or 
perceptions of actors involved in the reform process. Instead, the observable implications 
of layering include the introduction of new rules, arrangements, and processes that appear 
to complement the existing institutions but hold the potential for more widespread change 
over time. 
In the analysis presented here, I draw insight from scholarship on institutional 
design in both domestic and international politics (Boin et al., 2010; Duffield, 2003; 
Johnson, 2013; Koremenos et al., 2001; Voeten, 2019) to focus attention on the types of 
layered policies and reforms that are more likely to constitute meaningful change. After 
all, it is possible that the adoption of NFISs or specific features associated with the 
strategies are superficial in nature, with little chance of producing long-term changes 
expected by institutionalist arguments. To this end, I focus on three dimensions of reforms 
that are closely linked to institutional durability: “management of resources, institutional 
oversight, [and] decision-making practices” (Johnson, 2013, p. 185; Cox et al., 1973). The 
results are summarized in Table 5 and discussed in detail below. 
 
Table 5: Forms of Institutional Layering and Associated Strength of Evidence 
NFIS Feature Evidence Example 
Governance Structure Strong Tanzania 2018 
Dedicated Unit Strong Solomon Islands 2016 
Budget Uncertain Burundi 2015 







As recognized by both international organizations (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 
2018b; World Bank, 2018e) and other scholars (Dafe, 2020), central banks frequently play 
a leading role in the process of constructing and implementing National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies. Other leadership models include sole control by the Ministry of Finance (or 
other relevant government agencies) and inter-agency committees. While it is important to 
recognize the leadership of state financial regulators72, the specific governance structures 
themselves are more salient to the argument of institutional layering. To this end, the 
governance arrangements among existing NFISs typically consist of four bodies: an NFIS 
Council, an NIFS Implementation Committee, NFIS Technical/Working Groups, and an 
NFIS Secretariat (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2018b; World Bank, 2018e). 
The specific functions and status of the NFIS governance structures provide 
evidence of both the layering process and potential durability of the reforms. The creation 
of these structures is integral to the development of new policymaking authority, including 
the management of resources and exercise of oversight. Moreover, they incorporate many 
of the main state agencies responsible for governing the financial system without 
displacing them or rewriting their mandates. Instead, these structures map the financial 
inclusion agenda on to existing institutional arrangements and policy priorities. In turn, 
change is achieved without a “frontal attack on traditional institutions,” but by altering the 
support of constituencies and creating the conditions for new coalitions to mobilize 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005b, p. 23). Indeed, as demonstrated by Palier (2005) in his work on 
 
72 The counterfactual scenario of NFIS construction and implementation is one that both (1) lacks 
involvement of the primary state agencies through which financial systems are governed, but (2) contains 
substantively important policies or reforms that gradually alter the existing institutional arrangements. Such 
a scenario is unlikely to occur given the power vested in the primary state agencies responsible for governing 





French social policy, new policies introduced at the “margins” to complement the system 
can set in motion processes that supplant existing institutional arrangements. The precise 
direction of change will likely vary by country, given the specific economic and historical 
context, yet the conditions for change to occur are evident. 
Empirically, there is substantial variation in the specific form of the governance 
structures associated with NFISs (as well as the titles assigned to each component), but the 
identification and creation of such structures is a central feature of NFISs. For example, 
the NFIS Council often consists of “high-level figures and include[s] ministers, governors, 
and executives (or their deputies) of financial sector authorities” (World Bank, 2018e, p. 
30). In Tanzania, for instance, representatives on the NFIS Council include: the Ministry 
of Finance; the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives; the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade; the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training; the Prime 
Minister’s Office, Regional Administration, and Local Government; and the Ministry of 
Labor, Youth, and Employment (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2018b, p. 19). 
Consequently, the incorporation of such central individuals from different state bodies is 
conducive to ensuring the prioritization and support of the financial inclusion agenda. 
Beyond a focus on state bodies, the creation of novel structures also generates opportunities 
for non-state actors to have direct input into policymaking and achieve long-term change. 
The Jamaican NFIS created a “Stakeholder Advisory Group” that provides direct advice to 
the National Council. This group consists of representatives from both the private sector 
and civil society. 
Within the broader governance structure, it is also important to consider the 





(2018a) and Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2018b), the creation of a dedicated unit with 
accompanying full-time staff is instrumental for the administration, monitoring, and 
evaluation of National Financial Inclusion Strategies, while also serving as a “focal point” 
for stakeholders within and external to the government. Such units benefit from direct 
access to higher level bodies within the governance structure and, as argued by the Alliance 
for Financial Inclusion (2018b), are less likely to endure resource constraints. Across 
existing NFISs, dedicated implementation units appear quite common. As summarized by 
the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2018b, p. 23), “Given such potential benefits it is not 
surprising that most countries rely on a dedicated implementation unit, although apparently 
in many countries different names are used for units that are charged with this 
responsibility.” For instance, the Solomon Islands NFIS (2016) identifies the Financial 
Inclusion Unit (housed within the central bank) as the Secretariat for the NFIS, with 
responsibility to “provide necessary information, drive activities, and provide coordination 
and technical support to Working Groups and the Task Force” (Solomon Islands NFIS, 
2016). With committed human and financial resources, it is likely that the establishment of 
dedicated units helps to ensure the implementation and longevity of the new policies and 
programs. 
Turning to the allocation of financial resources, there is far less consistent evidence 
of the extent to which National Financial Inclusion Strategies are constructed with 
dedicated (and sufficient) budgets. While it is logical that the negotiation and 
implementation of an NFIS requires considerable financial support, the strategies 
themselves rarely contain such details. The Burundi NFIS (2015) is a frequently cited 





million (USD) annually for activities specifically related to the NFIS, including an itemized 
appendix that deconstructs the budget by NFIS objective and sub-objective. This 
transparent approach, however, is an outlier. As such, the evidence remains uncertain. It is 
possible that NFIS budgets are generally adequate but considered confidential. It could also 
be the case that budgets are frequently underfunded and power remains with existing 
institutional agencies (and other policy priorities). 
Finally, the extent to which consultations inform the construction of strategies 
sheds light on the exercise of decision-making authority and cooperation of stakeholders. 
Moreover, the inclusion of different types of actors (state agencies, private firms, civil 
society organizations) is indicative of the potential range of perspectives that are 
considered when setting the NFIS agenda as well as efforts to secure broad support for 
reforms. While inclusion in consultations should not be equated with agenda-setting power, 
it is often a necessary step. Here, there is reasonable evidence of broad consultative 
processes, especially in recent years. According to a 2016 survey of Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion member countries, “the three most frequently consulted groups in the 
development of a NFIS are government (92%), private sector and NGOs/ civil society 
(67%)” (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2017b, p. 23). The nature of these consultations 
is varied, as policymakers may seek input at different stages of the design process, in 
addition to different consultation formats.73 For example, the consultation process in 
Zimbabwe included (among other steps) “a one-day national workshop, where all 
stakeholders, including public, private, financial institutions, faith-based institutions, non-
 
73 Many National Financial Inclusion Strategies reference “consultation workshops” without providing 





government organizations and development partners, were invited to contribute to the 
formulation of the financial inclusion objectives and action plans” (Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion, 2017b, p. 23). These participative processes are more likely to facilitate the 
development of supporting coalitions domestically which, in turn, increase the likelihood 
that new policies and programs will be sustained. 
To summarize this section, there is clear evidence across National Financial 
Inclusion Strategies of the use of quantification and benchmarking to help embed the global 
agenda across domestic contexts. Moreover, NFISs broadly consist of the layering of new 
policies and rules among existing institutional arrangements. By considering the available 
evidence along several dimensions (governance structure, dedicated units, budgets, and 
consultative processes), we can be reasonably confident that the incremental changes 




In summary, this chapter provides an empirical assessment of how the global financial 
inclusion agenda is adopted cross-nationally. While evidence at the global level strongly 
conforms with the theoretical framework of this dissertation, as argued in Chapter 3, this 
chapter addresses questions related to its domestic implementation. In particular, global 
support for the agenda may derive from the opportunity to impose a specific interpretation 
of the agenda at the implementation stage. In such a scenario, global support is more 
accurately characterized as “cheap talk.” The ambiguity of the agenda would indeed 





By focusing on the adoption of National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs), 
this chapter investigates the adoption of the agenda and the potential pathways linking 
global and domestic politics. Using an original collection of 49 NFISs, this chapter employs 
text analysis techniques to situate each document on a latent continuum anchored using 
two NFISs that reflect the expectations of historical materialist accounts and my own 
framework. The results strongly align with the theoretical expectations of this dissertation. 
The vast majority of strategy estimates are in closer proximity to the “ambiguous” anchor. 
Moreover, when we disaggregate the latent positions by geography, time, and country 
income, no patterns emerge to suggest that the few NFISs that align with historical 
materialist arguments are more often found under specific conditions. 
This chapter also considers the World Bank as a “most likely” source of coercive 
adoption processes. In other words, if the World Bank (among other international 
organizations) is at the forefront of promoting financial inclusion and is doing so in a way 
that privileges the interests of transnational finance (as argued by several scholars), it 
follows that the World Bank is uniquely capable of employing coercive tools to advance a 
specific vision of financial inclusion. Reflecting this possibility, I also evaluate whether 
countries that receive greater development financing from the World Bank also have NFISs 
that more closely align with historical materialist expectations. Regardless of whether I use 
all financial sector development financing or limit the analysis to financing specifically 
related to financial inclusion projects, I find no evidence to support this observable 
implication. 
Finally, this chapter investigates the proposed mechanisms associated with the 





strategies provide evidence of quantification and institutional layering. There is extensive 
evidence of quantification across national strategies. Not only do many countries 
incorporate the Global Findex in their NFIS, but they also routinely construct country or 
region-specific benchmarks and targets. While the evidence for institutional layering is not 
conclusive, many necessary features are observed. There are strong indications that NFISs 
yield new governance structures and dedicated units while relying on inclusive consultation 
processes. 
Situating this chapter in the broader context of the dissertation, the evidence 
assembled here conforms with the central argument. Not only do we observe ambiguity in 
the financial inclusion agenda at the global level, but the domestic adoption of the agenda 
through National Financial Inclusion Strategies typically retains a degree of ambiguity in 
the range of financial services, actors, and outcomes associated with financial inclusion. 
Moreover, the decentralized and participatory dynamic that produces the ambiguity is 
visible at both global and domestic levels. While this chapter has considered coercive 
mechanisms through which global actors (specifically, the World Bank) might impose the 
agenda, it does not provide evidence regarding ideational pathways. In the following 
chapter, I investigate the adoption of the global agenda in Ghana as well as broader 















5 Implementing the Global Financial Inclusion Agenda in 
Ghana 
 
As I established in Chapter 4, there is a potential distinction between the politics 
underpinning the adoption of the financial inclusion agenda globally versus domestically. 
Notwithstanding the evidence presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 on the importance of 
ambiguity and the disparate actors who formed the supporting coalition, alternative 
explanations cannot be fully ruled out. More specifically, historical materialist scholarship 
might provide a more compelling account of the implementation of the agenda across 
domestic contexts. From this perspective, the design and implementation of regulatory 
changes or new development projects may reveal a disconnect between global discourse 
and the specific policies (and ideas they embody) on the ground. Chapter 4 considered this 
possibility by assessing the cross-national adoption of National Financial Inclusion 
Strategies (NFISs). Yet, as discussed previously, unpacking the precise mechanisms 
through which NFISs are adopted, as well as associated national and micro-level politics 
of implementing the financial inclusion agenda, were beyond the scope of that chapter. 
 In this chapter, I interrogate the mechanisms and power dynamics underpinning the 
implementation of the global financial inclusion agenda in a domestic setting. From the 
existing literature, there are several expectations associated with historical materialist 
arguments, which can be systematically organized according to the substance of the 
agenda, the mechanisms of adoption, and the source of political conflict, and the 
financialization of everyday life.  First, some scholars argue that the financial inclusion 
agenda is a repackaging of commercialized microcredit and neoliberal ideas. This should 





with respect to privileging credit and those actors who provide credit services (e.g., 
commercialized microfinance institutions). Second, insofar as the financial inclusion 
agenda is a product of Western countries, international financial institutions, and financial 
interests, these actors should be at the forefront of adoption efforts within a country. Third, 
consistent with broader historical materialist work on the international political economy, 
the primary source of political conflict is expected to be class-based. Fourth, global 
processes of financialization are expected to intersect with everyday practices by 
incorporating low and middle-income households into financial markets through consumer 
credit (or other mass-marketed financial products) and private insurance (as a substitute for 
welfare state protections).  
I use Ghana as a “most likely” case (Levy, 2008; Odell, 2001; Rohlfing, 2012) for 
historical materialist explanations, which is justified in two ways. First, the historical 
development of the Ghanaian financial sector (and Ghana more generally) is deeply 
connected to the involvement of global North actors, including Britain (in its colonizing 
role), international financial institutions, and Western development agencies. Ghana is 
often portrayed as a “success story” of the Washington Consensus and neoliberal ideas. 
Second, the World Bank financed the creation of Ghana’s NFIS. It thus stands to reason 
that if transnational finance, the World Bank, and credit-based forms of capital 
accumulation and power relations are the driving factors behind the agenda, they should 
be especially visible in the Ghanaian case. 
 Empirically, this chapter draws on a combination of primary documents and elite 
interviews to trace the processes underpinning both national level reforms and the 





major actors involved, as well as many of their activities and objectives. However, 
interviews were also conducted with individuals at Ghana’s ministries and regulatory 
agencies (such as the Ministry of Finance), a major Ghanaian commercial bank (Access 
Bank Ghana PLC), apex organizations (including the Ghana Microfinance Institutions 
Network, the Ghana Co-operative Credit Unions Association, and the Ghana Association 
of Bankers), international non-governmental organizations (including Plan UK, CARE 
International, and Safe Water Network), intergovernmental organizations (UNCTAD), and 
both the American (USAID) and German (GIZ) development agencies. Organizations and 
individuals were contacted based on their direct involvement with or knowledge of key 
events under study. These interviews contribute essential details about organizational 
decision-making and public policy disputes unavailable in public records. 
 This chapter is organized in four sections. First, I situate the case by providing a 
brief overview of the historical origins and development of Ghana’s financial sector. This 
section not only reveals the legacy of the colonial origins of the financial system that are 
still evident in the structure of the contemporary financial sector, but it also substantiates 
my claims for Ghana as an appropriate “most likely” case for historical materialist 
arguments. 
 In the second section, I assess the series of financial sector reforms that occurred 
between 2000-2020. These reforms gradually evolved to not simply accommodate the 
existence of telecommunications firms (telcos) and mobile money, but instead became a 
key site of contestation between commercial banks and telcos. As the ambiguity of the 
global financial inclusion agenda legitimated a wide range of policies and actors, telcos 





contributing to the financial inclusion agenda. This dynamic also manifested in the 
construction of Ghana’s NFIS. Moreover, in direct contrast to the expectations of historical 
materialist scholarship, interview evidence from a range of actors casts significant doubt 
on claims that the World Bank controlled the agenda. The process through which the NFIS 
was developed is better characterized as domestically owned and managed. 
 The third section takes inspiration from the “everyday” political economy literature 
by evaluating the implementation of financial programs from the “bottom up.” This 
scholarship centers the power dynamics and actors that shape broader forces in the political 
economy through their daily activities. In shifting attention away from the state and instead 
focusing on how new financial inclusion projects are implemented, I examine three 
different projects created between 2009-2020 (two focused on Village Savings and Loans 
Associations and one on the integration of financial inclusion with clean water services). 
Through these projects, I demonstrate the considerable agency of local communities and 
organizations during the implementation process. Rather than act as passive recipients of a 
global agenda, I find that the deliberate participation of these actors is integral to each 
project’s success. In the final section, I summarize the evidence against historical 
materialist expectations and locate the chapter within the broader argument of the 
dissertation. 
 
5.1 Historical Context 
This section provides information on the historical development of Ghana’s financial sector 
and situates Ghana within scholarship on global economic governance. The time period 





necessary for several reasons. First, it provides country-specific insight into the political 
dynamics informing early iterations of the global financial inclusion agenda. Second, as 
will be demonstrated in subsequent sections, contemporary politics and the structure of the 
modern financial sector are strongly informed by the historical development of the 
Ghanaian financial system. Third, Ghana’s role as a “most likely” case for historical 
materialist arguments is theoretically justified by its historical relationship with Western 
financial firms and international institutions, including the global promotion of 
neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. 
 Modern banking in Ghana can be traced to the opening of the first branch of the 
British Bank of West Africa (BBWA) in 1896, which initially began business in Accra (the 
colonial and modern capital) but shortly thereafter opened branches in Kumasi (historical 
capital of the Ashanti kingdom) and Tarkwa (a major mining region) (Stockwell, 2000, pp. 
20-21). It was followed by the Colonial Bank in 1917. These two banks respectively 
evolved into Standard Chartered Bank (1969) and Barclays Bank (1925) (Mensah, 2017, 
p. 118). The primary role of these banks was to support the colonial government and, in 
the case of BBWA, even perform central bank operations like issuing currency (Stockwell, 
2000, pp. 20-21). Indeed, legislation passed in 1906 prohibited companies from engaging 
in banking business unless they were incorporated outside of the colony (Stockwell, 2000, 
p. 26).74  Until the 1960s, each bank was controlled by head offices in London, England, 
rather than local head offices.  
 
74 This restriction was lifted in response to the Trevor Report, commissioned in 1949, which investigated 
banking practices in the Gold Coast and the operational activities of the two British banks (Brownbridge & 





 Notwithstanding the Post Office Savings Banks, created in 1905 to provide deposit 
services (Mensah, 2017, p. 120), the early development of the financial sector largely 
excluded Ghanaians and reflected the structural inequalities of the colonial system. By the 
late 1940s, this dynamic came under increasing scrutiny. In particular, the two British 
banks were accused of engaging in discriminatory practices and obstructing the 
development of Ghanaian businesses (Stockwell, 2000, pp. 78-79). As noted by Stockwell 
(2000, p. 78), “British banks also became the subject of nationalist criticisms in the late 
1940s, reflecting long-standing African concern that their monopoly on formal banking in 
the colony was a key factor handicapping the development of African enterprise.” Officials 
at the Colonial Office and Bank of England resisted growing calls for indigenous banks 
and domestic control of the financial sector.  Some officials at the Bank of England went 
so far as to claim that Africans wanted “a Santa Claus – not a bank” (Bank of England 
archive, as quoted in Uche, 2003, p. 75). In correspondence with the Colonial Office in 
1948, one official claimed that the 18 bank branches serving all of Ghana (approximately 
four million people) was sufficient, given the “primitive” nature of the colony (Uche, 2003, 
pp. 82-83): 
While ... there is a strong and not unnatural desire on the part of the people there 
for a bank of their own for the encouragement of domestic industry and for 
educative purposes, it is not so clear that there is room for a new bank which would 
confine its activities to legitimate deposit banking and would at the same time be 
able to operate on a profit earning basis. Barclays and the British Bank of West 
Africa provide 18 banking offices which should be enough for a primitive country 
with some population of some 4 million.  
 
This view of greater access to financial services as a part of statist development models 






The decision to support the establishment of the first indigenous bank in Ghana in 
1952, initially called the Bank of the Gold Coast and renamed Ghana Commercial Bank 
after independence in 1957 (Mensah, 2017, p. 120), was a deliberate political maneuver on 
the part of the Bank of England. From the British perspective, the driving force of this 
decision was not a recognition that British banks failed to adequately include the vast 
majority of the Ghanaian population. Rather, archival records from the Bank of England 
reveal “[t]he origin of the Bank of the Gold Coast was political. The real purpose was to 
deflect African pressure for the creation of a Central Bank” (as quoted in Uche, 2003, p. 
81). Nevertheless, the establishment of the first indigenous bank in Ghana immediately 
affected broader access to credit and deposit services. Despite earlier claims that the 
Ghanaians were adequately served by a total of 18 bank branches, the creation of Ghana 
Commercial Bank prompted aggressive expansion by the two British banks: BBWA and 
Barclays increased their branch networks to 60 and 44 branches, respectively (Mensah, 
2017, p. 120).  
While the early development of the Ghanaian financial sector certainly pre-dated 
the creation of the contemporary global financial inclusion agenda, each process contains 
similar themes. The exclusion of Ghanaians from the formal financial sector (i.e., financial 
exclusion) was a central motivation for creating a new (indigenous) financial institution. 
As summarized by Mensah (2017, p. 120), the post-independence government (led by Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah) objected to the existing financial system for three reasons: the absence 
of Ghanaian participation, the lack of support for Ghanaian business development, and the 
orientation of the banking sector towards supporting the colonial government rather than 





2), Ghana Commercial Bank was “instructed to extend a branch network into rural areas, 
so that people in the rural areas would have access to banking facilities, and was heavily 
involved in lending to agriculture.” Further evidence can be found in the Interim Progress 
Report of the Ghana Commercial Bank for the Year Ending 30th June 1961 (Ghana 
Ministry of Finance, 1961): 
The main objectives underlying the decision to open more branches in the rural 
communities are manifold. For the purpose of this report, I wish to state only four 
points. The first objective was to bring the Bank nearer to the people so as to add 
to the opportunities of contributing to the creation of banking habit throughout the 
country. The second objective was to provide a healthy competition in the banking 
field which was completely dominated during our colonial period by two expatriate 
banks. The third objective was the establishment of proper channels through which 
the Bank can compete effectively in the accumulation of savings throughout the 
country… The fourth objective relates to the providing of better services for the 
movement of cash during the major seasons of produce marketing. 
 
There are thus strong elements of state-led development models, as greater financial 
inclusion was tied to domestic resource mobilization and the channeling of capital 
accumulation into state development policies. Further, the mechanism through which 
financial inclusion was argued to advance developmental objectives resided primarily at 
the macro-level. This stands in contrast to modern discourse, which instead often stresses 
the individual benefits of access to payment services, savings accounts, credit, and 
insurance. 
The imperatives of the developmental state and its relation to financial inclusion 
after independence are further seen in the creation of new types of publicly owned banking 
institutions. Despite the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime (1966), the Ghanaian 
government largely persisted with a developmental state model. As it relates to the 
financial sector, the government established three development finance institutions to 





Investment Bank in 1963, the Agricultural Development Bank in 1965, and the Bank for 
Housing and Construction in 1974) (Brownbridge & Gockel, 1996). Of more direct 
relevance for financial inclusion, rural banking was introduced by the Ghanaian 
government in 1976, which consisted of “community banks to provide basic banking 
services to the rural communities” (Mensah, 2017, p. 121). Moreover, the Post Office 
Savings Bank was reorganized as the National Savings and Credit Bank in 1975, while the 
Social Security Bank (1977) and Ghana Cooperative Bank (1975) were established to 
provide financial services for workers and consolidate cooperative banking (respectively) 
(Mensah, 2017, pp. 121-122). Importantly, the government also adopted policies that 
incentivized greater use of these new financial institutions. For instance, the government 
transitioned from cash payment to the use of cheques for cocoa farmers in 1982, which 
helped stimulate demand for rural banks (especially in cocoa-growing areas) that could 
cash farmers’ cheques (Steel, 2013, p. 81).75 
An important shift in the development of Ghana’s financial sector occurred in 1983, 
whereby international financial institutions and neoliberal ideas became key drivers of 
financial reform. This change in direction also lays the foundation for situating Ghana as a 
“most likely” case for historical materialist arguments. In response to an escalating 
 
75 It is not clear from the available evidence if this decision was a deliberate effort to induce demand for 





economic crisis76 and following a successful coup by Jerry Rawlings77, Ghana embarked 
on a new Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983. Otherwise known as a Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP), the widespread reform effort was caused by two distinct 
factors. First, a domestic political coalition was successfully mobilized in support of the 
reforms. Opponents to proposed reforms were either co-opted into the coalition or, 
alternatively, sufficiently divided as to prevent a united opposition to the ERP (Whitfield 
& Jones, 2008, p. 190). This mitigated potential domestic backlash to changes enacted 
across multiple economic sectors. 
The second critical element was the role of the IMF and World Bank. As noted by 
Whitfield and Jones (2008, p. 190), a “range of authors agree that the IMF and World Bank 
became the most important architects of Ghana’s economic strategy and policies.” 
According to Herbst (1993, pp. 33-35), the influence of these international bodies stemmed 
from the resources at their disposal (in the form of conditional lending and technical 
assistance), the power of neoliberalism as an intellectual framework, and the “failure of 
radicals to propose a coherent solution to Ghana’s problems.” From the perspective of the 
IMF and World Bank, Herbst (1993, pp. 35-36) suggests that Ghana benefitted from the 
desire of officials in both international institutions to create a “success story” to justify its 
 
76 Not only did per capita income decline by 30 percent between 1970 and 1982 (Mensah, 2017, p. 122), but 
Ghana’s share of the international cocoa market (a commodity central to the Ghanaian economy) declined 
from 29 to 17 percent between 1970 and 1980 (Herbst, 1993, p. 24). The extent of the economic crisis is 
summarized by Herbst (1993, p. 27): “Every organization in the country, ranging from the government to the 
private sector to voluntary organizations in the rural areas such as the churches, had essentially ground to a 
halt because of lack of resources. It was estimated that two million Ghanaian simply left the country because 
of lack of economic opportunity. Ghana had completed the transition from a prospering middle-income 
developing country with great hopes at independence to a nation suffering from Fourth World poverty.” 






suite of economic reforms and the mobilization of substantial resources to support their 
implementation: “Ghana, a notorious basket case but with a new, committed government, 
fitted the World Bank’s requirement for an exemplary case. Indeed, at the pledging 
conference in 1987, Ghana received $818 million in commitments even though it had asked 
for only $575 million.”78 Although Ghanaian officials were recognized within the World 
Bank as tough negotiators, IMF and World Bank staff proceeded to implement much of 
the ERP over the course of the 1980s and 1990s (Whitfield & Jones, 2008). 
The launch of the Economic Recovery Program ultimately led to a series of reforms 
across many areas of the economy and state-society relations. However, the following 
discussion focuses more narrowly on the financial sector. The ERP led to the creation of 
the Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP), which included two distinct 
programs: the Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FINSAC) 1 (1988-1991) and 2 (1991-
1997). These programs collectively aimed to restructure existing banks, reform the 
regulatory and prudential system, and liberalize financial markets (Mensah, 2017, pp. 124-
125; Brownbridge & Gockel, 1996). Consequently, the FINSAP increased competition in 
the financial sector (in terms of the number of privately owned banks, from 10 in 1989 to 
18 in 1996), diminished the market share of Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) (from 57 to 
27 percent over the same period), and initiated the process of government divestiture from 
GCB (Mensah, 2017, p. 126).  
 
78 Herbst (1993, p. 35) argues that the role of such material resources, in relation to ideational factors, should 
not be easily dismissed: “Ideas count, but the Ghanaians would not have been so fast to embrace the World 





In addition to the FINSAP, it is also important to note the implementation of the 
World Bank’s Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI) Assistance Project (1996-2002). To 
reiterate, NBFIs operate as a “catch-all” term for institutions that lack an official banking 
licence yet facilitate a range of financial services, including financial advisory services, 
investment, credit, and payment services. While NBFIs constituted a small portion of the 
formal financial sector, especially in relation to state-owned banks (like Ghana 
Commercial Bank) and private commercial banks, they were largely unregulated prior to 
the 1990s. Consequently, in 1993, the Financial Institutions (Non-Banking) Act was 
passed, enabling the state to regulate nine discrete types of NBFIs.79  
The NBFI Assistance Project was designed increase the capacity of NBFIs to 
compete with banks and, ultimately, increase the availability of financial services 
throughout Ghana (World Bank, 1995). According to the World Bank’s project documents, 
there was a clear recognition of the exclusion of many Ghanaians from the formal financial 
system (World Bank, 1995, p. 15): 
Although Ghana's informal financial sector is large, with an estimated 45 percent 
of all private sector financial savings mobilized through informal channels, its 
capacity to intermediate between savers and investors is limited in part by the poor 
linkages between the informal and the formal sectors. This is because formal 
providers of financial services are concentrated geographically in a few urban 
centers and because formal financial institutions discourage small and micro clients 
even in areas where they are present. 
 
The analysis of Ghana’s informal financial sector thus builds on previous work at the 
World Bank in which the exclusion of Ghanaians from formal finance is conceptualized as 
 
79 These categories include: “discount houses, leasing and hire purchase companies, savings and loan 
companies, venture capital companies, mortgage finance companies, building societies, acceptance houses, 





a supply-side problem. In other words, evidence available at the time strongly suggested 
that Ghanaians frequently used informal financial services, such as susu systems (either as 
groups or individually) and individual moneylenders (Dugleby et al., 1992).80  
 Within the NBFI project, there are also connections to the nascent global coalition 
forming in support of financial inclusion during the 1990s. The Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poorest (CGAP)81 appears to have played a central role in facilitating cross-
national learning related to expanding access to financial services. More specifically, part 
of the Assistance Project included support for the Ghanaian Ministry of Finance as it 
engaged in a diagnostic review and pilot program targeted at (what we now recognize as) 
financial inclusion. Part of this sub-project sought “to analyze some of the internationally 
acclaimed success stories of institutions (such as BKK in Indonesia, Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh and other examples from Thailand, India, Brazil and Latin America) which 
have demonstrated the ability to reach significant numbers of people who traditionally have 
the least access to financial services, both savings and credit” (World Bank, 1995, p. 32). 
Moreover, CGAP was identified as a participant in this sub-project, providing technical 
support for both the initial review and subsequent pilot project. 
By the end of the 1990s, there are two key features of the Ghanaian case that inform 
the analysis in this chapter. First, the structure of the financial sector largely excluded 
Ghanaians and remained geographically organized in a similar fashion as the colonial 
system. Estimates indicate only approximately 5% of households were served by Ghana’s 
 
80 Susu systems involve the circulation of collectors who gather daily “deposits” from their clients and return 
the full amount (minus a small commission) at the end of the month (Osei-Assibey, 2015). 
81 CGAP is an international organization affiliated with the World Bank and heavily involved with the 





commercial banks and up to 60% of the money supply resided outside of the commercial 
banking system (Basu et al., 2004, p. 3; Steel & Andah, 2003, p. 4). Notwithstanding 
roughly forty years of government effort to transition from a financial sector built to serve 
colonial interests to one that was more inclusive of Ghanaians, the degree of financial 
inclusion remained limited. Further, despite growing interest in non-bank financial 
institutions in the 1990s, commercial banks remained dominant and largely concentrated 
in urban areas of the country.  
The second feature is the extensive involvement of international financial 
institutions and neoliberal ideas. Both the World Bank and IMF were intimately involved 
in Ghana’s financial reforms during the 1980s and 1990s and Ghana is widely heralded as 
a “success story” of the Washington Consensus. Additionally, as discussed in greater detail 
below, the World Bank financed the creation of Ghana’s National Financial Inclusion 
Strategy (NFIS). Consequently, it stands to reason that the adoption of the global financial 
inclusion agenda in Ghana can constitute a “most likely” case for historical materialist 
arguments. The preceding chapters have pushed back against the notion of the global 
financial inclusion agenda as a “repackaging” of neoliberalism, spread by Western states 
and businesses through a variety of coercive and ideational tools. Ghana thus offers an 
opportunity to evaluate the empirical strength of such arguments in opposition to the 
framework presented in this dissertation. The following section presents the empirical 






5.2 Incorporating the Global Agenda in State Regulation 
This section investigates the incorporation of the global financial inclusion agenda into 
state regulation and policy in Ghana. Between 2000-2020, Ghana adopted a number of 
financial reforms and the period of time has been characterized as Ghana’s “second 
generation reforms” in the financial sector (Mensah, 2017).  A timeline of selected reforms 
and policies relevant to this section are presented in Table 1. While the scope of regulatory 
changes during this period covers all aspects of the financial system, my focus is 
constrained to those that are most closely related to the financial inclusion agenda. 
 
Table 6: A Timeline of Selected Reforms and Policies in the Ghanaian Financial 
Sector, 2000-2020 
Year Title Type 
2003 Financial Sector Strategic Plan I (FINSSP I) National Strategy 
2003 Payment Systems Act, 2003 (Act No. 662) Legal Reform 
2004 Banking Act, 2004 (Act No. 673) Legal Reform 
2008 Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act No. 774) Legal Reform 
2008 Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 Act (Act No. 749) Legal Reform 
2008 Anti-Terrorism Act, 2008 (Act No. 762) Legal Reform 
2008 Branchless Banking Guidelines (BG/GOV/SEC/2008/21) Regulatory 
Guidelines 
2012 Financial Sector Strategic Plan II (FINSSP II) National Strategy 




2016 Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 
2016 (Act No. 930) 
Legal Reform 
2016 National Financial Inclusion Development Strategy 
(2017-2023) 
National Strategy 








Research on the contemporary politics of financial reform in Ghana is exceptionally 
limited, especially in comparison to previous work on financial liberalization under the 
Washington Consensus and to financial reform in Western contexts. Indeed, Emily Jones’ 
(2020b) work on the Ghanaian adoption of the Basel international regulatory framework 
for banking82 provides one of the few political assessments. In her view, the “start and 
stop” nature of Basel implementation is primarily attributable to the differences between 
the interests and policy ideas of the two main political parties, the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Her argument identifies the desire of 
the NPP to position Ghana as a regional financial hub as a key factor in adopting global 
financial standards that may be ill-suited to the domestic context. While the ideological 
and policy orientation of the parties does not map neatly onto Western 
conceptualizations,83 Emily Jones (2020b, p. 159) suggests: “The NPP is widely perceived 
to be a party that supports the business class, with strong international connections, and 
several of its most prominent financiers have come from the financial sector.” By 
comparison, the NDC is described as a “social democratic party” whose elites have a 
stronger nationalist orientation and weaker ties to the financial sector than their NPP 
counterparts (E. Jones, 2020b, pp. 161-162).84 The financial inclusion agenda, however, 
 
82 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is located in Switzerland at the Bank for 
International Settlements and is the main body for the development of global prudential standards. While 
such standards are voluntary in nature and primarily targeted at advanced economies, a variety of political 
and economic factors encourage global harmonization (Lall, 2012; Jones E. , 2020a; Jones & Zeitz, 2017; 
Young, 2012). 
83 Whitfield (2018, p. 16), for example, draws on political settlements scholarship to explain the origins and 
nature of competitive clientelism in Ghana and the “continuity in policies and practices between two political 
parties whose ideological tags indicate that they should act quite differently.” 





involves a similar but distinct set of actors and ideas than the political economy of the Basel 
standards.   
Reflecting historical materialist scholarship and Ghana’s position as a “most likely” 
case, this section pays close attention to whether international financial institutions 
(particularly the World Bank) and Western businesses or development agencies control the 
policy and reform efforts. Moreover, I also consider the centrality of personal credit, either 
through commercialized microfinance institutions or commercial banks, in policy design 
and debates. As argued previously, much of the historical materialist scholarship on 
financial inclusion focuses attention on the exploitative nature of credit-debt relations and 
their associated power asymmetries.  
 As I demonstrate below, however, the available empirical evidence does not closely 
align with the observable implications of historical materialist work. Instead, I find that the 
primary focus of political conflict relates to the incorporation of telecommunication firms 
(telcos) and mobile money (i.e., digital payments and savings) in the financial system and 
the resistance of commercial banks. Especially in relation to the construction of the 
National Financial Inclusion Strategy, interviewees widely rejected the idea that the World 
Bank controlled the agenda. This is not to suggest that international factors played no role 
in financial reforms or the NFIS. Rather, benchmarking and knowledge dissemination 
among global South countries exerted pressure on governments to take a more active role 
in promoting financial inclusion. In addition, the layering of policies among existing 
institutional arrangements best characterizes the reform process. Consequently, the 







5.2.1 Financial Inclusion, Mobile Money, and New Regulatory Conflicts 
With the election of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2000, the regulation of the financial 
sector took on a new direction and sense of urgency. As argued by Emily Jones (2020b), 
the NPP sought to position Ghana as the hub for financial services in West Africa and 
deepen its integration with global financial markets. The ambitious reform strategy 
entailed, among other things, the implementation of the Basel II regulatory standards, the 
licensing of universal banks, and increased independence of the central bank.85 The 
development of Financial Sector Strategic Plan I (FINSSP I) and a number of legal reforms 
(including the Payment Systems Act, 2003 and Banking Act, 2004) must be viewed in this 
light. In line with global dynamics at the time, there is little evidence of the financial 
inclusion agenda during this period. Indeed, the 2008 NPP election manifesto contains no 
reference to financial inclusion, yet does state the following about its banking, finance, and 
monetary management policies: “In line with our regional and continental policy, our 
central objective is to lead the march towards the transformation of Ghana into the financial 
service centre of West Africa” (New Patriotic Party, 2008, p. 43). The establishment of the 
global financial inclusion agenda in the late 2000s coincides with regulatory reforms and 
debates within Ghana that started to incorporate financial inclusion. 
Notwithstanding the reform efforts and strategic plans during the early to mid-
2000s, my focus in this section primarily begins in 2008 for two reasons. First, 2008 was 
 
85 Interestingly, according to Emily Jones (2020b, p. 161), the IMF attempted to persuade the Bank of Ghana 
to not adopt the Basel II standards and instead limit the reform efforts to the Basel Core Principles. The Bank 
of Ghana largely ignored this advice, as adopting the more sweeping Basel II standards was intertwined with 





a key year with respect to the anti-money laundering regime in Ghana, as demonstrated by 
the passage of both the Anti-Money Laundering Act and the Ant-Terrorism Act. Not only 
did this establish the Financial Intelligence Centre as the main oversight body for ensuring 
the integrity of Ghana’s financial sector, but it also laid the foundation for the rules and 
obligations that would deeply impact subsequent financial inclusion efforts. Second, the 
Bank of Ghana’s development of its Branchless Banking Guidelines marked a key shift in 
the retail financial services landscape and in the promotion of financial inclusion more 
generally. As noted by Dr. Settor Amediku, Head of the Payment Systems Department at 
the Bank of Ghana: “The Mobile Money concept, introduced in 2009 under the Branchless 
Banking Guidelines, has been the main driver of financial inclusion in Ghana” (Amediku, 
2018, p. 11). 
Amidst the expansion of the global anti-money laundering regime in the aftermath 
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, officials began updating Ghana’s legislation by 
the mid-2000s.86 The Anti-Money Laundering Act first took shape in 2005 when, 
according to Ghana’s Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, meetings between the 
Ghanaian government and G8 Ambassadors (prior to the 2005 G8 Summit) prompted the 
development of draft legislation in line with global standards (Modern Ghana, 2006). When 
eventually passed in 2008, the Anti-Money Laundering Act criminalized money 
laundering, outlined what actions constituted aiding and abetting money laundering, 
 
86 For more details on the global anti-money laundering regime and its connection to the financial inclusion 





created “accountable institutions,”87 and formally established the Financial Intelligence 
Centre as permanent body for the oversight of anti-money laundering efforts. In 
combination with the 2008 Anti-Terrorism Act, the Ghanaian legal and regulatory 
framework for combatting money laundering was brought closer in line with global 
standards.  
The consequences of this shift were twofold. First, these steps were favourably 
viewed by the key regional and global networks that together constitute the global anti-
money laundering regime. A 2009 mutual evaluation conducted by the Inter-Governmental 
Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)88, an associate member 
of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), praised the steps taken by the Ghanaian 
government (Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West 
Africa, 2009). As noted in previous chapters, there are potentially severe material and 
reputational consequences for failing to abide by the global AML standards. Second, it 
positioned anti-money laundering as a critical dimension in regulatory conflict and efforts 
to implement the financial inclusion agenda. As argued below and in section 5.3, 
navigating the requirements of the AML regime while seeking to expand access to financial 
services required the deliberate cooperation of actors concerned with financial integrity 
(like the Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre). This mirrors debates at the 
 
87 “Accountable institutions” refers to those institutions (such as banks and non-bank financial institutions) 
designated as responsible for monitoring activities that may involve money laundering, reporting suspicious 
transactions to the appropriate authorities, and maintaining adequate records of transactions.  
88 GIABA was formed in 1999 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and became 
an official associate of FATF in 2010. As a FATF-Styled Regional Body, it is responsible for facilitating the 
adoption of international standards (specifically, FATF standards) among member countries through 
knowledge sharing, technical assistance, and mutual evaluations (Inter-Governmental Action Group Against 





global level (Chapters 2 and 3) and required both state and non-state actors to carefully 
determine the range of policies that might promote financial inclusion. In other words, the 
financial and reputational consequences for countries and firms seen as violating AML 
standards made this dimension of policymaking especially relevant for debates around 
financial inclusion. 
 Ghana became a relatively early adopter of branchless banking regulation when the 
Bank of Ghana enacted the “Regulatory Framework for Branchless Banking” in 2008. 
Indeed, the guidelines explicitly note the underlying role of promoting financial inclusion: 
“The essential spirit of Branchless Banking is financial inclusion.” As a point of reference, 
in 2007 m-Pesa emerged as the mobile money “success story” story for facilitating greater 
financial inclusion (Tyce, 2020). Consequently, according to one report 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ghana Association of Bankers, 2009, p. 19), the adoption of 
the guidelines reflected a recognition of the growing role of mobile technology in financial 
services: “In response to the increasing role of [Information and Communications 
Technology] in banks’ service delivery, [Bank of Ghana] published guidelines on 
branchless banking in August 2008 to allow collaboration between banks, 
telecommunication companies and merchants to provide greater access to banking and 
financial services to the wider public.” This shift in the treatment of mobile money is 
consistent with the theorized role of institutional layering, as argued in greater detail below. 
Moreover, several features of the guidelines are worth highlighting due to their relevance 
for subsequent policy conflicts.  
First, the Bank of Ghana formalized a “bank-led” model to mobile financial 





reflect the degree to which either Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) or banks serve as the 
lead actors. In bank-led models, MNOs are required to work with commercial banks and 
the partnerships are thus regulated by existing financial regulations. By comparison, MNO-
led models allow telcos to operate more independently of banks and potentially enjoy less 
stringent forms of regulation (with respect to anti-money laundering rules, for instance). 
The choice between models thus has potentially major implications for the competitiveness 
of each type of firm. This mirrors wider debates and political conflict that set the dominant 
actors within a given sector against technology firms seeking to “disrupt” the existing status 
quo and capitalize on less restrictive regulation (Brass & Hornsby, 2019; Cartwright, 2021; 
Culpepper & Thelen, 2020). 
The second important aspect of the guidelines is the adoption of a “many to many” 
approach to the bank-led model (the first of its kind globally). This approach prohibited 
exclusive partnerships between banks and telcos, instead requiring the participation of 
multiple banks and multiple telcos in any partnership. The available evidence does not 
clearly indicate why the Bank of Ghana chose this specific approach, although it is worth 
reiterating that Ghana was an early adopter of branchless banking regulations and thus 
could not draw on knowledge of other countries’ policies or experiences. One possible 
rationale that can be inferred from the guidelines is the desire of the Bank of Ghana to 
improve competition within the financial sector by ensuring a fully interoperable system 
among banks and telcos. As stated in the guidelines (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 
2011, p. 6): “[T]his model offers the maximum connectivity and hence maximum outreach 





each other’s customers.” By 2011, 3 telcos (MTN, Airtel, and Tigo) had entered the market 
in partnerships with 12 banks (Sawyer & Welch, 2018, p. 2). 
 Ghana’s efforts to develop branchless banking regulation in (partial) service of 
broader financial inclusion goals informed global debates at the time. Ghanaian officials 
were among a select number of global South countries included in the G20 Financial 
Inclusion Experts Group meetings in 2009-2010 that laid the foundation for the G20 Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion. In their role as Non-G20 Country Advisors, Ghanaian 
officials were invited to share their experience as “pioneers” of branchless banking and 
provide feedback on initial drafts of the Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion (G20 
Financial Inclusion Experts Group, 2010). Yet, the adoption of the guidelines also served 
as the first step in a broader series of conflicts between banks and telcos. 
 In the years following the adoption of the Branchless Banking Guidelines, global 
and regional forms of quantification and benchmarking were incorporated into the 
government’s engagement with the financial inclusion agenda. For instance, the 2012 
Financial Sector Strategic Plan II (FINSSP II), included access to banking (i.e., financial 
inclusion) as one of two “policy prongs” for both economic development and poverty 
reduction (Republic of Ghana, 2012, p. 7). Indicators related to deposit accounts, loans, the 
number of branches and ATMs are presented for a selection of 10 African countries and 8 
non-African countries. The slow adoption of mobile money by Ghanaians, as revealed by 
regional benchmarks, also played a key role in efforts to revise the original Branchless 
Banking Guidelines. Elly Ohene-Adu (Head of the Banking Department at the Bank of 
Ghana) explained the impetus behind the reform efforts as follows (Groupe Speciale 





and Uganda in financial inclusion. CGAP played a key role in bringing these numbers to 
our attention. When the Bank reviewed the comparative data from other countries, we 
realised it was time to call for a revision of the Guidelines.” Consistent with my argument 
in preceding chapters, quantification and benchmarking practices serve as an important 
mechanism through which pressure is exerted on domestic audiences to adopt the global 
agenda. 
 The reform efforts associated with mobile money are also consistent with the role 
of institutional layering as a mechanism through which the global financial inclusion 
agenda is embedded among domestic regulatory institutions. More specifically, seemingly 
small-scale and innocuous reforms were gradually adopted alongside existing regulatory 
arrangements that maintained broad support among financial sector firms and regulators. 
Such policies and guidelines simultaneously promoted financial inclusion and enabled 
greater participation of telcos and financial technology (fintech) firms in the financial 
sector while maintaining some measure of ambiguity around the agenda. These reforms 
thus served to diffuse pressure for more radical shifts to the regulation of financial services 
in favour of telcos and fintech firms, while also potentially laying the foundation for more 
transformative changes in the future. Indeed, as I discuss below, these seemingly minor 
reforms have facilitated a greater role for telcos in the domestic financial sector and helped 
strengthen calls for greater regulatory accommodation at the expense of incumbent banks. 
Given the entrenched status of commercial banks and their material interests, this form of 
change is most amenable to the distribution of power within the existing institutional 





institutional change in the long-term remains an open empirical question. Nevertheless, the 
initial steps of institutional layering appear consistent with such an outcome. 
 To further expand on the branchless banking reform efforts, officials at the Bank of 
Ghana, banks, and telcos all (eventually) recognized the collective action problems and 
perverse incentives created by the original guidelines. Stated more simply, telcos were 
committed to the expansion of mobile money and bore much of the development costs but 
were forced to depend heavily on banks who did not share their interest in mobile money 
and reaching marginalized communities. According to Franklin Belnye (Head of Banking 
Supervision at the Bank of Ghana), by 2014 the Bank of Ghana acknowledged this dynamic 
(Sawyer & Welch, 2018, p. 3): “Growth has been slow because banks should be at the 
forefront of promoting mobile money, but they’re not. They hold the power but they’re not 
very interested. Telcos do all the investment, but they can’t really promote product.” 
Although revised guidelines were eventually produced, which allowed non-banks to own 
and operate mobile money independently of banks and be directly licenced by the Bank of 
Ghana (E-money Issuers Guidelines, 2015), the new rules were delayed by last-minute 
resistance and lobbying by banks (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2017).  
The conflict between banks and telcos, initially facilitated by the layering of small-
scale reforms around the regulation of mobile money, continues to operate as the main axis 
of political conflict. According to a report by the Oxford Business Group, the regulation of 
mobile money was unlikely to be resolved soon: “[L]obbying by telecoms operators and 
banks – each wanting a greater role in MM [mobile money] – means regulations are open 
to revision in the coming years” (Oxford Business Group, n.d.). This prediction has thus 





entry of non-bank financial institutions and financial technology (FinTech) firms into the 
mobile money market (Ghanaian Times, 2019). As one outlet reported (Mobile Money 
Africa, 2019), “Speaking on the impact of the Bill, the Head of Payment Systems at the 
Bank of Ghana (BoG), Dr Settor Amediku stated that its passage should not just aid in 
promoting financial inclusion, but would negatively affect the income of banks who fail to 
be innovative.” Consequently, calls for increasingly favourable regulatory treatment of 
telcos and, to a lesser extent, financial technology firms, at the expense of incumbent banks 
are indicative of the transformative potential of the institutional layering that began more 
than a decade prior. Ultimately, the initial regulatory changes seeking to advance financial 
inclusion while maintaining broad support for the agenda may pave the way for more 
radical changes in the types of firms that compose the financial sector. 
This dynamic is not unique to Ghana. The increasing adoption of mobile money by 
individuals have provided clear benefits for implementing the global financial inclusion 
agenda (as further discussed in Section 5.4) and created both market and political 
advantages for telecommunications firms. Yet, resistance by banks and regulators 
contributes to ongoing conflict. For instance, Bob Collymore (CEO of Safaricom, one of 
the main actors behind m-Pesa in Kenya) described the slow uptake of mobile money in 
Africa as follows: “The reason you find it has failed [in some African countries] is that the 
banks are really good at lobbying against competition” (Russon, 2019). Similarly, The 
Economist (2009) noted: “Given all of its benefits, why is mobile money not more 
widespread? Its progress has been impeded by banks, which fear that mobile operators will 
eat their lunch, and by regulators, who worry that mobile-money schemes will be abused 





global financial agenda, which can be used to legitimate policies supporting the provision 
of financial services by a wide range of actors, manifests in a protracted conflict between 
banks and telecommunications firms while regulators balance competing interests and 
multiple aims (poverty alleviation, economic growth, financial stability, and financial 
integrity). I elaborate further on this dynamic in the following sub-section, as I turn to the 
creation of Ghana’s National Financial Inclusion Strategy. 
 
5.2.2 Constructing the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) 
National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs) are increasingly viewed as a “best 
practice” in support of implementing the global financial inclusion agenda. As the focal 
point of Chapter 4, I argue that NFISs provide analytical traction on assessing the global 
to domestic transmission of the agenda. Not only do NFISs support an “apples to apples” 
comparison across countries, but the particular policies, reforms, actors, and objectives 
they embody provide insight into how ambiguity in the agenda is resolved (or not). Indeed, 
multiple interviewees in Ghana remarked on the role of the Ghanaian NFIS in helping to 
bring together different visions of financial inclusion. As one interviewee stated, it helped 
organizations “move in the same direction” (In-Person Interview, Enock Nii Zoli, 
GHASALC89, Accra, Ghana, August 2019) and served as a “credible commitment” to the 
financial inclusion agenda (In-Person Interview, James Lykos, USAID, Accra, Ghana, 
August 2019). NFISs also help to probe the explanatory power of historical materialist 
arguments, both in terms of their substance and the mechanisms through which they are 
 
89 The Ghana Association of Savings and Loans Companies (GHASALC) is the apex organization for such 





produced. While Chapter 4 provided a cross-national perspective, a deeper analysis of any 
individual NFIS was beyond the scope of the chapter. 
 The Ghanaian NFIS90 was developed for the 2018-2023 period and is consistent 
with a “most likely” case for historical materialist expectations. These expectations take 
two primary forms. On the one hand, Ghana’s status as a “success story” of the Washington 
Consensus and the direct financing of the NFIS by the World Bank may lead us to strongly 
suspect that the World Bank (or Western development agencies) exerted control over its 
creation. On the other hand, the substance of the strategy – the types of financial services 
it prioritizes, the range of actors it incorporates, and the mix of policies and anticipated 
outcomes it supports – may reflect a “repackaging” of commercialised microcredit without 
necessarily finding evidence of direct control of the agenda by external actors. However, 
the evidence presented in this section does not conform with either of these observable 
implications. Instead, the interviews and documentary evidence strongly fit the argument 
developed in this dissertation in three ways: the role of global South actors in shaping the 
agenda, the embrace of multiple types of financial services, policies and outcomes within 
the NFIS itself, and the use of benchmarking as a form of pressure and agenda definition. 
 First, international actors played an important role in initiating the process, but their 
control of the agenda should not be overstated. Instead, the process through which the NFIS 
was developed reflects the ownership of Ghanaian officials, banks, telcos, and civil society 
actors over the process. As noted in a draft of the NFIS (Republic of Ghana, 2017, p. 2):  
In 2015, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) requested World Bank support in 
developing a National Financial Inclusion and Development Strategy (NFIDS) to 
 
90 Technically, the Ghanaian strategy is called the National Financial Inclusion and Development Strategy 





help increase access to financial services in Ghana and promote broader financial 
sector development. With support from the FIRST Initiative, the World Bank 
Finance and Markets Global Practice provided the technical assistance to help 
develop the NFIDS.91  
 
Additionally, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) played a key role in early stages 
of the process, providing guidance and organizing several meetings before eventually 
withdrawing from the process on their own accord (In-Person Interview with Yaw Gyamfi, 
Executive Director, GHAMFIN, Accra, Ghana, August 2019).   
 The role of the World Bank in the NFIS development process is mixed. The World 
Bank provided financing for the development of the NFIS through the FIRST Initiative 
(2016) and $30 million USD in financing to assist with NFIS implementation among other 
financial sector objectives (World Bank, 2018c). Moreover, the World Bank also supplied 
technical guidance and was heavily involved in the data collection used in drafting the 
NFIS. These points are clearly documented. However, interviews with participants in the 
process reveal a far more complex dynamic. According to Yaw Gyamfi, Executive Director 
of the apex association for microfinance in Ghana (GHAMFIN), stakeholders refused to 
allow World Bank officials to hold a leadership position in developing the strategy (In-
Person Interview, Accra, Ghana, August 2019). Moreover, while the World Bank officials 
sought to prioritize consumer protection issues, others (such as individual government 
ministries or agencies) were more concerned about the allocation of resources (money) and 
capacity building. According to Enock Nii Zoli (In-Person Interview, GHASALC, Accra, 
Ghana, August 2019) and Ben Tsikudo (In-Person Interview, Ghana Ministry of Finance, 
 
91 The Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening (FIRST) initiative is a World Bank project that provides 





Accra, Ghana, August 2019), there was also a concern with ensuring the strategy reflected 
the specific needs and context within Ghana. Indeed, the assertiveness of World Bank 
officials and the response of domestic actors to ensure a Ghanaian owned and managed 
strategy was noted by several interviewees. 
 Second, the ambiguity that characterizes the global agenda is not wholly resolved 
in the articulation of the NFIS. Instead, we continue to see an embrace of multiple types of 
financial services, policies, and outcomes, which was necessary to maintain a broad 
coalition in favour of the strategy. This is first evident in the formal definition of “financial 
inclusion” provided by NFIS steering committee in consultation with stakeholders 
(Republic of Ghana, 2018, p. 2): “Universal access to, and regular use of, a broad range of 
affordable formal financial services, including credit, saving and investment products, 
insurance, payment and money transfer services, mobile money, etc., which meet 
consumers’ needs and which they understand and trust.” Further, the NFIS is structured 
around five “pillars,” including (Republic of Ghana, 2018, p. ix): “(a) Financial Stability; 
(b) Access, Quality, and Usage of Financial Services; (c) Financial Infrastructure; (d) 
Financial Consumer Protection; and (e) Financial Capacity.” Between the fundamental 
definition of financial inclusion and the orientation of the NFIS around an expansive list 
of topics and policies, it is immediately clear that the strategy is far more encompassing 
than commercialized microfinance, the reduction of barriers to entry for foreign banks, or 
credit-based financial services. 
 Additional evidence is found in how the NFIS describes the state of financial 





(Republic of Ghana, 2018, p. 10), the use of all financial services except credit had 
increased from 2010-2015: 
With the exception of credit, the use of financial products has grown since 2010. 
Between 2010 and 2015, the use of credit products dropped from 9 percent to 7 
percent, while the use of formal remittances rose almost five times from 5 percent 
to 24 percent, savings products from 37 percent to 45 percent, and insurance from 
5 percent to 11 percent. Mobile money played a critical role in stimulating savings 
and remittances, contributing two-thirds of their increase. 
 
To be clear, this was not used as a justification for focusing greater attention on credit. 
Rather, the NFIS instead emphasized the need for further increasing the availability and 
use of payment and savings services. 
This leads to an issue of central contention in the development of the NFIS: mobile 
money. As noted in the above quote, mobile money served as the primary contributor to 
improvements in financial inclusion prior to the NFIS. The potential contribution of mobile 
money is summarized as follows (Republic of Ghana, 2018, p. 33): “In the presence of 
traditional barriers for rural and geographical[ly] dispersed populations to access banks, 
such as the high costs to deliver services and low revenues in rural areas, mobile money 
emerges as a low-cost option, given the relatively high penetration of mobile phones in 
Ghana.” However, a recurrent theme across interviews was the recognition of the conflict 
between commercial banks and telecommunications firms. Consistent with debates before 
and after the NFIS, there was concern that the financial inclusion agenda and associated 
reforms would enable telecommunications firms to supplant banks as the dominant actors 
within the financial sector (In-Person Interview with Yaw Gyamfi, Executive Director, 
GHAMFIN, Accra, Ghana, August 2019). Some argued that banks were committed to the 
financial inclusion agenda and extension of financial services throughout Ghana (In-Person 





Ghana, August 2019). Yet, evidence from several interviews, as well as the existence of 
relatively few bank projects designed to facilitate financial inclusion, suggest that 
individual banks remain predominantly interested in their traditional customer base. The 
layering of mobile money reforms throughout the 2010-2020 period, though they may have 
diffused pressure for more extensive reforms, gradually enabled telecommunications firms 
(especially MTN, given its market dominance) to challenge the banks for their own 
customers. However, to reiterate an important point about this conflict, the use of mobile 
money and growing market share of telcos centers around payment services and savings 
products, not credit.  
Third, the NFIS incorporates the quantification and benchmarking practices that I 
theorize to be a central mechanism through which the financial inclusion agenda is 
promoted. This is made clear through the extensive use of indicators to inform the state of 
financial inclusion at the time of the NFIS consultations. Although the NFIS was structured 
around data from the CGAP Financial Inclusion Insights (FII) Survey rather than the World 
Bank’s Global Findex, this was a deliberate decision justified on the basis of the increased 
data availability of the FII Survey (Republic of Ghana, 2018, p. vii). This data provided 
extensive information on the full range of financial services used by Ghanaians between 
2010-2015, disaggregated by sex, income, and region. 
The use of benchmarking is also seen in the creation of the NFIS “Financial 
Inclusion Targets.” Across two target dates (2020 and 2023) and 9 categories92, there are 
 
92 These categories include: access to financial services, financial services access points (per 10,000 km2), 






36 individual targets (Republic of Ghana, 2018, pp. 19-20). Importantly, none of the targets 
involve increasing access to or use of credit. These targets form a credible commitment 
and operationalize the agenda. Given that such targets are voluntarily constructed and, as 
seen in a select number of other countries, can potentially focus predominantly on credit 
and commercialized microfinance, the substance of the Ghanaian targets is instructive.  
 
Figure 8: Benchmarking Financial Inclusion in the Ghanaian NFIS 
 
Note: Figure reproduced from Republic of Ghana (2018, p. 63). 
 
Finally, we can observe the role of regional benchmarking in the NFIS as well. As 
shown in Figure 8, which is an image reproduced from the Ghanaian NFIS, direct 
comparisons with other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were used to create pressure to 





which the experiences of other countries informed the construction of Ghana’s NFIS. For 
instance, the experiences and lessons from other countries, such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Rwanda, informed how stakeholders prioritized different policies and 
objectives (Roderick Okoampah, In-Person Interview, ARB Apex Bank, Accra, Ghana, 
August 2019; Yaw Gyamfi, In-Person Interview, Executive Director, GHAMFIN, Accra, 
Ghana, August 2019). These lessons included the reluctance to embrace mobile money in 
Nigeria and the monopolization of mobile money by the telecom Safaricom in Kenya 
(Dafe, 2020; Tyce, 2020).  
The reproduction of the global agenda’s ambiguity through the participatory 
construction of the NFIS, which includes and supports multiple policies, actors, and targets, 
enables the maintenance of broad support among diverse constituencies. In other words, 
the NFIS does not narrow or constrain the shared understandings of financial inclusion 
despite the opportunity to do so. Different types of organizations are instead able to secure 
space for their own interests and contribute to the ambiguity of the agenda through their 
creative implementation of financial inclusion programs. Moreover, the lack of explicit 
targets involving credit is in direct contradiction of the expectations of historical materialist 
arguments. If ambiguity and a marginalization of credit within the agenda is evident in 
global discourse, global knowledge production, cross-national government strategies, and 
even the government targets within a “most likely” case for historical materialist 
arguments, the empirical evidence becomes increasingly incompatible with historical 
materialist expectations. 
This section casts considerable doubt on the explanatory power of historical 





agenda to domestic contexts. In surveying the financial reforms and strategies adopted in 
Ghana between 2000-2020, both documentary and interview evidence instead conform 
with the explanatory framework of this dissertation. The ambiguity of the global agenda is 
not meaningfully resolved as it is adopted at the national level. Instead, we observe ongoing 
policy conflicts over the regulation of mobile money and telecommunications firms. We 
also see the importance of expanding the coalition to incorporate actors whose concern is 
primarily anti-money laundering, as their willingness to adopt relaxed standards for mobile 
money is integral to its success (a point to which I return below). Furthermore, the 
importance of both benchmarking and institutional layering become evident in explaining 
how pressure is created for action, how “financial inclusion” itself is operationalized, and 
how the global agenda is embedded among existing institutional arrangements. However, 
the analysis presented thus far focuses primarily on the dynamics occurring at the national 
level. While important, this perspective obscures the ways in which the global agenda is 
implemented “on the ground” and the distinct types of politics and power that exist at that 
scale. I address this “bottom up” perspective in the next section. 
 
5.3 Financial Inclusion from the “Bottom-Up” 
In this section, I draw inspiration from recent scholarship on the “everyday” International 
Political Economy93 to interrogate the financial inclusion agenda from the “bottom-up” 
within Ghana. The purpose of the section is threefold. First, it illuminates the less visible 
 
93 The “everyday” IPE scholarship was pioneered by such scholars as Hobson and Seabrooke (2007) and 






ways in which power and agency are exercised in the process of transmitting the agenda 
from global to local levels. Rather than view the power of elite actors (such as transnational 
finance) as hegemonic, we can instead identify important ways in which the agenda 
depends on and is shaped by “everyday” actors. Second, examining how new programs are 
designed and implemented within the context of the global agenda helps reveal the distinct 
motivations and belief formation associated with different types of actors. When the 
“rubber hits the road,” what logics underpin the participation of disparate organizations 
and how does ambiguity facilitate or impede coalition maintenance? Third, it demonstrates 
a key mechanism I theorize to be central to the diffusion of the global agenda: coordination 
effects. More specifically, the evidence reveals how new civil society organizations and 
state agencies serve to broaden the supporting coalition as they embrace the potential 






Figure 9: The Spatial Organization of the Ghanaian Financial Sector 
 
Note: In both panels, population density is overlayed with the major highway system. 
Further, the left-hand panel contains orange points designating the 10 largest 
contemporary cities and the right-hand panel contains red points designating Ghana 
Commercial Bank (GCB) bank branches. 
 
To effectively employ a “bottom-up” perspective and evaluate the associated 
empirical evidence, it is useful to first consider the societal and economic context as it 
relates to everyday actors. Figure 9 presents two maps to aid in this effort. Both maps 
present the estimated population density across Ghana (using the 2010 census94) and the 
major highways in Ghana95. The left-hand panel includes additional orange points to 
 
94 Population density estimates were produced and made available by Leasure and Tatem (2020). 






denote the ten largest cities. The two largest cities – Accra (within the cluster of cities along 
the coast which constitute Greater Accra) and Kumasi (the major hub in the Southwest area 
of the country) – are the only cities with populations greater than one million people. The 
right-hand panel includes additional red points, which mark the locations of Ghana 
Commercial Bank (GCB) branches.96 Among commercial banks, GCB has a long history 
of state-directed outreach among the Ghanaian population (as outlined in section 5.1). 
Moreover, as the largest indigenous bank in Ghana, it has the capacity to support an 
extensive branch network. It thus serves as a useful (and best-case) proxy for contemporary 
branch networks. 
 What these maps reveal is not only the relatively low levels of urbanization and 
population density, but also the extent to which modern branch networks embody the 
colonial origins of the Ghanaian financial sector. The everyday politics of implementing 
the global financial inclusion agenda thus operate within a context in which wealth is 
largely concentrated in the few urban centres of the country, while individuals and 
communities contend with limited physical access to commercial banks outside of these 
centers. GCB branches are predominantly clustered in population centers and along major 
lines of transportation, mirroring the initial development of foreign and domestic banks in 
the first half of the twentieth century. In combination with a lack of well-maintained 
infrastructure and limited options for public or personal transportation, physical access to 
commercial bank branches is an obstacle for many Ghanaians. This dynamic creates 
 
96 Data on Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) branch locations were manually collected using the GCB website 





distinct obstacles and incentive structures in the implementation of projects related to 
financial inclusion.  
To evaluate the ways in which everyday actors and actions intersect with the global 
financial inclusion agenda, I focus empirically on three partnership programs implemented 
in Ghana between 2009-2020. As discussed in greater detail below, each of the banking 
partnerships aimed to facilitate greater access to formal financial services. Further, the 
types of actors involved can be broadly grouped in four categories: commercial banks (e.g., 
Barclays Ghana, Fidelity Bank), telecommunications firms (e.g., MTN), international 
nongovernmental organizations (e.g., CARE International, Plan UK, Safe Water Network) 
and local community organizations. Focusing on these programs sheds light on how the 
multiple policies and outcomes associated with the agenda can be simultaneously 
legitimated, thus aiding the expansion of the supporting coalition. 
 
5.3.1 Banking On Change 
The first program, called Banking on Change, was a multiyear partnership between two 
major international nongovernmental organizations (CARE International and Plan UK) 
and a global financial firm (Barclays). The origins of the unusual partnership can be traced 
to an initiative spearheaded by the Guardian newspaper in 2007. The Guardian sought to 
partner with an organization to “help bring a community out of poverty and deprivation,” 
ultimately selecting the African Medical and Research Foundation (Amref) and the area of 
Katine, Uganda (The Guardian, 2007). Although financial inclusion was not an explicit 
goal of the project (the goals instead revolved around health, education, water and 





agenda were incorporated into the project. Barclays contributed funding ($3 million USD) 
to the project and worked with CARE to support the development of Village Savings and 
Loans Associations (VSLAs)97 and financial education (Derban & Hares, 2008). By the 
end of the project, Barclays was interested in continuing its involvement in the nascent 
financial inclusion agenda and, in consultation with development practitioners, launched a 
new partnership with CARE and Plan UK (In-Person Interview, Anissa Msallem, Senior 
Corporate Partnerships Executive, Plan International UK, London, England, April 2017). 
The new initiative was formally announced as part of the Clinton Global Initiative in 2008 
and programme implementation began in 2009 across 11 countries (including Ghana).98 
 
 
97 Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) typically involve 10-30 members of a community 
joining together to collectively pool and monitor savings, which can also be used as loans for the VLSA 
members. The functioning of VSLAs is summarized by Plan UK  (Plan UK and Barclays, 2016: Preface) as 
follows (Plan UK and Barclays, 2016, p. i): “They are simple in set-up and management: groups of people 
come together to pool their savings in a joint savings box. Group members save small amounts of money 
together regularly, often weekly, and this money not only builds their own savings (giving a safety net in 
times of need) but is used to make loans to other group members. These loans are typically for income-
generating purposes or paying for health and education costs. Interest or a ‘service charge’ is paid on the 
loans at rates determined by the group itself. At the end of the savings cycle (which typically lasts 12 months) 
the members receive a ‘share-out’ of their savings, including dividends from interest paid on loans. Most 
VSLAs also have a ‘social fund’ which acts as a small insurance fund; members make small weekly 
contributions into the fund and the group can vote to give an emergency grant to any of its members from 
the fund.” As a “methodology” for development and expanding access to financial services, it was originally 
developed by CARE in Niger in the early 1990s (Plan UK et al., n.d.). 
98 Phase 1 of the project (2009-2012) included the following 11 countries: Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia (Plan USA, n.d.). Phase 2 of the project 
(2013-2015) included 7 countries: Egypt, Ghana, India, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia (Plan UK, 





Figure 10: Banking On Change Program Strategy 
 
Note: Figure reproduced from Plan UK, Barclays, and CARE International (2013, p. 7). 
 
Not only was the pilot program unique in the types of actors it brought together, 
but it also constituted the world’s first explicitly savings-led program (Allan, 2013). The 
strategy of the program is illustrated in Figure 10 and its tiered conceptualization of 
financial inclusion (beginning with savings and building up towards other types of financial 
services) mirrors discourse at the global level. By working with local organizations and 
community members, the Banking on Change program sought to develop new VSLAs and, 
where possible, formal linkages with financial institutions. This is one area in which 
Barclays played a key role beyond funding. More specifically, Barclays (in collaboration 
with its partner organizations) developed new types of group-based savings accounts to 
enable the VSLAs to collectively access formal financial services. Importantly, this process 
does not simply reflect a “bait-and-switch” to provide various forms of credit to the 
community groups. As noted by a project summary report (Plan UK et al., 2013, p. 17): 





the use of a set of Principles, originally developed by CARE, who first began linking 
savings groups with other national, rather than global, financial service providers. These 
Principles are essential to ensure that both the group members and the bank truly benefit 
from the experience and that sustainability is guaranteed.” Moreover, the decision to link 
the VLSA with a formal financial institution (i.e., Barclays branches) was the responsibility 
of community members rather than being a mandated feature of the program. 
 This is not to suggest that participants in the program all had the same altruistic 
aims. The rationales associated with the program’s promotional activities and, by 
extension, the international NGOs aligns with our expectations: “Community-based 
financial services tailored to the needs of poor and vulnerable households are having a 
measurable impact in reducing poverty, and improving general wellbeing and 
empowerment, particularly when offered to women” (Plan UK et al., n.d.). As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, the key outcomes often attributed to financial inclusion 
by development actors (poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment) are plainly 
evident. From Barclay’s perspective, we also find that the interests of a global financial 
firm are not simply in support of ending poverty and discrimination. Rather, “[t]he Banking 
on Change partnership also hints at wider potential benefits for Barclays in the longer term” 
through the development of a new customer base and new source of profit (Plan UK et al., 
2013, p. 22).  
While the project boasts of assisting more than 750,000 people across 11 countries 
from 2009-2015 (Plan UK et al., 2016, p. 5), this is clearly a small proportion of the total 
number of individuals excluded from the formal financial sector across these contexts. As 





inform subsequent knowledge creation and policy debates. The program summary report 
provides some indication of how knowledge generated from the Banking on Change 
partnership was intended to be transmitted back to the global level (Plan UK et al., 2013, 
p. 23): “The Banking on Change partnership is committed to sharing its experiences with 
the Alliance for Financial Inclusion and central banks, to inform their thinking.” The 
program also led to the creation of the Linking for Change Charter, a set of principles 
centered around a savings-led vision of financial inclusion that received support from 31 
organizations, including the UNCDF, the International Rescue Committee, World Vision 
International, VISA, and the Mastercard Foundation. As one interviewee (In-Person 
Interview, Anissa Msallem, Senior Corporate Partnerships Executive, Plan International 
UK, London, England, April 2017) recalled, “We were trying to do advocacy as part of 
this program to say ‘look at what we’re doing, we’re getting great results. This is what 
we’ve learned, you can replicate this.’” As part of this advocacy, reports and webinars were 
disseminated, the Charter was advertised at global conferences and networking forums, 
and (when global banks showed less interest) local and regional banks were targeted for 
inclusion in the new “Alliance” (In-Person Interview, Anissa Msallem, Senior Corporate 
Partnerships Executive, Plan International UK, London, England, April 2017).  
Importantly, however, the outcomes associated with the program (and global 
financial inclusion agenda, more generally) cannot be guaranteed. Ambiguity thus operated 
as a double-edged tool for coalition building. Insofar as the evidentiary base of the agenda 
was (and remains) disputed, it complicates efforts to incorporate new supporters who may 
question whether their interests are adequately served. Yet, at the same time, ambiguity 





the promotion of the program and associated Charter, one interviewee (In-Person 
Interview, Anissa Msallem, Senior Corporate Partnerships Executive, Plan International 
UK, London, England, April 2017) emphasized the need to resolve some of the ambiguities 
in order to more effectively expand the coalition: 
I think the focus should be on building that evidence and the business case for this. 
It’s not just about ‘Aren’t these Principles great? Sign up for these Principles.’ It 
needs to be win-win, big business wants to help society, but there also needs to be 
a benefit to them. 
 
However, the long-term aspirations of Barclays and likeminded financial firms – formal 
linkage with VSLAs and the opportunity for new forms of financial profit – was far from 
certain. This point was echoed by interviewees at Access Bank (discussed below), one of 
whom noted that banks “[h]ave to believe in the project, [there are] no short-term benefits” 
(In-Person Interview, Mac-Neil Bruce, Team Member Inclusive Banking, Access Bank, 
Accra, Ghana, August 2019). 
 
5.3.2 CARE, Telecoms, and Digitizing VSLAs 
The second program also included partnerships between international NGOs and private 
firms, as well as a focus on VSLAs, but involved key differences relating to the 
involvement of private firms. Between 2014-2017, the MicroLead project99 supported new 
partnerships between CARE International, Fidelity Bank Ghana, GN Bank, Sinapi Aba (a 
 
99 The MicroLead program began in 2008 as a $28 million global programme called the LDC Fund to Develop 
Savings-led Market Leaders for Inclusive Finance (shortened to MicroLead) with the support of the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation. It aimed to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) by supporting the development of financial service providers and savings-focused financial services 






microfinance institution later converted to a Savings & Loans company), and MTN. The 
general aim was to build on CARE’s expertise and experience with VSLAs to expand their 
use, their formal linkages with financial institutions, and their digitization.  
An important difference between this program and others, like Banking for Change, 
was the role of telecommunications firms and the use of mobile money. More specifically, 
two factors encouraged a far greater focus on involving telecommunications firms 
(specifically, MTN) in the digitization of VSLAs and linking them with financial 
institutions. First, previous experiences (including the Banking on Change program) 
revealed the challenges of implementing the financial inclusion agenda given the structure 
of the Ghanaian financial sector. Reflecting its historical development and as illustrated at 
the beginning of Section 5 (see Figure 9), commercial banks remain largely concentrated 
in major cities and typically cater to businesses and wealthy individuals therein. While 
other types of financial institutions (such as microfinance institutions, savings and loans 
companies, credit unions, rural community banks, etc.) certainly increased the availability 
of financial service providers in non-urban areas, access remained limited. Second, as 
discussed in Section 5.3, the 2010s witnessed a dramatic increase in both the availability 
and use of mobile phones and mobile money. Consequently, mobile phones offered a 
potential solution to the challenges of digitizing VSLAs and increasing the availability of 






Figure 11: Digitizing VSLAs with Telecommunications Firms 
 
 
The structure of this partnership is illustrated in Figure 11. The process is neatly 
summarized by Lauren Hendricks, executive director of CARE’s Access Africa program 
(CARE International, 2014): 
To open an account, representatives from a CARE VSLA need only visit a Fidelity 
Smart Bank agent in their village. The agent snaps photos of their identification 
cards and sends it over the MTN mobile network to a processing agent. Within five 
minutes, the remote processing agent opens the account. It’s a secure, convenient 
system that’s among the first of its kind in West Africa. In rural farming 
communities that are hours, if not days, from the nearest bank branch, this 
technology is a game-changer. 
 
Mirroring global dynamics associated with the financial inclusion agenda, as argued in 
earlier chapters, a necessary first step was the support of regulators whose priority was 
anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF). The legal and 
regulatory requirements associated with the global anti-money laundering regime often 
impede the extension of financial services. Rules governing personal identification 
documents, for example, are often disconnected from the everyday lives of people 
throughout the global South, many of whom lack such documents. With approval from the 
Bank of Ghana, Fidelity Bank created a new (“SMART”) account with reduced Know-
Your-Customer (KYC) requirements (IFC, n.d.). Consequently, individuals (on their own 





a voter ID or National Health ID care are used). To circumvent the physical constraints of 
extending financial services, bringing MTN into the partnership dramatically expanded its 
capacity to reach rural communities. CARE then served as a key link between the financial 
and telecommunications firms and local communities. Their expertise and experience with 
VSLAs allowed CARE to take responsibility for group formation and education.  
A key element of the partnership that directly relates to the “everyday” perspective 
is the involvement of local community representatives.  In interviews with individuals from 
CARE and Access Bank (which operated a similar program during this period), community 
representatives were described as a combination of local NGOs, community chiefs, and 
local “opinion leaders” (In-Person Interviews with Ellen Sedziafa, CARE International, 
and with Charity Ahadzie (Team Lead Women Banking Unit) and Mac-Neil Bruce (Team 
Member Inclusive Banking), Access Bank, Accra, Ghana, August 2019). These 
representatives played a critical role in the adoption of the programs across communities, 
owing to the legitimacy and trust in these representatives and the comparative lack of trust 
in banks.100 By serving as a liaison between partner organizations and the community, 
representatives facilitated communication in both directions. Further, as repeatedly 
emphasized by individuals at CARE and Access Bank, the voluntary nature of these 
programs required deliberate “buy-in” from communities. The success of the programs 
ultimately hinged on the active participation of communities and their willingness to 
integrate (digitized) VSLAs into existing financial practices. 
 
100 Indeed, the interview evidence citing community distrust of banks is supported by survey evidence. In the 
2017 World Bank Findex survey, 16.7% of Ghanaians without a bank account at a formal institution cited a 
lack of trust in banks as a reason (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). This was the third most common reason, after 





It is also important to note how the creation of digitized VSLAs involved the 
blending of existing and new practices by everyday actors. Group savings systems are not 
new; indeed, susu collectors in Ghana are a well-established form of indigenous informal 
finance (Osei-Assibey, 2015). The design of the CARE VSLAs sought to replace the 
physical elements of existing practices with digital alternatives (International Finance 
Corporation, n.d.): 
CARE VSLAs include up to 25 people with an elected chairperson, secretary and 
treasurer who hold keys. Each group has a box that is locked with three locks that 
are opened by these keys. To replicate this level of security, Fidelity Bank has split 
the four-digit account PIN into two, giving two digits each to two persons selected 
by the group, with the card being domiciled with a third person.101 
 
The embrace of new technology and, more specifically, mobile money in accordance with 
existing practices should not be viewed as inevitable. Rather, it reflects the agency of 
individuals and local communities throughout Ghana. 
The cumulative effect of the embrace of such financial inclusion programs and 
mobile money by Ghanaians is seen in two ways. First, as discussed in Section 5.3, it 
ultimately increases the market power of telecommunications firms and alters the 
regulatory conflicts occurring at national and global levels. Second, an important element 
of the everyday perspective is the potential feedback loop between the practices of non-
elite actors and broader knowledge structures. In the Ghanaian context, one way in which 
such a dynamic is visible is with respect to the “lessons learned” from these partnership 
programs. More specifically, such evidence is visible in the World Bank’s documentation 
 
101 The program operated by Access Bank operated in a similar fashion in terms of mimicking existing VSLA 
rules through the use of digital savings box (instead of a physical box) and distribution of digital “keys” (In-
Person Interviews with Charity Ahadzie (Team Lead Women Banking Unit) and Mac-Neil Bruce (Team 





accompanying its Financial Sector Development Project. Upon reflecting on the 
implementation and outcomes of the above programs, the following “lesson” is outlined 
(World Bank, 2018c): 
[W]hile  technology  is  important  to  creating  linkages  between  VSLAs  and  
providers  of  formal financial services, it should not disrupt the core dynamics of 
VSLA groups. VSLAs rely heavily on the trust and  other  social  dynamics  that  
come  with  frequent  group meetings.  Thus,  interventions  to  link  these groups 
to formal financial services providers should complement their activities and modus 
operandi and not seek to replace them. In addition, mobile wallets and mobile 
linkages to financial institutions, does not  mean  VSLA  members  should  no  
longer  meet  to  deposit,  count,  and  share  funds  in  front  of  one another; instead, 
mobile channels should seek to increase the security of group funds by providing a 
safe place for groups to store their money and make it easier to transact. 
 
This “lesson” provides clear evidence of how knowledge is constructed from these 
collective experiences. More specifically, the actions and experiences of local communities 
informs how program partners and other organizations perceive appropriate policies 
associated with the global financial inclusion agenda.  
Evidence of this knowledge-feedback process can also be traced through CARE 
International. As recently summarized by CARE (2020, p. 4): 
In 2018, CARE engaged with the Financial Inclusion Strategy Peer Learning Group 
of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), the leading network of central banks 
and government ministries focused on financial inclusion. As a globally recognized 
leader in financial inclusion, CARE was invited to share our experience on the role 
that savings groups can play in bridging the gap between the formal and informal 
financial sectors. CARE, in partnership with the Government of Liberia and the 
Central Bank of West African States, are jointly developing guidance for AFI 
members on how savings groups facilitate financial inclusion, particularly for rural 
and marginalized women. Having a seat at the table with global leaders who have 
fiduciary responsibility enables CARE to target advocacy efforts to emphasize the 
potential that savings groups have in spurring economic growth and leveraging the 
power of women and girls in that effort. 
 
The adoption of the global financial inclusion agenda is thus not accurately characterized 





commercialized microfinance and debt-based forms of capital accumulation at the expense 
of “everyday” actors. Instead, in Ghana we find evidence of adaptation and deliberate 
participation by individuals and communities across local contexts. Additionally, such 
practices can be seen to subsequently inform elite knowledge structures about the 
implementation of the agenda. 
 
5.3.3 Coordination Effects and Safe Water Network 
The third program is part of a global project called Financial Inclusion Business Runways 
(FIBR). The lead partners of the project were Bankable Frontier Associates (BFA) 
Global102 and the Mastercard Foundation. The project operated from 2015-2019 and, as 
described by BFA, deliberately sought to expand the types of organizations involved in 
implementing the global financial inclusion agenda (Del Ser, 2016): 
The mission of FIBR is to fund and test new business models that foster indirect 
financial inclusion instead of going by the traditional direct relationship (a financial 
institution trying to market to a low-income customer). The FIBR, indirect model 
leverages trusted relationships of small businesses, such as a shopkeeper, with their 
customers, in their local communities as an access point to financial services.103 
 
As a research and development project, it thus sought to explore different approaches to 
extending access to financial services rather than promote a single “best” policy. Moreover, 
it primarily operated across four countries: Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (BGA 
 
102 BFA Global is a research and consulting firm specializing in increasing access to financial services in the 
global South, founded by David Porteous (a widely recognized expert in microfinance and financial sector 
development) in 2006 (BFA Global, n.d.b). 
103 This vision of expanding the supporting coalition is similarly identified by Brendan Ahern (associate at 
BFA) (Ahern, 2016): “FIBR rethinks financial inclusion by working with a broader set of partners, such as 
fintech companies and small businesses in addition to traditional banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs), 





Global, n.d.a). Within each of these countries, the FIBR project teamed up with both 
financial and non-financial partners. 
 My focus is specifically on the FIBR partnership with Safe Water Network in 
Ghana. Founded in 2006 by Paul Newman, Safe Water Network is an international NGO 
with operations in Ghana and India. Its activities and advocacy broadly focus on the 
sustainable provision of safe water in rural communities and (more recently) efforts to 
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (specifically, SDG6, clean water and 
sanitation). Safe Water Network’s model is known as “Small Water Enterprises,” which 
involves the establishment of locally-owned and operated businesses that provide a market-
based supply of clean water to small communities inadequately served by public services 
(Safe Water Network, n.d.). The privatization of water services is an area of intense 
criticism. Indeed, many scholars have challenged the commodification of water and the 
“marketization of nature” (Bakker, 2010, p. 80; Bayliss, 2017; Marcatelli & Buscher, 2019; 
Morinville & Rodina, 2013; Roberts, 2008). To be clear, however, the purpose of this 
section is not to directly engage with this important debate (which is beyond the scope of 
this project). Rather, I use the experience of FIBR and Safe Water Network to instead probe 
the process through which new organizations are incorporated into the supporting coalition 
through the identification of coordination effects. The evidence also relates directly to the 
“everyday” perspective of this section, insofar as it reveals how local communities have 
voluntarily embraced new forms of digital financial services that fit with existing practices. 
 At the global level, key organizations developed an interest in the possible 
complimentary relationship between financial inclusion and access to energy and water 





services) became widely adopted. In 2013, for example, the GSMA Association104 and UK 
government launched the Mobile for Development Utilities program to examine the 
potential benefits of mobile technology for utilities services in marginalized communities. 
This program involved both an “Innovation Fund” (to support organizations piloting new 
mobile-based solutions), as well as knowledge generation and dissemination through 
reports and regional working groups (Groupe Speciale Mobile Association, n.d.). Others 
viewed the financial inclusion link with utilities through the lens of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. For instance, a 2016 report produced by the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP) (in collaboration with the World Bank, the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the UN Capital Development Fund, and the United Nations Secretary-
General’s Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development) documents the ways 
in which financial inclusion serves as a means to achieving several specific Sustainable 
Development Goals (Klapper et al., 2016). On the topics of water (SDG 6) and energy 
(SDG 7), the report states (Klapper et al., 2016, p. 7): “Two of the SDGs focus on access 
to essential infrastructure and resources—water and sanitation, and energy. Both of these 
goals are likely to have significant impact on people’s quality of life. There are many 
reasons to believe that innovations in digital financial services are likely to accelerate 
access to these resources, although the literature does not yet document this impact.” It is 
with this background in mind that I turn to the specific dynamics of the FIBR partnership 
with Safe Water Network. 
 
104 The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSMA) Association is an industry trade organization 





 In the process of establishing new Small Water Enterprises across communities, 
Safe Water Network recognized several challenges with existing payment systems. 
Communities had consistent problems with individuals and households falling into arrears 
and the task of physical collection of cash payment for water services was time consuming, 
costly, and open to fraud or corruption. In response, the organization experimented with 
“pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) payment arrangements and a transition to mobile payment 
services. Of course, Safe Water Network could not develop its own mobile payment 
platform. Instead, it turned to MTN (Waldron, 2018): 
Safe Water Network began a collaboration with MTN Ghana, the largest mobile 
money operator in Ghana. MTN recognized potential in Safe Water Network to act 
as a use case for rural mobile money users and offered their support in mobilizing 
payments. Together, the two entities carried out mobile money activation 
campaigns in each of the pilot communities. Workshops were put on, in which Safe 
Water Network customers were given reminders of the importance of safe water 
while MTN staff walked them through the mobile payment process and highlighted 
the benefits of paying with their phones. Safe Water Network announced a 
promotion campaign, offering small prizes (like T-shirts) to users who made the 
most mobile payments. 
 
The transition to mobile money also entailed the installation of “smart” meters for homes 
and “water ATMs” at community pumping stations, both of which allowed people to use 
their mobile phones to make instant payments. 
 Of course, some might question the extent to which communities were active and 
willing participants in this process. In other words, is this a type of coercive implementation 
of the financial inclusion agenda by making access to water contingent on using formal 
financial services? Interview evidence from Joseph Ampadu-Boakye, who manages 
program development, strategic partnerships, and communication for the Safe Water 
Network Ghana Country Office (In-Person Interview, Accra, Ghana, August 2019) casts 





individuals in the community in order to hand over ownership of each Small Water 
Enterprise to the respective communities, but it also engages in frequent consultation 
through each community’s “water and sanitation committee.”105 Furthermore, monitoring 
and evaluation of the project considered the extent to which community members opted to 
use public and/or free water sources or opted to pay by cash instead of mobile money. 
While collecting data on these choices is obviously valuable from the standpoint of 
program evaluation, it also indicates that these choices were, in fact, available to 
community members. Consequently, we can reasonably compare the participation of 
communities in this program to the digitization of VSLAs discussed previously. The 
success of the project hinged on the willingness of individuals and rural communities to 
deliberately adopt and use mobile financial services. 
 The experience of Safe Water Network’s embrace of financial inclusion 
demonstrates the power of coordination effects in expanding the financial inclusion 
agenda’s supporting coalition. Both the agenda and the NGO were present in Ghana for 
roughly 8 years before the launch of the pilot project. Yet, Safe Water Network recognized 
how supporting the agenda could be instrumental to advancing its own goals of sustainable 
and safe water services. In turn, as noted by Joseph Ampadu-Boakye (In-Person Interview, 
Accra, Ghana, August 2019), the organization became an important player in promoting 
financial inclusion and “it made us a key player in providing those services.” This dynamic 
thus serves to strengthen the agenda by locking in support from a wider range of actors 
 
105 Interestingly, there is a requirement that committees include at least 30% women, but most are 
approximately 50% women. While exact statistics are unavailable, Joseph Ampadu-Boakye (In-Person 






who were either uninvolved or potentially opposed to the agenda’s creation in the first 
place. 
There is also evidence of a similar type of knowledge creation and feedback that 
was observed with the multiple banking partnerships. Within Ghana, the success of Safe 
Water Network with respect to both its Small Water Enterprise model and its embrace of 
mobile money and financial inclusion have informed discussions with the relevant state 
regulator, Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA). According to Joseph 
Ampadu-Boakye (In-Person Interview, Accra, Ghana, August 2019), this relationship and 
knowledge sharing with CWSA has encouraged the agency to explore reforms to its own 
policies and laws to support wider use of these tools (Safe Water Network, 2017, pp. 21-
22). The feedback in knowledge creation and dissemination is also visible at the global 
level, especially with respect to Safe Water Network’s relationship with GSMA and, to a 
lesser extent, CGAP. GSMA provided the organization a platform to showcase its work, 
share its experiences, and inform best practices on the intersection of financial inclusion 
and water services (In-Person Interview with Joseph Ampadu-Boakye, Safe Water 
Network, Accra, Ghana, August 2019). Further, Safe Water Network has been featured in 
reports and by GSMA (Groupe Speciale Mobile Association, 2019, 2020) and as part of a 
CGAP series on “Financial Inclusion and Water” (Waldron et al., 2018). 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Interrogating the adoption of the global financial inclusion agenda in Ghana provides 
systematic evidence about the political dynamics, logics, and power associated with the 





materialist arguments. In so doing, I consider diverse forms of documentary and interview 
evidence at both the level of regulatory politics and the level of project implementation 
(i.e., from the “bottom up”). Not only does the chapter provide clear evidence against 
historical materialist explanations, but it also demonstrates the role of mechanisms I argue 
to be central to the promotion of the global agenda. 
 The regulatory conflicts occurring within Ghana differ from historical materialist 
expectations in terms of the source of conflict, the role of Western actors, and the central 
role (or lack thereof) of credit. Reflecting both the spatial organization of the Ghanaian 
financial sector and the increasing ubiquity of mobile phones, the primary source of 
conflict revolves around entrenched interests (commercial banks) and new entrants or 
challengers within the financial sector (telecommunication firms) who are better positioned 
to provide widespread access to financial services. This has important implications for not 
only understanding conflicts associated with the agenda, but also the layering process 
through which new policies and regulations are added to existing institutional 
arrangements. Further, by assessing the process and substance of the Ghanaian National 
Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS), I also demonstrate how credit is relatively 
marginalized within the agenda. Not only is the NFIS concerned with a broad range of 
financial services and potential outcomes, but the indicators and benchmarks associated 
with the NFIS exclude credit altogether. If it is the case that historical materialist arguments 
are primarily concerned with new forms of capital accumulation and asymmetric power 
dynamics due to credit, how do we explain an agenda in which credit occupies a relatively 





the consistent evidence against claims that Western actors (like the World Bank) controlled 
the NFIS agenda casts further doubt on such arguments. 
 Focusing on the implementation of the agenda also undermines the explanatory 
power of historical materialist perspectives. By investigating the creation and 
implementation of two novel banking projects and an initiative to digitize payments for 
water services, I reveal the many ways in which global South actors exercise agency in 
supporting, adapting, and informing the global financial inclusion agenda. The evidence 
reveals how the success of said projects depends on the voluntary participation of many 
different types of actors operating at different scales within Ghana. Yet, in supporting these 
projects, local actors are also able to graft the tools and aims of the agenda onto existing 
financial practices. In other words, many Ghanaians were already engaged in diverse forms 
of savings and payment practices; providing digital bank accounts through mobile phones 
is neither fundamentally different than existing practices nor obviously exploitative. 
Further, there is also evidence to show how these experiences serve to expand the coalition 
and ultimately inform the production of knowledge among central financial inclusion 
organizations at the global. 
 This chapter thus provides the final link in the empirical chain connecting the 
embedding of the financial inclusion agenda at the global level (Chapter 3) through the 
cross-national adoption of the agenda (Chapter 4) to its implementation at the domestic and 
local level. Collectively, these chapters systematically evaluate the observable implications 
of historical materialist accounts while also developing the argument advanced in this 
dissertation. In so doing, I demonstrate how explaining the emergence and diffusion of the 





of disparate actors throughout the global North and South in shaping the agenda. As a final 
step, the following chapter considers the expansion of the agenda over time and in “least 







6 Integrating the Global Financial Inclusion Agenda with 
Humanitarian Governance 
 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the process through which the global financial 
inclusion agenda was adopted within a specific national context (Ghana). This case 
provided theoretical and empirical insight into the politics around financial inclusion as the 
global agenda is implemented in the form of legal or regulatory changes or specific 
programs. In turn, the chapter considered Ghana to be a “most likely” case for historical 
materialist explanations, thus providing strong evidence against the explanatory power of 
historical materialism while also considering the plausibility of the argument advanced in 
this dissertation. To further probe the persuasiveness of my own argument, this chapter 
provides a second case study centered on humanitarian governance. 
What explains the expansion of the global financial inclusion agenda to include 
humanitarian assistance? In addressing this question, I situate the integration of financial 
inclusion and humanitarian assistance as a “least likely” case for my own arguments.106 
Not only does the provision of financial services in humanitarian contexts face substantial 
practical barriers, but divisions between humanitarian organizations and private firms (and 
between the humanitarian and development sectors more generally) cast doubt on the 
capacity of ambiguity to effectively mitigate these conflicts in the process of coalition 
 
106 Odell (2001, p. 165) defines a “least likely” case study as follows: “Probably the closest a single case 
study can come to approximating a neutral test would be when the researcher selects an extreme case that is 
highly unlikely to confirm, and finds that even this case does so. Such a least-likely case study would provide 
strong, though not unqualified, support for the inference that the theory is even more likely to be valid in 
most other cases, where contrary winds do not blow as strongly.” It is also known as the “Sinatra inference,” 
as the logic of this type of case selection mirrors Sinatra’s famous song lyrics about New York City – if you 





building. Finding evidence in support of this dissertation’s framework thus strengthens our 
confidence in the central argument. Moreover, the specific timing of this case also helps to 
unpack the evolutionary element of the financial inclusion agenda. Rather than consider 
the transformation of the agenda strictly within the domain in which it was conceived, 
evaluating its expansion across development and humanitarian contexts provides a new 
angle from which to assess participatory ambiguity. 
Empirically, this chapter draws on both primary documents and elite interviews to 
trace the evolution of the integration process in the 2010s and assess the strength of 
evidence in support of my own theoretical framework. While the documentary evidence 
provides substantial insight into the formal elements of the integration process, interviews 
with officials from Western development agencies, UN organizations, international non-
governmental organizations, major philanthropic organizations, global think tanks, and 
consulting firms shed light on the hidden political dynamics at hand. Together, the evidence 
provides clear support for the capacity of participatory ambiguity to explain the integration 
process and the salience of layering and coordination effects in consolidating the agenda. 
By comparison, the near total absence of consumer credit (and associated credit-debt power 
relations) from the integration process and the limited evidence for private firms 
controlling the agenda cast doubt on the explanatory power of historical materialist 
scholarship. 
This chapter proceeds in four sections. I first provide an overview of the actors and 
structures that constitute humanitarian governance, a necessary step to understand and 
evaluate the substantive focus of the chapter. Second, I identify the process through which 





of events characterizing the integration of financial inclusion and humanitarian assistance. 
The third section evaluates the evidence through the framework of the dissertation, 
considering the extent to which participatory ambiguity offers explanatory power for the 
integration process and whether quantification, layering, and coordination effects operate 
as key mechanisms for expanding and sustaining the agenda. The final section concludes. 
 
6.1 The Global Governance of Humanitarian Assistance 
This section situates the analysis by outlining what is meant by “humanitarian governance” 
and “humanitarian assistance” in this chapter. Further, I identify the relevant actors and 
global governance structures related to humanitarian assistance. The literature on 
humanitarian governance, assistance, and intervention is extensive and covers a wide range 
of issues that are beyond the scope of this project. Consequently, this necessarily brief 
overview will largely exclude aspects (such as the “Responsibility to Protect”) that have 
little relevance to the global financial inclusion agenda. 
Scholarship on global governance broadly seeks to understand how both state and 
non-state actors can manage common goods and global issues (Weiss, 2000). Humanitarian 
governance is a component of global governance, insofar as it focuses more specifically on 
humanitarian crises. While multiple definitions of “humanitarian governance” exist, many 
scholars employ some version of the following: “[T]he increasingly organized and 
internationalized attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce the suffering 
of the world’s most vulnerable populations” (Barnett, 2013, p. 379). A focus on 
humanitarian governance thus directs attention to the “administration of human 





to address issues of humanitarian concern. Some scholars prefer to conceptualize the 
governance of humanitarian activity as an instance of a “regime complex.”107 Orchard 
(2018, pp. 29-30) argues that a general international humanitarian regime complex, “based 
on the principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality,” contains a number of individual 
but related regimes with mandates centered around such issues as state sovereignty, 
refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). 
The governance of humanitarian assistance is distinct from definitions of humanitarian aid 
(or relief) itself, which typically involve the specific actions related to assistance in 
humanitarian contexts.108 I unpack the specific actors and structure of humanitarian 
governance in greater detail below. 
 Although humanitarian action has a long history in global politics109, there has a 
been a marked increase in humanitarian activity and scholarly attention since the end of 
the Cold War (Barnett, 2013). Explanations for this shift are wide ranging, including the 
use of humanitarianism by states as a tool of foreign policy (Chomsky, 2012), the blurring 
of humanitarian activity with military actions or security threats (Barnett, 2005; Duffield, 
 
107 A regime complex is defined as the “presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international 
regimes that are not hierarchically ordered” (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 13). See also Alter and Raustiala 
(2018), Orsini, Morin, and Young (2013), and Raustiala and Victor (2004). 
108 For example, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on the following definition 
of humanitarian aid in 2007 (Carbonnier, 2015, p. 40): “Assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering 
and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. To be classified as 
humanitarian, aid should be consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality 
and independence. Humanitarian aid includes: disaster prevention and preparedness; the provision of shelter, 
food, water and sanitation, health services and other items of assistance for the benefit of affected people and 
to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods; measures to promote and protect the safety, welfare 
and dignity of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities and rehabilitation, reconstruction and 
transition assistance while the emergency situation persists.” 
109 For a general overview of the historical development of humanitarianism, see L. Barnett (2002) and M. 
Barnett (2011). On the creation and evolution of the Red Cross, see Forsythe (2005). On the historical practice 





2007), and efforts by a variety of non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations 
to expand the scope of action beyond traditional principles or boundaries (Chandler, 2001; 
Yamashita, 2015). In empirical terms, the scale of humanitarian crises has dramatically 
increased with few signs of abating. According to UNHCR (2018, p. 4): “The global 
population of forcibly displaced people grew substantially from 43.3 million in 2009 to 
70.8 million in 2018, reaching a record high.”110 Indeed, the number of forcibly displaced 
people globally has roughly doubled since 1990 (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2019). The financing of humanitarian assistance has similarly expanded, from 
approximately $2.1 billion in the early 1990s to approximately $30 billion USD in 2019 
(Buchanan-Smith & Randel, 2002; Development Aid, n.d.). 
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the range of actors who participate in 
this space and the governing structure of humanitarian assistance have similarly shifted 
over time. The following subsections map out the evolution of actors and structures over 
time while also unpacking their interaction. I will also make clear how a political economy 
perspective helps explain the behaviour of actors within the humanitarian space. Focusing 
on the political economy of humanitarian assistance also reveals the salience of 
mechanisms underpinning the incorporation of financial inclusion within humanitarian 
governance. The final subsection thus pulls together the contextual information with the 
dissertation project by explaining how this case serves as an effective “least likely” case 
for the argument of the dissertation and identifies the observable implications associated 
with my own and historical materialist perspectives. 
 






6.1.1 Who are the Key Actors? 
A key step in understanding the organization of humanitarian governance is identifying the 
actors involved in this space. According to one estimate (Gharib, 2016), approximately 
4,500 aid agencies operate within the humanitarian space, in addition to a variety of states 
and intergovernmental organizations. Further, the humanitarian sector employs roughly 
274,000 people according to a 2010 estimate (Carbonnier, 2015, p. 37). While many 
organizations are widely recognized, such as the Red Cross, Oxfam, and various United 
Nations entities, the full scope of participating organizations is increasingly diverse. “New 
humanitarians” like multinational corporations, rebel groups, and international diasporas 
are often key players in contemporary humanitarian contexts (Sezgin & Dijkzeul, 2015). 
Indeed, as Barnett (2013, p. 387) suggests, if the criteria for identifying relevant actors is 
“Who shows up?” rather than assuming all members of the humanitarian community 
subscribe to a shared set of values and beliefs, many different types of actors become 
salient. 
 One useful approach to disentangling the humanitarian community is offered by 
Carbonnier (2015, pp. 58-59), who separates “traditional” from “new” actors. Within the 
traditional category, he identifies four distinct groups of actors: multilateral 
organizations111, non-governmental organizations112, the International Movement of the 
 
111 This includes the United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). 





Red Cross and Red Crescent, and bilateral or governmental aid agencies113. The centrality 
of the United Nations and its agencies within humanitarian governance is widely 
recognized. As noted by Orchard (2017, p. 170): “The core humanitarian principles have 
been institutionalized in the United Nations, based around UN General Assembly 
Resolution 46/182, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
within the UN Secretariat, and the Emergency Relief Coordinator.” The UNHCR, for 
instance, was formed in the aftermath of the Second World War, employs more than 7,000 
staff globally with a budget exceeding $2 billion, and is viewed as the “guardian of the 
wider global refugee regime” (Betts et al., 2013, pp. 1-2). While the relationships between 
these actors have varied over time, as will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
subsection, the “traditional” actors have continuously occupied an essential role in 
humanitarian governance. 
Notably, this traditional perspective reflects not only the Western-based view of 
humanitarianism, but also the historical exclusion of private sector actors as influential 
actors. Recent scholarship recognizes a wide array of new or emerging actors within the 
humanitarian community (Carbonnier, 2015; Sezgin & Dijkzeul, 2015). Global South 
countries, such as China (Lee et al., 2012; Paik, 2011), Turkey (Bayer & Keyman, 2012) 
and Brazil (Harig & Kenkel, 2017) are emerging as new leaders in humanitarian efforts. 
For instance, Brazil has spearheaded efforts to update the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) 
norm in the wake of the Libyan intervention (2011) by promoting its own principle of 
“Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP). These efforts, according to Harig and Kenkel 
 
113 For example, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Department for International Development (DFID), United 





(2017, p. 632), “solidified Brazil’s position both as a defender of the traditional values of 
post-colonial states, such as non-intervention and the non-use of force, and as a global actor 
keen on building bridges between these normative commitments and those of established 
powers.” Beyond emerging powers in the global South, new humanitarian actors also 
include a number of non-state entities, including diaspora communities (Brinkerhoff, 
2009), philanthropies (Mitchell, 2017), volunteer communities (Stavinoha & 
Ramakrishnan, 2020) and private firms (Carbonnier & Lightfoot, 2016). 
 Of particular relevance to this chapter is the growing role of private firms. To be 
clear, private firms have always contributed to humanitarian assistance beyond 
philanthropic funding. Such activities include logistics, transportation, and commodities, 
all of which are factored into the operational budgets and plans of humanitarian 
organizations. Since the 2000s, however, private firms have arguably played a more 
prominent role in humanitarian operations, competing directly with nongovernmental 
organizations for contracts and establishing various types of public-private partnerships (as 
described in greater detail below) (Binder & Witte, 2007). Of course, it would be 
misleading to treat private firms as homogenous (Carbonnier & Lightfoot, 2016); private 
firms engaged in humanitarian activities vary tremendously in terms of size (transnational 
corporations to domestic small and medium-sized enterprises), sector (e.g., security, 
healthcare, telecommunications, transportation, etc.), and relationship with traditional 






6.1.2 How is Humanitarian Governance Organized? 
The organization of both “traditional” and “new” actors within the humanitarian space is 
far from coherent. As suggested by Barnett (2013), humanitarian governance contains 
elements of market mechanisms (Cooley & Ron, 2002), networks (Slaughter, 2005), and 
hierarchy (Lake, 2010). Both the prominence of these different elements and their specific 
manifestation has shifted over time.  
The market mechanisms that affect organizational relations are by no means unique 
to the humanitarian sector. In their analysis of international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IOs), Cooley and Ron (2002) 
argue the marketization of organizational activities (combined with the uncertainty, 
competition, and insecurity faced by said organizations) broadly affects transnational 
interactions and outcomes. Yet, these dynamics are especially prevalent within the 
humanitarian sector and have increased over time (Carbonnier, 2015; Weiss, 2013). These 
organizing logics extend beyond competition for resources to the adoption of specific tools 
or modalities in response to market forces. As argued by Dijkzeul and Sandvik (2019, p. 
598): “We are increasingly seeing the construction of crisis, insecurity, and [protection of 
civilians] as issues that can be solved through outsourcing aid to for-profit actors, 
standardisation, and better technology.” Moreover, the growing professionalization and 
standardization of the sector, as well as demands for accountability and transparency from 
donors and the public, have led to the widespread development of common benchmarks 
and indicators (Davis et al., 2012; Satterthwaite, 2010). 
 Humanitarian governance is also characterized as a network of organizations. 





functions by multiple actors, whose interactive effects in practice can yield more effective 
global coordination and performance of major governance functions” (Haas, 2004, p. 1). 
In the context of humanitarian governance, the many traditional and new actors are often 
loosely connected, with coordination often a product of negotiated arrangements rather 
than external imposition. Some argue that the flexibility and democratic nature of such 
networks make them an ideal arrangement. Barnett (2013, p. 388) suggests: “It is not 
uncommon to hear those in the humanitarian sector praise the network, suggesting that its 
combination of democratic practice and effectiveness makes it an ideal form.” Importantly, 
however, the network elements of humanitarian governance are not static. On the one hand, 
the freedom ascribed to network models may conflict with the market dynamics described 
above (e.g., increasing standardization), resulting in an ongoing tension between these 
forms of governance. On the other, networks are not benign “equal playing fields” of 
actors. Instead, networks operate within and among evolving hierarchical relations, either 
formal (e.g., institutional structures) or informal (e.g., distributions of power and 
authority). 
The hierarchical relations within humanitarian governance are multifaceted. At a 
high level, we can distinguish between structures within and between organizations. For 
instance, hierarchy within (traditional) humanitarian organizations has increased as new 
information and communication technologies facilitate greater centralization (Dijkzeul & 
Sandvik, 2019). Yet, looking across organizations, the hierarchical dynamics are more 
complicated. As the sector professionalized from the 1990s onwards, formal institutional 
arrangements complemented existing international law and the myriad United Nations 





mix of formal rules and agreements connecting states, multilateral organizations, and civil 
society organizations. One attempt at making sense of this regime complex is offered by 
Betts (2010), who maps out the interlocking refugee, human rights, labour, travel, 
humanitarian, and security regimes (Figure 12). But persistent informal forms of 
hierarchical relations require attention as well. For instance, the silencing of local voices 
in relation to professional (and often international) humanitarian organizations creates an 
important informal structure shaping the behaviours and interactions of different actors. As 
noted by Barnett and Walker (2015, p. 131): “Relief work remains something done to 
others, not alongside them.” 
 
Figure 12: The Humanitarian Regime Complex 
 






Within the overarching structure and hierarchies of humanitarian governance, 
different types of partnerships blend network and hierarchical elements. Broadly, public-
private partnerships (PPPs) or multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) seek to provide 
governance services through collaboration between public and private actors (Beisheim et 
al., 2018; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). However, “business-humanitarian partnerships” 
(BHPs) have emerged as a distinct form of public-private partnership (PPP). BHPs 
typically involve a formalized relationship between one or several firms and 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations performing humanitarian activities 
(Andonova & Carbonnier, 2014). This differs from PPPs in that “there is no ‘public’ actor 
in the partnership, but a private non-for-profit and a private commercial organization, both 
of which operate internationally within a field framed by a set of humanitarian norms 
endorsed by international public law” (Andonova & Carbonnier, 2014, p. 351). The nature 
of the partnership often goes beyond the provision of funding from business actors. Instead, 
humanitarian organizations may benefit from technical assistance and joint advocacy 
efforts in addition to financial support. 
 
6.1.3 A Least Likely Case and Observable Implications 
I argue that the recent incorporation of the financial inclusion agenda within the 
humanitarian sector provides empirical and theoretical insight into the broader arguments 
advanced in this dissertation. More specifically, this chapter provides a “least-likely” case 
for my own argument. Although a perfect “least likely” case study is unlikely to exist in 
practice, I argue that treating the integration of humanitarian financial inclusion and 





First, providing retail financial services to forcibly displaced people involves 
immense practical challenges. Consider, for instance, the logistical obstacles to providing 
financial services in refugee camps. As described in an interview with a Bank of Uganda 
official (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2017a, p. 7): “The main hurdle is how can banks 
be persuaded to set up bank branches near these rural camps? As camps exist in isolated 
rural areas, infrastructure, including building branches, internet connection and electricity, 
would not be cost effective, and finding staff to live and work there would be difficult.” 
The political situation surrounding forcibly displaced persons presents additional barriers. 
Employment restrictions imposed by national governments may prevent the generation of 
income, limiting the capacity of individuals to afford any financial services on a long-term 
basis. Further, inadequate official identification documents and broader concerns about 
money laundering and terrorist financing also exacerbate the situation by pitting security 
and humanitarian agendas against one another. 
 Second, in theoretical terms, this case provides a compelling challenge to the 
capacity of ambiguity to mitigate conflicting interests and objectives among various 
humanitarian, development, and private sector actors. As outlined in greater detail in the 
following empirical sections, humanitarian organizations typically emphasize the 
immediacy of humanitarian assistance and the fundamental imperative to “do no harm.” 
As a result, the more expansive inclusion of private firms and the long-term orientation of 
development actors may not be easily reconciled with humanitarian organizations. From a 
regulatory perspective, both global and national regulators (especially those related to anti-
money laundering and counter terrorist financing) may view the financial inclusion of 





expansion of the financial inclusion agenda can also be thought of as spanning the 
“humanitarian-development nexus” (Zetter, 2019), which creates a separate set of divisions 
that can induce conflict among similar types of actors (e.g., development versus 
humanitarian non-governmental organizations) or even within actors (e.g., development 
versus humanitarian divisions within USAID or DFID). Collectively, these constituencies 
often have markedly different interests and are likely to view financial inclusion in very 
different terms, raising questions about the capacity of participatory ambiguity to 
effectively mitigate these differences and potential conflicts. 
Two brief examples effectively illustrate the potential for conflict between different 
constituencies. The role of the private sector is likely to be central to discussions of 
financial inclusion in this context. No one would reasonably suggest that humanitarian 
organizations are capable of simultaneously fulfilling their mission while also transforming 
themselves into financial inclusion experts or operating as some type of bank. Yet, distrust 
of the private sector in the context of humanitarian assistance is commonplace among many 
practitioners and organizations. Indeed, as suggested by Kamradt-Scott (2016, p. 171): 
“Although often left unspoken, the fundamental issue underlying this distrust is how 
organizations, motivated by profit, should be permitted to operate in environments that are 
punctuated by profound human misery.” Additionally, as discussed in detail in Chapters 2 
and 3, there are substantial material and reputational incentive structures shaping the 
provision of financial services within the context of the global anti-money laundering and 
counter terrorist financing (AML/CTF) regime. The 2013 political conflict involving 
efforts by Barclays (the last UK bank with operations in Somalia) to close its remittance 





regime, and the resulting backlash among development and humanitarian organizations, 
aptly demonstrates this tension. 
This case thus provides insight into the explanatory power of participatory 
ambiguity and the mechanisms of quantification, layering, and coordination effects. More 
specifically, this case sheds light on the capacity of participatory ambiguity to mitigate 
conflict among disparate actors. Barriers created by both the practical constraints of the 
context and the pre-existing conflict between broader goals (e.g., humanitarian aid versus 
AML/CTF) and actors (e.g., among competing non and inter-governmental organizations, 
between humanitarian non-governmental organizations and private firms, etc.) make the 
incorporation of financial inclusion in humanitarian governance a “hard” case. Further, this 
case also illuminates how the theorized mechanisms operate within a set of conditions 
dissimilar to those present during the initial development of the agenda. In other words, to 
what extent do quantification, layering, and coordination effects explain the process 
through which the financial inclusion agenda was adopted in a non-development context? 
Although the primary focus of this chapter is assessing my own theoretical 
framework, it is still possible to evaluate alternative explanations. More specifically, 
historical materialist explanations would lead to the following set of expectations.114 First, 
we would anticipate businesses to exercise control over the agenda and the ways in which 
financial inclusion is promoted and articulated in this space (reflecting the material 
incentive of financial profit). In this regard, business-humanitarian partnerships would 
 
114 To my knowledge, the integration of financial inclusion and humanitarian assistance is sparsely addressed 
in political science. The few studies that exist have focused on the role of financial technologies and 





have a strong potential for co-optation. Second, building most explicitly on historical 
materialist accounts of financial inclusion, credit (and credit-debt power relations) are 
central to the political and economic relations associated with the agenda. Evidence in 
support of these expectations would strengthen claims that historical materialist 
explanations can effectively explain the dynamics at hand. 
 
6.2 The Integration of Humanitarian Governance and 
Financial Inclusion 
How did the integration of the financial inclusion agenda and humanitarian governance 
occur and what explains this process? This section provides a necessary first step towards 
an explanation in two ways. First, I identify an important shift within the humanitarian 
sector that created an opportunity structure for subsequent efforts related to financial 
inclusion: the adoption of cash transfers as a prioritized tool over in-kind aid. Cash transfers 
as a disaster relief tool are not new. For example, the British colonial administration 
distributed cash (as well as coffee and train tickets) to famine-affected populations in Sudan 
in 1948 (Creti & Jaspars, 2006, p. 7). The widespread use of cash transfers in humanitarian 
assistance, especially as a preferred modality for assistance, is a more recent phenomenon. 
I not only outline the initial promotion of cash transfers among humanitarian organizations, 
but their promotion through key international actors and forums. 
Second, I empirically trace the ways in which financial inclusion was embraced by 
both key organizations, such as the UNHCR, and the broader humanitarian community 
over the 2010s. Moreover, I identify how central actors within the financial inclusion 





Financial Inclusion) subsequently embraced humanitarian assistance within their 
promotion of the agenda. I only provide a select discussion of the connections between this 
evidence and the broader theoretical framework of the dissertation within this section, 
instead reserving a more detailed analysis for section 6.4. Rather, the primary focus of 
section 6.3 is to establish the empirical chain of events in order to better evaluate the 
explanatory power of my theoretical framework in section 6.4. 
 
6.2.1 The Shift Towards Cash Transfers Over In-Kind Aid 
Providing cash to targeted beneficiaries has a long history as a tool of government for 
poverty alleviation and economic development. Within the general category of “cash 
transfers,” we can distinguish between three kinds of transfers (Innovations for Poverty 
Action, n.d.): “conditional cash transfers” (CCTs), where beneficiaries must fulfill certain 
requirements; “labeled cash transfers” (LCTs), where funds are designated for a specific 
purpose; and “unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), where no requirements or conditions 
are associated with the transfer. We can also distinguish between cash and vouchers, which 
can be exchanged for a pre-determined amount or value of goods and services (Cash 
Learning Partnership, n.d.). In development contexts, cash transfers are closely associated 
with the provision of social safety nets. Conditional cash transfers, which arguably 
originated in Latin America in the mid-1990s, appealed to multiple ideological and political 
positions (Béland et al., 2018, p. 470): “What was attractive about this new policy 
instrument was that it offered to enhance long-term human capital while providing short-
term, government-provided income support, avoiding the lock-in effects of publicly 





reduction and social assistance.” Through a variety of mechanisms, including “instrument 
constituencies” (Béland et al., 2018), South-South development cooperation (Leite et al., 
2015), and promotion by Western development agencies and intergovernmental 
organizations (e.g., DFID, World Bank), CCTs gained global support. Indeed, there are 
remarkable parallels between the enthusiasm displayed for both CCTs and microcredit by 
their respective advocates. Nancy Birdsall, president of Center for Global Development in 
Washington, D.C., is quoted describing CCTs as follows (Duggar, 2004): “I think these 
programs are as close as you can come to a magic bullet in development.” 
Despite the sporadic use of cash transfers in humanitarian contexts and the growing 
support for cash transfers in development contexts, humanitarian organizations did not 
begin to widely adopt the tool until the mid-2000s. What explains this delay? In addition 
to logistical concerns, Peppiatt et al. (2001) identify two key factors limiting uptake of the 
policy idea. First, donor policy constituted a major barrier preventing shifts away from in-
kind (especially food) aid. Historically, the in-kind provision of aid was intimately 
connected to domestic agricultural production, subsidies, and politics, whereby commodity 
surpluses were partially managed through food aid to developing countries (World Bank, 
2016). Although reforms in donor countries in the 1980s and 1990s attempted to 
disentangle humanitarian policy from domestic agricultural politics, these dynamics 
remained an important feature of donor policy. Second, paternalist assumptions persisted 
within the humanitarian community. In other words, rhetoric about “empowering” people 
in need of assistance was not reflected in programs where outside organizations determined 
beneficiary needs and interests. In practice, this meant that humanitarian programming 





unconditional cash transfers to beneficiaries (which would allow beneficiaries to decide 
for themselves how to spend the money). 
 Notwithstanding the resistance among humanitarian actors to using cash transfer 
programs more widely, several key benefits were (and remain) commonly identified in 
using cash instead of in-kind aid. These benefits, outlined by Creti and Jaspars (2006), can 
be characterized as practical, economic, and normative. From a practical standpoint, cash 
transfers are often cheaper, faster, and easier to distribute than in-kind aid. Consider, for 
example, the many logistical hurdles to the proper transportation and storage of food. By 
some estimates, in-kind aid is upwards of double or triple the cost to deliver to beneficiaries 
compared to cash (Bailey & Pongracz, 2015). In economic terms, cash transfers often avoid 
overwhelming domestic agricultural markets and can also stimulate local markets. 
Especially using unconditional cash transfers (rather than CCTs or vouchers), recipients 
have the flexibility to spend cash as needed. By comparison, in many instances recipients 
of food aid have been forced to sell the aid at a loss to obtain the cash for purchasing what 
is needed at the time. Finally, there are strong normative arguments in favour of cash 
transfers. Providing cash allows for recipients to choose how to best spend the money rather 
than dictating these decisions. 
 A widely cited turning point in the uptake of cash transfers by humanitarian 
organizations was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. As noted by the Report of the High 
Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers (Overseas Development Institute, 2015, p. 
15): “The response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was a turning point for cash transfers, 
as several aid agencies piloted them as an alternative to in-kind aid.” In the aftermath of 





organizations (e.g., Mercy Corps, CARE, Save the Children, World Food Program) piloted 
cash transfer programs to complement similar programs being implemented by 
governments in affected countries (Adams & Winahyu, 2006). 
 Capitalizing on the moment, several initiatives were subsequently launched to 
further promote cash transfer programs in humanitarian contexts, produce and disseminate 
knowledge (and best practices), and institutionalize networks of practitioners as a new 
transnational community. For example, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a major 
independent UK think tank working on both development and humanitarian issues, 
spearheaded the “ODI Tsunami Cash Learning Project” in 2005 (Adams, 2007). With 
funding from five donors (Oxfam GB, Mercy Corps, the British Red Cross Society, SC and 
Concern Worldwide), the project collected and synthesized evidence from the many cash 
transfer programs being implemented. This was a key step considering the disparate 
policies and attitudes towards cash transfers. On one end of the spectrum, the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Vision both prohibited cash transfer programs. 
Others (e.g., CARE, World Food Program) secured permission from senior management 
for their pilot programs. At the other end of the spectrum, Mercy Corps “identified cash as 
a key element of recovery from the outset because cash transfers fit well with the agency’s 
emergency recovery principles” (Adams, 2007, p. 9). 
However, accelerating the uptake of cash transfers in humanitarian contexts 
required far greater organization and outreach. To this end, the Cash Learning Partnership 
(CaLP) was launched in 2005 as a global partnership of humanitarian organizations and 
practitioners (including more than 150 organizations and 5,000 practitioners) to form a 





radically increase the scale and quality of cash transfer programming as a tool for 
humanitarian assistance” (Cash Learning Partnership, 2018). This new network is 
composed of a collection of both “traditional” and “new” humanitarian actors, including 
funding from several Western governments and intergovernmental organizations115, 
implementing partnerships with high-profile non-governmental organizations116, and a 
variety of international or regional non-governmental organizations and private firms. 
Among the private firms are two companies that quickly emerged as central actors in the 
incorporation of cash transfer programs and later integration of the financial inclusion 
agenda: Mastercard and Visa. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the 2004 tsunami in catalyzing the spread of 
cash transfer programs and associated networks, a second key event was the onset of the 
Syrian civil war in 2011. The humanitarian crisis triggered by the conflict had profound 
implications for the citizens of Syria, neighbouring countries and regions, and the wider 
humanitarian sector. The staggering number of forcibly displaced peoples (approximately 
7.6 million internally displaced people and 3.7 million refugees outside of Syria by 2014) 
put enormous pressure on neighbouring host countries (particularly Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, 
Egypt, and Turkey) while also straining the capacity of humanitarian organizations 
(Ostrand, 2015). By 2021, the situation had become the world’s largest refugee crisis and 
 
115 Including the European Union’s European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO; later renamed 
to Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations), USAID, Global 
Affairs Canada, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the German Federal Foreign Office, 
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 





more than 12 million forcibly displaced people remained in need of assistance (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2021). 
The Syrian crisis had a direct bearing on the uptake of cash transfer programs in 
two ways. First, the scale of the crisis, in combination with the growing popularity of cash 
transfer programs, created strong incentives to use cash over in-kind aid. In summarizing 
events in Jordan and Lebanon, Chehade et al. (2020, p. 1) report that between 30-38% 
($400-500 million) of total humanitarian assistance in Lebanon and 28% ($252 million) of 
assistance in Jordan was in the form of cash transfers, creating two of the largest 
humanitarian cash transfer responses in history. Humanitarian efforts related to the Syrian 
crisis were thus characterized by the deployment of cash transfer programs as a major 
component of the broader response, rather than as a limited or pilot project. 
 Second, the Syrian crisis was not only the largest humanitarian crisis of the modern 
era, but it also quickly became clear that the conflict would not be resolved in the near-
term. The result of the protracted nature of the conflict was a blurring of the “humanitarian-
development nexus.” When global humanitarian governance was first established 
following the Second World War, the concepts of “humanitarian assistance” and 
“international development” were considered separate issues. The division of labour was 
reflected in the creation of UN entities and in bureaucratic boundaries within Western 
countries (Crisp, 2001). However, this division was increasingly contested over time, 
resulting in numerous (though arguably unsuccessful) efforts within the international 
community to bridge this divide (Zetter, 2019).  
The Syrian crisis created a new urgency to rethink the relationship between 





crafting effective policy responses, greater incorporation of development-led approaches 
was viewed as fitting the scale and time-horizon of such crises (Zetter, 2019, p. 4): 
Above all, the Syrian refugee crisis has provided a further and much more sustained 
impetus for transitioning from humanitarian to development responses and has been 
popularized around the concept of the [humanitarian-development nexus]. Whilst 
the scale of the response reflects the impact of the crisis on middle-income 
countries, and notably countries that are close to Europe (thus inescapably linking 
the response to ‘securitizing’ this refugee crisis), nevertheless, it transcends the 
immediate context by crystallizing innovative policies that are being applied in 
other refugee-impacted countries, with the emphasis firmly swinging towards 
promoting development-led approaches. 
 
As described above, cash transfer programs became broadly accepted in development 
contexts prior to their similar acceptance by humanitarian actors. By creating a greater 
impetus to simultaneously consider the needs of forcibly displaced people in the Syrian 
crisis from a humanitarian and development perspective, cash transfer programs received 
even stronger consideration. Yet, there was also a material incentive to linking 
humanitarian and development responses. In characterizing the line of thought at the time, 
Ziad Ayoubi suggested (UNHCR Deputy Representative in Mauritania, Telephone 
Interview, December 2020): “Humanitarian funding is very limited, and the development 
funding is bigger, so how can we link them together?” The material (financial) strain on 
global humanitarian assistance and the greater resources available to development 
initiatives created a strong incentive for humanitarian organizations to seek greater co-
operation. 
 The momentum created by each crisis (the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2011 
Syrian civil war) and the expanding professional networks and expertise centered around 
humanitarian cash transfer programs ultimately produced a “crossroads” in the mid-2010s. 





around the growing number and scale of humanitarian crises, as well as the future of cash 
transfer programs. Most notably, the 2015 High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash 
Transfers (Overseas Development Institute, 2015) was convened by the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) and was comprised of academic and independent 
researchers, international non-governmental organizations, development agencies, and 
intergovernmental organizations (including more than 200 participants in consultations, 
broadly spanning traditional and new humanitarian actors). The outcome of this and other 
initiatives during this period is aptly summarized by Bailey and Harvey (2017, p. 5): “The 
[2015 High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers] and other high-level initiatives 
in 2015 and 2016, most notably the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), unequivocally 
established that cash transfers are of strategic importance in improving humanitarian 
response.” 
 
6.2.2 A New Opportunity to Promote Financial Inclusion? 
To understand the integration of the financial inclusion agenda and humanitarian assistance 
requires a closer examination of the shift towards widespread acceptance of digital cash 
transfers and the potential links this created with financial inclusion. This section traces the 
embrace of financial inclusion within humanitarian governance by focusing on formalized 
support for financial inclusion within key organizations and international forums. In so 
doing, I distinguish between the contextual factors that created a conducive opportunity 
structure (namely, the embrace of digital cash transfer programs) and the promotion of 





evidence clearly reveal the interactions and overlap of “humanitarian” and “development” 
spaces throughout this process. 
 The integration of financial inclusion in this space first began in the early 2010s. 
At this point in time, the global financial inclusion agenda was at its initial stage of global 
uptake (as argued in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). While interviewees could not identify a 
specific moment or event that triggered broader conversations, they consistently recalled 
the early 2010s as the start of the process. What explains the shift at this specific point in 
time? A key factor is the Syrian crisis, which did more than simply accelerate the use of 
cash transfers and spark greater interest in the “humanitarian-development nexus.”  The 
design of humanitarian cash transfer programs in this context, especially those that relied 
on commercial banks in Jordan to help implement the program (Chehade et al., 2020), 
revealed “obvious” linkages with financial inclusion. As argued by Ziad Ayoubi (UNHCR 
Deputy Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, December 2020):  
I think the use of cash in humanitarian contexts plus the need for reaching scale to 
link with development, prepared the enabling environment to start talking about 
things that are not, you know, rocket science. It’s very obvious that if you use banks 
to deliver cash, it makes a lot of sense to ask these banks to offer other services. 
And this is how I think it all came together.  
 
In other words, the turn to digital cash transfers and reliance on commercial banks helped 
to reveal the potentially complementary dynamics of humanitarian cash transfers and the 
financial inclusion agenda. Indeed, the turn to digital cash transfers in and beyond the 
Syrian crisis created an important opportunity structure within which actors could advocate 
for explicit incorporation of financial inclusion in cash transfer programs. 
Moving beyond this initial recognition, however, the shift towards digital 





inclusion in humanitarian contexts. Further, determining who was engaged in advocacy 
efforts does not always produce cleanly separated groups of organizations; rather, in many 
cases units or departments within the same organization were engaged in learning or 
experimentation processes within their respective domains while also interacting with each 
other. This was especially the case for large state or intergovernmental organizations, but 
also occurred among several international non-governmental organizations. Importantly, 
the salience of financial inclusion often manifested through the digitization of payment 
services. This is a crucial point as it directly contradicts some expectations of historical 
materialist perspectives. Unlike the evolution of the global financial inclusion agenda from 
microcredit (or other forms of credit-based financial services) to a broader suite of services, 
there is comparatively little evidence of credit-debt relations shaping the early stages of 
this process. 
The experience of USAID aptly illustrates the internal dynamics described above. 
Like other development agencies (such as Global Affairs Canada and DFID), USAID 
provides both development and humanitarian assistance, albeit through different 
organizational units (bureaus). For example, the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance 
(BHA) oversees the agency’s humanitarian assistance work while the Bureau for 
Development, Democracy, and Innovation (DDI) plays a key role in development 
assistance. In the early 2010s, the Global Development Lab within USAID took a growing 
interest in the digitization of all payments (not just to beneficiaries, but to vendors and 





agnostic with respect to payments.117 Following the internal shift within USAID (the 
Global Development Lab) and changes in the broader humanitarian sector, USAID 
eventually codified a formal policy change in support of digital payments in humanitarian 
assistance contexts through Procurement Executive Bulletin (PEB) 2014-06 in 2014. As 
described by one interviewee, “[i]t’s sort of an addendum to all of USAID’s requirements 
basically saying you have to use electronic payments except in certain circumstances where 
you can’t or it’s impractical.” Not only did this pave the way for efforts to promote financial 
inclusion through digital cash transfers within USAID, but it also manifested in the 
subsequent establishment of the Barcelona Principles. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that some empirical division of actors is 
impossible. To this end, the experience of UNHCR is instructive, especially given its 
central role in the structure of humanitarian governance more broadly. Prior to the 2010s, 
UNHCR had explored the use of microfinance in some circumstances to promote 
“economic empowerment” of forcibly displaced people (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2011).118 However, in the context of the Syrian crisis, 
UNHCR began devoting greater attention to incorporating the nascent financial inclusion 
agenda and rethinking its response strategy in relation to financial services. As explained 
by Ziad Ayoubi (UNHCR Deputy Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, 
 
117 The procedures at that time were described by one interviewee (Interview, Technical Advisor at Donor, 
October 2019) as: “Guidance on the humanitarian side had said, you know, do whatever is accessible and 
convenient and secure for everybody, and accountable, and having some sort of a continuum between straight 
up cash in envelopes and fully electronic payments.” 
118 For example, the UNHCR, in collaboration with the International Labor Organization (ILO), produced 
reports in 2002 (Introduction to Microfinance in Conflict-Affected Communities) and 2010 (Lessons Learned 





December 2020): “[F]inancial inclusion is one of the phenomena that were evoked, were 
explored, because humanitarian operations included a lot of cash transfers and cash-based 
interventions.” Indeed, the UNHCR’s Global Strategy for Livelihoods (2014a, p. 31) 
included the following description of the role of financial services in humanitarian 
assistance: 
Services such as savings, credit, money transfers and micro insurance have the 
potential to be powerful tools for supporting livelihoods among refugee 
populations, if and when the minimum conditions exist. These services and 
products can help safeguard assets, build financial capital, and open economic 
opportunities. Reliable sources of credit can provide a basis for planning and 
expanding business activities. Access to financial products such as savings 
schemes, loans for learning or training, insurance and remittances can help refugees 
diversify their income sources to meet basic needs and cope with economic shocks. 
They also reduce vulnerability to risky lending practices or insecure financial 
schemes. These structures are often lost during a crisis. UNHCR works with 
financial institutions, partners and local governments in host communities to allow 
access to services and products where they exist, and develop them where they do 
not. 
 
This is not to suggest, however, that the interest of UNHCR in financial inclusion 
developed in a manner disconnected from the wider humanitarian and financial inclusion 
community.  
 Beginning in 2006, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Ford 
Foundation developed the “Graduation Approach” as a development intervention centred 
around cash assistance, savings mechanisms, and skills training for the “ultra poor” (no 
assets and chronically food insecure) (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2014b). In 2013, CGAP approached UNHCR with a proposal to pilot the Graduation 
Approach with refugees in a select number of countries (Ziad Ayoubi, UNHCR Deputy 
Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, December 2020). This intervention 





Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014a) and was implemented in collaboration 
with CGAP, the Ford Foundation, Trickle Up (an international non-governmental 
organization), and local partner organizations (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, n.d.). The success of the pilot programs led to two subsequent initiatives, both 
of which further institutionalized UNHCR’s embrace of financial inclusion. First, UNHCR 
and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) launched a joint five-year 
program in 2018 called “Financial Inclusion of Forcibly Displaced People (FDP) and Host 
Communities.” The ambitious project aimed to support greater financial inclusion by 
providing grants, loans, and technical expertise to private firms and civil society 
organizations, supporting knowledge creation and dissemination, and leading country and 
regional policy advocacy (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and United 
Nations Capital Development Fund, 2018). Second, UNHCR and the World Bank’s 
Partnership for Economic Inclusion convened the Poverty Alleviation Coalition in 2019 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Partnership for 
Economic Inclusion, 2019).119 The focus of the coalition was the broad implementation of 
the Graduation Approach (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and Partnership for Economic Inclusion, 2019, p. 2): “The duration of a graduation 
programme is approximately 18-36 months per household, and includes a combination of 
consumption support, development of market-oriented skills for self and wage 
employment, cash/asset transfer and access to savings, financial inclusion, social and legal 
 
119 The coalition includes 13 international non-governmental organizations with development and/or 
humanitarian expertise: BRAC, World Vision, Mercy Corps, HIAS, Concern Worldwide, BOMA Project, 





services and mentoring.” Both contemporary initiatives thus explicitly integrated financial 
inclusion as part of broader efforts to improve humanitarian responses. 
The evidence related to this sequence of events involving UNHCR substantiates 
two important dynamics. First, outreach by CGAP to UNHCR contributed to the initial 
uptake of the financial inclusion agenda and helped set in motion a series of initiatives that 
codified the organization’s embrace of the agenda. Second, UNHCR was not a passive 
recipient. Consistent with the broader concept of participatory ambiguity, UNHCR sought 
to actively shape the development of financial inclusion within the humanitarian context. 
In response to a question about the connection between the aforementioned initiatives, Ziad 
Ayoubi (UNHCR Deputy Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, December 
2020) explained: “It’s all part of the new way of working. So this was all towards building 
more partnerships, building more alliances in areas like livelihoods, economic inclusion, 
financial inclusion, because UNHCR wants to advise development actors to include 
refugees. It was part of the same work stream. In headquarters, the UNHCR partnership 
was led by my team when I was there and the piloting of the graduation was led by the 
same team. So it’s the same strategy.” Thus, while CGAP may have played the role of 
“entrepreneur,” we must also recognize the agency of UNHCR in both embracing the idea 
while also seeking to shape the agenda in line with its main priorities. 
Notwithstanding the shifts within organizations such as USAID and UNHCR, 
important changes also occurred in the mid to late 2010s within and among key 
international forums. The adoption of the financial inclusion agenda not only further 
codified the embrace of financial inclusion in humanitarian contexts, but also frequently 





inclusion. One prominent example was the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash 
Transfers (described in the previous section). In addition to its objective of elevating the 
role of cash transfers (especially digital transfers) in humanitarian responses, the panel also 
sought to further tie cash transfers to the promotion of financial inclusion in humanitarian 
contexts. For instance, one of the 12 recommendations make this relationship explicit: 
“Where possible, deliver cash digitally and in a manner that furthers financial inclusion.” 
Importantly, the precise meaning (and policy implications) of “furthering financial 
inclusion” is not well-defined. Moreover, their understanding of the relationship was not 
linear (i.e., greater use of digital cash transfers increasing financial inclusion among 
refugees). Instead, they presented the global financial inclusion agenda and incorporation 
of financial inclusion within humanitarian contexts as mutually reinforcing (Overseas 
Development Institute, 2015, p. 13): “This accelerating pace of financial inclusion 
increases our capacity to deploy humanitarian cash transfers. At the same time, greater use 
of cash transfers creates new opportunities to expand financial networks in some of the 
world’s poorest regions by attracting investment in systems (as part of preparedness 
measures) and by linking people with payment systems.” In other words, the uptake of the 
financial inclusion agenda in areas not (yet) affected by conflict or forcibly displaced 
persons might facilitate the subsequent use of digital cash transfers as a humanitarian 
intervention. This is a noteworthy articulation of the relationship as it makes clear the 
potential coordination effects associated with the financial inclusion agenda. Unlike strictly 
development contexts (for instance, the embrace of financial inclusion by utilities NGOs 
in Ghana in the preceding chapter), where coordination effects helped incorporate new 





importance of coordination effects in helping to expand the supporting coalition across the 
development and humanitarian spaces. 
The High-Level Panel was not alone in formalizing support for the financial 
inclusion agenda. First, USAID spearheaded the development of a set of principles to guide 
the design and implementation of digital cash transfer programs in humanitarian contexts. 
Convened in February 2016, a group of 25 officials120 with expertise in humanitarian 
assistance and financial inclusion met in Spain to address the overarching question: “[H]ow 
can digital payments be leveraged to prioritize emergency needs first and, at the same time, 
build a bridge towards long-term economic, social, and financial inclusion?” (Martin et al., 
2017). The product of this workshop was “The Barcelona Principles for Digital Payments 
in Humanitarian Response,” which included a set of eight principles that addressed broad 
issues related to digital cash transfer programs and financial inclusion. Indeed, the fourth 
principle explicitly called for attention to financial inclusion (“4. Facilitate pathways to 
financial inclusion when possible and appropriate”). Resembling the G20’s Principles for 
Innovative Financial Inclusion (which helped launch the global financial inclusion agenda 
in 2010; see Chapter 2), the Barcelona Principles were ambiguous with respect to the 
 
120 The organizations represented at the meeting include the following (Principles for digital payments in 
humanitarian response, 2016): “Better than Cash Alliance, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Cash 
Learning Partnership (CaLP), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), Danish Church Aid (DCA), Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian 
Aid Operations (ECHO), Electronic Cash Transfer Action Network (ELAN), Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy Corps, NetHope, Norwegian Refugee 
Council (NRC), Save The Children, UK Aid, UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN International Emergency 
Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Department of State, World 





specific policies or programs required to effectively incorporate financial inclusion in this 
space (Principles for digital payments in humanitarian response, 2016):  
Digital payments offer recipients access to and ability to use at least one formal 
transaction account that can perform most, if not all, payment needs; safely store 
some value; and serve as a gateway to other financial services. They can be 
delivered via mobile phone or card-linked accounts, and accessible at agents, 
merchants, ATMs, and bank branches. If digital payments are not possible at the 
onset, agencies plan for future inclusive payments by considering options that could 
most easily provide a link to financial services later. 
 
As discussed in greater detail in the next section, this codification of support for financial 
inclusion did not resolve competing priorities or interpretations among different 
organizations involved in the process, but instead created space for different constituencies 
to operate within. 
A second major initiative transpired in conjunction with the World Humanitarian 
Summit later in 2016. The Summit was convened by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
and was meant to “help overhaul the crisis-response agenda” (Barnett & Walker, 2015, p. 
132; Agenda for Humanity, n.d.) As part of the Summit, a group of 18 humanitarian 
organizations and private firms121, led by the World Economic Forum, created the 
“Principles for Public-Private Cooperation in Humanitarian Payments.” Building on the 
Barcelona Principles and previous work on public-private partnerships, these principles are 
clear with respect to their intended purpose (World Economic Forum, 2016):  
The set of principles delineated in this document does not aim to recommend a 
definite set of “right answers”. The ambition is to deliver key driving principles 
identified by the Forum that can catalyse an efficient transition to cash-based 
 
121 The organizations represented include (World Economic Forum, 2016): “Cash Learning Partnership 
(CaLP), Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Electronic Cash Transfer Learning Action Network 
(ELAN), Ericsson, European Commission, GSMA, Mastercard, Mercy Corps, PayPal, SAP, Segovia, Tata 
Consultancy Services, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Visa, 





humanitarian aid and a successful multistakeholder partnership effort within the 
financial inclusion agenda. It aims to be positioned as a working document, which 
over time can be customized and refined to attain collaborative and harmonized 
approaches to effective public-private cooperation in humanitarian action. 
 
By eschewing any set of “right answers” and presenting the principles as a “working 
document” to be customized and refined, the creators similarly embraced a degree of 
ambiguity while simultaneously situating humanitarian cash transfers within the financial 
inclusion agenda. 
 There is thus clear evidence of the incorporation of the financial inclusion agenda 
within humanitarian governance by the mid 2010s. Moreover, the various high-level 
principles constructed among different groups of humanitarian, development, and private 
sector actors appear to embrace ambiguity in a similar fashion as the principles formalizing 
the initial global financial inclusion agenda. The final link in the process, however, was the 
subsequent effort by central organizations and groups within the established financial 
inclusion agenda to incorporate humanitarian assistance within their remit. In other words, 
the two-step sequence involved humanitarian actors first embracing financial inclusion, 
followed by financial inclusion actors embracing humanitarian assistance. 
 Most notably, both the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GFPI) 
and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) supported incorporating humanitarian issues 
in the late 2010s. As argued in the preceding chapters, the creation of these two 
organizations served as strong signals of the global uptake of the financial inclusion agenda 
and they each operate as important nodes within the global ecosystem supporting the 






While the G20 has made a substantial contribution to financial inclusion, [Forcibly 
Displaced Persons] have so far not been considered as a particularly vulnerable 
group within the work of the G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion 
(GPFI)… Against this background, we - as German G20 Presidency in 2017 - put 
this topic high on the agenda with the objective of providing FDPs on the one hand, 
and their host communities on the other, with better access to a broad range of 
adequate financial services. 
 
The new humanitarian focus within the GPFI was supported by a series of workshops and 
panels, bringing regulators and development organizations together with humanitarian 
organizations. The culmination of these efforts was the creation of the Roadmap to the 
Sustainable and Responsible Financial Inclusion of Forcibly Displaced Persons in 2020 
(Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, 2020). 
 Focusing more specifically on AFI, the organization produced a special report as 
part of the GPFI’s efforts to address humanitarian assistance. This report not only 
recognizes a new “consensus” view about the relationship between humanitarian assistance 
and financial inclusion, but also distinguishes its own role in the process (Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion, 2017a, p. 4):  
There is now broad consensus in the international community that addressing the 
financial needs of FDPs is critical to finding a sustainable solution to the global 
crisis of forced displacement. Humanitarian agencies and related stakeholders have 
already done extensive work on access to finance for FDPs, and this report does not 
aim to duplicate these efforts. Instead, it draws on AFI’s unique position as a global 
network of developing and emerging country financial regulators and policymakers 
to solicit member views on current approaches, challenges and opportunities. 
 
In addition to the report, AFI also established “Forcibly Displaced Persons” as a cross-
cutting theme within the organization’s structure. This allowed AFI to facilitate knowledge 
production and dissemination, as well as peer learning, among its members. For example, 





Into National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFIS)) in consultation with the members of 
its Financial Inclusion Strategy Peer Learning Group (FISPLG). 
 This section has tied together several key elements that are integral to explaining 
the integration of humanitarian assistance and the global financial inclusion agenda. In 
particular, I have documented the chronological evolution of this process while also 
identifying both the salient opportunity structures and deliberate actions by a range of 
development and humanitarian actors to codify this change. The embrace of cash transfers 
as a preferred modality in humanitarian assistance, in combination with their deployment 
at scale in response to the Syrian crisis, created an important opportunity structure for the 
subsequent integration of financial inclusion. Against this backdrop, the promotion of 
financial inclusion by development actors (such as CGAP and the Gates Foundation) 
combined with processes of knowledge exchange and learning among humanitarian 
organizations to elevate the role of financial inclusion in this space. However, to effectively 
explain these shifts and situate the dynamics within and among coalition members in a 
broader theoretical perspective, the following section analyzes the role of ambiguity and 
the mechanisms underpinning the integration of financial inclusion and humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
6.3 Explaining the Expansion of the Financial Inclusion 
Agenda Through Participatory Ambiguity 
Participatory ambiguity provides a framework through which we can better understand the 
integration of financial inclusion and humanitarian assistance. The following subsections 





consider the role of language and alternative interpretations of the agenda by actors 
operating within the humanitarian space. I also address the extent to which the collective 
evidence fits with historical materialist expectations. Additionally, I evaluate whether 
quantification, institutional layering, and coordination effects help explain the expansion 
and consolidation of the integrated agenda.  
 
6.3.1 Building a Coalition Through Ambiguity 
As was the case with the initial construction of the global financial inclusion agenda, there 
is also evidence of the supporting coalition resembling a “broad church” owing to the 
participatory nature by which the ambiguity is created. In characterizing different 
understandings of financial inclusion, one interviewee suggested (Interview, Humanitarian 
Official, October 2019): “Sometimes I think [the humanitarian community] might be 
talking different languages, you know, when we are talking to actors who are focused on 
financial inclusion.” This dynamic is similarly evident in the various sets of principles 
developed in the mid 2010s. To facilitate the integration of humanitarian assistance and 
financial inclusion and foster widespread support, the principles remained agnostic about 
the “right” policy approach. Stated differently, there is little evidence suggesting that the 
integration process has led to any organization (like UNHCR or CGAP) or group of 
organizations (like the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers) deliberately 
limiting the policy space available within the supporting coalition. Instead, the ambiguity 
of the agenda is both facilitated by the discourse at the global level and constructed through 





or outcome in relation to financial inclusion in this space is not wholly determined by any 
type of centrally located “entrepreneur.” 
 The specific language around financial inclusion in the humanitarian context also 
sheds light on the ways in which the agenda is interpreted, the level of organizational 
commitment to the agenda, and potential areas of conflict. Mercy Corps is instructive in 
this regard, as the organization is explicit in its understanding of the agenda in humanitarian 
contexts (Mercy Corps, 2014): 
We strive for full financial inclusion for the unserved and chronically underserved 
and in areas affected by conflict, natural disasters, and economic and political crisis. 
Mercy Corps embraces a broad definition of financial inclusion, seeking to improve 
access, ensure quality and actual usage of financial products and services, including 
credit, insurance, leasing, payments, remittances, and savings. Mercy Corps’ 
financial inclusion theory of change states: Within inclusive financial systems, if 
participants are able to access, use, and afford a range of financial services then 
they will better manage economic assets to cope with shocks and stresses, adapt to 
changing circumstances, and transform their lives. 
 
Of course, Mercy Corps’ understanding of the agenda should not be interpreted as perfectly 
representative of all humanitarian organizations. Nevertheless, the organization’s 
interpretation broadly resembles those of other development actors (as argued in the 
preceding chapters). Financial inclusion, from this perspective, involves a wide range of 
financial services (as opposed to a dominant focus on credit). Moreover, the outcomes 
associated with financial inclusion broadly reflects the “poverty alleviation” focus of 
development-oriented organizations.  
The UNHCR provides a second example. As financial inclusion was embraced by 
the organization in the early 2010s, they deliberately changed the language used within the 
organization (Ziad Ayoubi, UNHCR Deputy Representative in Mauritania, Telephone 





inclusion became a top priority.” In their case, however, the “old” way of doing things 
involved the direct provision of financial services to beneficiaries. The “new” way of doing 
things, as reflected in their use of “financial inclusion,” instead involved incorporating 
refugees into the mainstream financial system (Ziad Ayoubi, UNHCR Deputy 
Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, December 2020): “The strategy of 
UNHCR is to use the mainstream financial system to include refugees in it. So push the 
refugees to become part of the clientele of the mainstream financial sector. That’s the 
policy now. So a lot of advocacy, a lot of negotiations, sometimes creating incentives for 
these financial institutions in terms of doing one half support and so on.” Thus, in the case 
of the UNHCR, we find a stronger emphasis on advocacy and negotiations to change the 
institutional environment rather than strictly focusing on the design and direct 
implementation of assistance programs. Importantly, both approaches – focusing on the 
implementation of financial inclusion programs (e.g., Mercy Corps) and the reorientation 
of the mainstream financial sector (e.g., UNHCR) – are legitimated and facilitated through 
the agenda’s ambiguity and the all-encompassing language of “financial inclusion.” 
It is also evident that the level of commitment to financial inclusion in this space is 
not universally shared. On the one hand, humanitarian actors may have only a weak 
commitment to the agenda despite public rhetoric. As described by one interviewee 
(Interview, Humanitarian Official, October 2019): “I mean, we do, we highlight it as this 
is a positive knock on effect, at, you know, where it suits the narrative, but I don't think we 
see it as, this is an opportunity that we need to capitalize on.” This relates to a broader 
source of tension between organizations who are primarily focused on either humanitarian 





(Interview, Technical Advisor at Donor, October 2019): “Even if it means that you're not 
being the most cost efficient, even if it means that you're not giving them anything that 
would last longer, right. Like above all, you cannot do harm. You cannot put people at risk. 
Um, so I think that sort of natural tension was there too.” This sentiment was similarly 
expressed in a state-of-practice review (Bailey, 2017, p. 3): 
Connecting people with financial services is not a common goal of emergency cash 
programmes, which tend to have humanitarian objectives, such as meeting basic 
needs, protecting livelihoods and increasing access to food and shelter. As such, 
while linking people with financial services may be a desirable outcome, it is rarely 
one that is specifically intended or monitored, and evidence on the link between 
humanitarian e-transfers and financial inclusion is limited. 
 
In other words, financial inclusion is a long-term objective that, from a humanitarian 
perspective, is a distant second to the immediate needs of people requiring assistance and 
the fundamental imperative of not doing harm. Given the lack of a strict hierarchical 
structure in humanitarian governance more generally, there is space for organizations to 
work with and learn from others (the network component of the structure) while also 
exercising considerable freedom in how the agenda is interpreted and implemented. 
 Further illustrating point, a review of cash transfer programs and financial inclusion 
in Jordan and Lebanon identifies examples of policy disagreements that are partially 
masked by the language of the agenda (Chehade et al., 2020). In recognizing that digital 
cash transfers programs had failed to stimulate greater financial inclusion among refugees 
in this context, the authors argue that a key problem was reliance on pooled bank accounts 





offered advantages to humanitarian organizations122 whose primary concern was the 
humanitarian response effort. As described in the report (Chehade et al., 2020, p. 19): 
“[T]here is a trade-off between short-term benefits—such as low costs, reporting 
capabilities, and fast delivery—and longer-term development outcomes of individual and 
household resilience.” In other words, the support of humanitarian organizations for 
financial inclusion is often tempered by their prioritization of the immediate response 
effort.  Consequently, the specific policies supported by different constituencies (e.g., 
humanitarian versus development) may conflict, but the language and ambiguity of 
financial inclusion helps mitigate these differences outside of specific policy interventions. 
On the other hand, differing levels of commitment are also evident in the range of 
new actors participating in humanitarian assistance, in part due to the integration of 
financial inclusion. Resembling broader shifts in humanitarian governance, there are both 
“traditional” and “new” humanitarian actors participating in this process (El-Zoghbi et al., 
2017, p. 6):  
New mobile technologies and branchless banking platforms that manage cash 
transfer programs rely on existing financial infrastructure and leverage recent 
technological advancements that allow digital financial services to develop in many 
lower-income countries. New actors can be found in humanitarian responses, 
notably financial institutions, card acquirers, mobile network operators, banking 
agents, and financial sector regulators. 
 
As was the case in the Ghanaian context, it would be naïve to assume that private firms 
(like financial institutions) are participating simply due to altruistic ideals. Whether 
through fees charged to humanitarian organizations as part of a public-private partnership 
 
122 Such advantages included faster program set-up and implementation, as well as simpler navigation of 






or through the cultivating of a new customer market, private firms often have a material 
incentive to contribute towards the integration of humanitarian assistance and financial 
inclusion. 
 The incorporation of the private sector in this process is a critical point at which to 
evaluate alternative explanations. Indeed, a major theoretical expectation of historical 
materialist scholarship is either the dominance or co-optation of the agenda by businesses 
due to their power in capitalist systems and pursuit of new forms of capital accumulation. 
However, while constructing new markets and including financial firms is certainly viewed 
warily by some, there is little evidence to suggest that firms are driving the agenda. As 
described by one interviewee (Interview, Technical Advisor at Donor, October 2019): 
It’s not like we’ll never work with the private sector. It’s more, you know, 
recognizing that they have their own imperatives and know their own interests, 
which is fine. And that the humanitarian agencies have their imperative and 
interests, which are also fine. And then where do they dovetail? And then just be 
honest about where they diverge. You know, making sure that we're not feeding 
one to the detriment of the other.  
 
This idea was shared across several interviews with individuals from non-governmental 
organizations, development agencies, and major philanthropic organizations, especially 
when considering the comparative expertise of private firms in such areas as financial 
services provision and data protection and privacy. Working with private firms (e.g., 
through increasingly common business-humanitarian partnerships) thus creates 
opportunities for mutually beneficial arrangements. The mere inclusion of private firms in 
this process does not provide strong evidence in support of alternative arguments. As seen 
in the Ghanaian case study, political conflict is more likely to revolve around competing 






 In addition to the role of private firms within the coalition and absence of class 
conflict, it is also worth reiterating the role (or lack thereof) of credit within the integration 
process. As outlined previously, a central focus within historical materialist scholarship is 
the role of credit and credit-debt power relations within the microcredit/microfinance 
agendas and the subsequent financial inclusion agenda. Throughout this dissertation, I 
argue that such a focus is insufficiently grounded in the available empirical evidence, and 
this remains the case for the integration of humanitarian assistance and financial inclusion. 
It is abundantly clear that the driving focus behind the incorporation of financial inclusion 
within humanitarian governance is the adoption of (digital) cash transfer programs. While 
credit is included as part of the full range of financial services invoked by financial 
inclusion in this context, there is no evidence to suggest that the primary focus is credit-
related products. At its current stage, the integration process is far more fixated on the 
institutional environment and payment or savings related services.  
 In sum, participatory ambiguity provides an analytically useful framework for 
understanding the political dynamics behind the integration of humanitarian assistance and 
financial inclusion. By focusing on the co-production of ambiguity by disparate 
organizations and the role of language in both facilitating multiple interpretations and the 
inclusion of a range of “traditional” and “new” actors, this framework reveals how a 
supporting coalition was constructed. In contrast, there is far less evidence in support of 
alternative (historical materialist) explanations, especially with respect to the power of 
private firms in controlling the agenda and the dominant role of credit. To provide a more 
complete explanation of the process, however, I now turn to the specific mechanisms that 






6.3.2 Mechanisms Underpinning the Consolidation of the Agenda 
The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation identifies three key mechanisms 
supporting the spread and consolidation of the financial inclusion agenda over time. These 
mechanisms include the use of quantification and benchmarking by organizations, 
processes of institutional layering, and the identification of coordination effects. Together, 
they help explain how and why the global coalition supporting agenda has both expanded 
over time and support for agenda is maintained. To what extent do these mechanisms help 
to explain the integration of financial inclusion and humanitarian assistance? 
 First, there is limited evidence of the use of benchmarking. Importantly, however, 
this is likely a function of the early stage of the integration process rather than a sign of the 
irrelevance of benchmarking as a mechanism. On the one hand, this can be attributed to 
the lack of systematic data that would be necessary to effectively create (and use) 
benchmarks. For instance, the Jordanian National Financial Inclusion Strategy (2018-
2020) includes the following statement (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2020c, p. 12):  
[T]here is no internationally comparable data on the financial inclusion of non-
nationals and refugees in particular. Due to a lack of available data on the financial 
inclusion of refugees in peer countries, benchmarks for that segment presented 
below could not be calculated using the same evidence-based methodology…they 
are therefore rough estimations of the potential in the financial inclusion of this 
priority segment. 
 
Despite the apparent interest in using benchmarks in the specific context of financial 
inclusion and refugees, the lack of data hindered their use.  
 On the other hand, the early stage of integration also means that some organizations 
view the primary focus as reshaping the legal and regulatory environment. In other words, 





changes that will enable the effective and sustainable provision of financial services to such 
individuals. In the meantime, attempting to construct benchmarks is premature (Ziad 
Ayoubi, UNHCR Deputy Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, December 
2020): 
I’m not sure that we’ve reached a point of benchmarking. Sometimes we 
benchmark, that we very much use, is the legal environment allows people, it’s the 
access, first of all. That’s a very important benchmark. Then it’s another story to 
measure the level of access, the level of actual access. So there is the breakthrough 
first, which is having the right legal and policy environment. And for us, that’s a 
very big achievement. I think we are not there at the level yet of measuring the 
extent to which people benefitting from the conducive environment. It’s coming, 
it’s going to come at some point, because you need to measure success. 
 
Consequently, benchmarking may come to play a larger role in the integration process in 
the medium to long-term. 
 Second, the layering of reforms within organizational programming and structures, 
as well as the pursuit of incremental legal or regulatory changes, constituted a major avenue 
through which financial inclusion was embedded within humanitarian governance. 
Consider, for instance, the adoption of financial inclusion objectives within humanitarian 
programming. Especially in the context of cash transfer programs, promoting financial 
inclusion required both the explicit creation of financial inclusion objectives and 
adjustments to the design and implementation of the program. As one interviewee 
summarized (In-Person Interview, June 2018): “In these programs, most of them didn’t 
have [financial inclusion] as an objective initially. And so you know, if you have that as 
your program objective, it’s not enough just to give them cash transfers and hope for an 
improvement in financial inclusion gains, but structuring the program so that is an objective 





teaching them about the technology, mentoring them, helping them to get to grips with it 
and lots of other stuff.”  
In turn, such additions and adjustments to humanitarian assistance often required 
broader (albeit subtle) shifts in the organizational structure. This might include the creation 
of new departments or teams and the hiring of specialized personnel. The preceding 
discussion of the changes within the UNHCR aptly demonstrates this dynamic. The 
incorporation of financial inclusion goals and programs involved the amendment or 
modification of organizational structures and programs, including the hiring of a financial 
inclusion officer to coordinate related activities within the organization (Ziad Ayoubi, 
UNHCR Deputy Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, December 2020). 
However, UNHCR was not alone in experiencing this type of change. Mercy Corps, for 
instance, strongly embraced financial inclusion within its organization in the mid 2010s 
through a similar process. This included the hiring of a new financial inclusion director 
(Interview, Technical Advisor at Donor, October 2019) and the development of an internal 
“financial inclusion approach” to guide and modify organizational programming (Mercy 
Corps, 2014). 
Beyond the types of layering observed within individual organizations, the 
incremental addition of new “policy settings” or “instruments” (Vetterlein & Moschella, 
2014) among the institutional arrangements governing domestic financial sectors was 
especially contentious. This is most clear with respect to anti-money laundering and 
counter terrorist financing (AML-CTF) regulatory arrangements. As discussed at length in 
previous chapter, the global AML-CTF regime is a powerful force within the global 





inclusion in humanitarian assistance brings AML-CTF to the forefront. Indeed, the 
regulatory arrangements associated with AML-CTF are tied to a vital constituency that 
composes the broader financial inclusion agenda coalition. In this context, AML-CTF 
regulatory arrangements are a critical barrier to cash transfer and financial inclusion. As a 
result, integrating humanitarian assistance and financial inclusion is deeply dependent on 
the politics around AML-CTF in crisis-affected countries. Constraints, such as the need for 
formal identification requirements for beneficiaries to access bank accounts or material 
disincentives (e.g., legal sanctions and financial penalties) for organizations found in 
violation of AML-CTF regulations, must be addressed in order to facilitate the integration 
of the financial inclusion agenda in this context. 
In response, both humanitarian and development organizations have primarily 
focused their efforts at the country level and sought “creative” arrangements with domestic 
regulators. For instance, one interviewee (Interview, Humanitarian Official, October 2019) 
described the dynamic as follows: “[W]here people are being most creative is really at the 
country level. I would say it's not an international policy levels, you know, through like the 
Financial Action Task Force, all the discussions around de-risking. I mean, those are good 
and they need to happen, but they haven't been terribly productive.” Instead, organizations 
have sought to develop close working relationships with domestic financial regulators, 
often by including them in meetings to improve their knowledge and awareness of the 
situation (Interview, Humanitarian Official, October 2019). As a result of such efforts to 
build relationships and advocate for regulatory changes, some new arrangements have been 
achieved. In Mauritania, for instance, UNHRC worked with regulators to modify existing 





financial services from mainstream financial institutions (Ziad Ayoubi, UNHCR Deputy 
Representative in Mauritania, Telephone Interview, December 2020). In the aftermath of 
Typhoon Haiyan, the World Food Programme worked with regulators in the Philippines to 
amend or suspend certain AML-CTF regulations (Interview, Technical Advisor at Donor, 
October 2019). To be clear, it is too soon to assess the long-term transformative potential 
of these altered regulatory arrangements or to make systematic claims about the conditions 
under which this type of institutional layering is successful. Nevertheless, the available 
evidence corroborates the important role of this mechanism in supporting the integration 
of humanitarian assistance and financial inclusion. 
Third, the existence of coordination effects is one of the strongest dynamics 
underpinning both the integration of humanitarian assistance and the financial inclusion 
agenda and the development of cash transfers as a preferred modality. At its core, 
coordination effects “occur when the individual receives increased benefits from a 
particular activity if others also adopt the same option” (Pierson, 2000, p. 492). While the 
actors, policies, and objectives associated with humanitarian assistance and the financial 
inclusion agenda differ in numerous ways, a major factor supporting their integration is the 
recognition that the pursuit of one can benefit the other. As discussed previously, this is 
particularly explicit within the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian 
Cash Transfers (Overseas Development Institute, 2015). In their view the deployment of 
digital cash transfers greatly improves opportunities to advance financial inclusion (a 
common articulation of the relationship). Since cash transfers are often preferred over other 
forms of assistance, improving financial inclusion before crises occur is likely to make the 





 However, insofar as cash transfers provide the foundation for incorporating 
financial inclusion, coordination effects may also threaten to fundamentally disrupt the 
supporting coalition. By seeking to deploy cash transfer programs at scale, coordination 
effects across organizations can lead to more efficient program delivery. For example, the 
“Common Cash Facility” (CCF) was pioneered by the UNHCR in Jordan in 2016 and 
involved two UN organizations and eight humanitarian organizations. Since each 
organization was implementing cash transfer programs, they worked collectively to reduce 
costs with a partner commercial bank (Gilbert & Austin, 2017, p. 5):  
The aim of the CCF is to provide humanitarian actors with direct and equal access 
to a common financial service provider… The CCF uses a public-private 
partnership approach, contracting with a financial service provider (currently the 
Cairo Amman Bank), which provides transparent and equal services to all agencies 
under the CCF Agreement. The financial service provider acts as platform manager, 
with costs paid to it directly by member agencies in proportion to the services 
received. This arrangement ensures that each organization maintains a separate and 
direct relationship with the bank, upholding financial integrity and accountability. 
The combined strength of partners within the CCF has allowed it to negotiate 
record-low banking rates and premium services. No fees other than the bank fees 
are associated with CCF membership. 
 
Consequently, coordination effects helped each organization operate collectively and 
achieve improved program implementation. Yet, such coordination effects and collective 
action may also lead to efforts to rationalize humanitarian assistance. To use a simple 
example, is it efficient for five organizations to operate the same (or similar) cash transfer 
and financial inclusion programs for the same group of beneficiaries at the same time? 
While coordination effects may thus incentivize greater support for cash transfer programs 
and financial inclusion, the associated push to rationalize humanitarian governance has 
been “incredibly political” and, in some cases, led to “straight out turf battles” (Interview, 





consequences of cash transfer programming and coordination effects for humanitarian 
governance is beyond the scope of this chapter (as it strays too far from the focus on 
financial inclusion), it suffices to acknowledge that coordination effects may have both 
positive and negative long-term consequences for the agenda’s supporting coalition. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigated the integration of the financial inclusion agenda within 
humanitarian governance. Although the financial inclusion agenda originated in a 
development context, it has expanded across other areas of global economic governance 
since its uptake in the late 2000s. Consequently, considering how and why the agenda has 
dynamically evolved to incorporate new issues and spaces allows me to further interrogate 
the central claims of this dissertation. More specifically, the chapter serves as a “least 
likely” case for my theoretical framework. The disparate interests and objectives of actors 
who are broadly involved in humanitarian governance and the financial inclusion agenda 
challenges the capacity of participatory ambiguity to effectively mitigate these differences. 
However, the empirical evidence strongly supports the explanatory power of not only 
participatory ambiguity, but also the mechanisms of institutional layering and coordination 
effects.  
By combining primary documents and elite interviews spanning humanitarian non-
governmental organizations, Western development agencies, intergovernmental 
(especially United Nations) organizations, technical advisors, and major philanthropic 
organizations, I empirically traced the evolution of the integration process through both 





how the promotion of financial inclusion by organizations typically associated with the 
agenda, such as CGAP and the Gates Foundation, influenced the activities of humanitarian 
organizations and discourse within the humanitarian community. Additionally, given the 
dual humanitarian and development mandate of many organizations, intra-organizational 
processes of learning and communication provided an additional avenue through which 
financial inclusion was promoted. In turn, the codification of support for financial inclusion 
at key international humanitarian forums helps explain the subsequent embrace of 
humanitarian efforts among central financial inclusion actors (specifically the Global 
Partnership for Financial Inclusion and Alliance for Financial Inclusion). 
The participatory construction of ambiguity, in part through changes in the 
language used by humanitarian organizations, plays a key role in explaining broad support 
for the integration process. Rather than impose a particular “vision” of the agenda within 
the humanitarian space, we instead find that international forums embraced an ambiguous 
conceptualization of financial inclusion that resembled similar dynamics present at the 
initial establishment of the financial inclusion agenda (e.g., the principles informing the 
creation of the GPFI). This ambiguity was further produced by the humanitarian 
organizations, such as Mercy Corps, that embraced a broad understanding of the financial 
services encompassed by financial inclusion in humanitarian contexts. Finally, the early 
stage of the integration process constrains the applicability of quantification and 
benchmarking as an explanatory mechanism. However, both layering (within individual 
organizations and among domestic regulatory arrangements) and coordination effects are 
readily apparent. While the long-term transformative potential of such changes remains to 





associated theorized mechanisms help explain the construction and consolidation of a 













The idea of “financial inclusion,” understood as the access to and use of a broad range of 
retail financial services (including bank accounts, payment services, credit, and insurance) 
by everyone in society, emerged as a global priority in the late 2000s. A decade later, 
financial inclusion continues to feature prominently in global economic governance and 
the activities of diverse international organizations, states, businesses, and civil society 
organizations. This dissertation seeks to explain the origins and evolution of the global 
financial inclusion agenda. In so doing, I provide a more complete explanation than 
alternative (historical materialist) explanations through a novel theoretical framework. 
Synthesizing insights from research on historical institutionalism, international norms, and 
political marketing, I develop the concept of participatory ambiguity, which I define as the 
process by which entrepreneurs and coalition members construct multiple cognitive frames 
around a central idea. Rather than primarily viewing ambiguity as a strategic tool 
employed by “central entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Jabko, 2006), I instead 
theorize how ambiguity is co-produced by disparate actors who use language (or branding) 
and creative action to legitimate multiple policies and outcomes and secure space for their 
own interests. Further, I identify how three key mechanisms help to sustain the agenda and 
its supporting coalition over time: quantification, institutional layering, and coordination 
effects. 
 Empirically, the dissertation draws on extensive original data. I combine primary 
documents, more than 70 elite interviews, and an original collection of National Financial 
Inclusion Strategies (NFISs). In turn, I rely on a combination of process tracing and 





to my own and historical materialist explanations. In contrast to historical materialist 
accounts, I argue that the origins and evolution of the agenda are explained by the role of 
ambiguity and construction of a broad coalition around the ties between financial inclusion 
and poverty alleviation, economic development, financial stability, and financial integrity. 
Focusing on the power of Western states and business, as well as credit-based financial 
services, is insufficiently grounded in the available empirical evidence. This dissertation 
instead reveals the importance of ambiguity and power of global South actors in the 
development of the global financial inclusion agenda. Consequently, this project makes an 
important contribution to the broader literature in international relations on the intersection 
of ideas, agency, ambiguity, and global coalitions.  
 
7.1 Explaining the Global Financial Inclusion Agenda 
In seeking to explain the origins and evolution of the global financial inclusion agenda, this 
dissertation provides a more complete explanation than existing historical materialist 
accounts. Throughout each empirical chapter of the dissertation, I weigh the available 
evidence against the observable implications derived from historical materialist arguments 
and the theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation. From the perspective of several 
historical materialist analyses of financial inclusion, the agenda is intimately connected to 
the promotion of microcredit and microfinance by commercialized microfinance 
institutions, global financial firms, Western development agencies, and international 
financial institutions (Bateman, 2010; Mader, 2015; Roy, 2010; Soederberg, 2014a). 
Moreover, there is a strong tendency to focus primarily on credit-based financial services 





scholars working in this tradition have claimed that the more holistic financial inclusion 
agenda is “almost entirely fake” (Bateman, 2012). The observable implications associated 
with these arguments thus emphasize the role of Western states and businesses in both 
shaping and promoting the agenda, the primary status of credit-based financial services 
within the agenda, and the class conflict underpinning political contestation around 
financial inclusion. 
In contrast to historical materialist explanations, my own argument instead 
emphasizes the centrality of ambiguity and coalitional politics. Rather than view the 
financial inclusion agenda as a coherent set of ideas, I demonstrate that the agenda is 
ambiguous with respect to its associated policies and potential outcomes. Further, I 
distinguish my own framework from work on “strategic ambiguity” by emphasizing the 
dynamic co-production of ambiguity by multiple actors within the coalition. In so doing, I 
stress the combined effects of creative actions by coalition members and the use of 
language to legitimate different policies and outcomes. Further, I argue that there are three 
key mechanisms that sustain the agenda over time; quantification and benchmarking rally 
support while maintaining the ambiguous nature of the agenda, institutional layering 
embeds the agenda among organizations and existing institutional structures, and 
coordination effects motivate the expansion of the supporting coalition. 
Consequently, there are five general observable implications derived from my 
argument. First, the theorized co-production of ambiguity suggests that ambiguity is not 
entirely attributable to the strategic actions of “central entrepreneurs” (who could take the 
form of civil society organizations, international organizations, or states). Instead, the 





members jointly constructs the observed ambiguity. Second, ambiguity itself is produced 
through the creative actions of coalition members and the use of language and branding to 
legitimate multiple (and potentially conflicting) policies or outcomes. Third, the 
incorporation of the agenda among organizational policies and structures, as well as 
regulatory arrangements, will involve the introduction of new rules, tools, and objectives 
on top of existing ones. Fourth, actors will use quantification and benchmarking strategies 
to shape the agenda and rally support. Fifth, actors will link financial inclusion to new 
outcomes through the identification of coordination effects, which will foster the 
construction of new constituencies in support of financial inclusion. 
 In Chapter 2, I assess the origins of the global financial inclusion agenda. This 
chapter traces the establishment of the global agenda in the late 2000s from earlier ideas 
and coalitions around domestic resource mobilization and statist development models, 
microcredit, and microfinance. While historical materialist explanations have also stressed 
the links between financial inclusion and the development of microcredit and microfinance, 
existing scholarship often obscures the ambiguity of these earlier agendas. Further, 
interrogating how ambiguity around financial inclusion was created reveals the important 
roles of actors beyond Western states and businesses. 
 Through key turning points like the 1997 Microcredit Summit, the 2005 UN Year 
of Microcredit, and the establishment of the G20’s Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion (GPFI), I demonstrate how ambiguity was constructed and facilitated coalition 
building. The evidence reveals the importance of language and branding, as “financial 
inclusion” provided a more malleable and emotionally appealing brand than alternatives 





establishing the global agenda entailed the incorporation of organizations and individuals 
whose primary mandates were financial stability and financial integrity. Ambiguity was 
co-produced by both entrepreneurs seeking to promote the new idea, like the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) or the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), and 
members of the wider coalition attempting to secure space for their own interests, such as 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and global South states. A predominant focus on 
Western actors and credit-based financial services thus conceals important sources of 
agency and power in the uptake of the agenda globally. 
 Despite the role of ambiguity in the emergence of the agenda, we might expect 
historical materialist explanations to provide a more compelling account of the subsequent 
evolutionary process beyond the origins of the global agenda. In other words, establishing 
the global agenda may have hinged on ambiguity and the construction of a disparate 
coalition of actors, but the power of Western businesses and states enabled the co-optation 
of the agenda in the 2010s. Chapter 3 thus investigates how the agenda evolved at the 
global level during the 2010s while also considering the theorized mechanisms of 
quantification, institutional layering, and coordination effects. I show how the agenda was 
embraced by salient global standard-setting bodies (SSBs), a process that depended on both 
the layering of new goals and guidelines among existing standards used to regulate 
financial markets and the recognition of coordination effects among multiple objectives 
(financial inclusion, financial stability, and financial integrity). The evolution of the 
coalition reveals sources of intra-coalition conflict that contradict historical materialist 
expectations, such as the work of Somali community organizations, Oxfam, and the FATF 





Further, the expansion of the coalition was facilitated by the identification of a broader 
range of coordination effects (including linkages with the Sustainable Development Goals 
and combatting modern slavery). Throughout this period, a host of new benchmarks and 
quantification projects (such as AFI’s Maya Declaration in 2012 and the World Bank’s 
Global Findex survey) helped to rally support for the agenda. These benchmarking 
initiatives also reflected the creative actions of global South states and a diversity of 
financial services. I find little evidence corroborating expectations of co-optation by 
Western business or states at the global level. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 shift the analytical focus away from the global level. While 
previous chapters demonstrate that my theoretical framework provides a more complete 
explanation of global dynamics, it stands to reason that the domestic implementation of the 
agenda creates new opportunities for Western states and business to reshape the agenda in 
their own image. As a result, these chapters investigate this possibility while balancing 
issues of internal and external validity. 
 Through an original collection of National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs) 
and quantitative text analysis, Chapter 4 assesses the extent to which national efforts to 
implement the agenda domestically vary cross-nationally and correspond with historical 
materialist expectations. More specifically, I address whether the content in the NFISs is 
narrowly focused on commercialized microfinance institutions and credit-based financial 
services. If so, this would be indicative of a transformation of the global agenda at the 
implementation stage in a manner that corroborates key claims of historical materialist 
scholarship. I also consider whether the substance of NFISs covaries with financial sector 





important role in the Washington Consensus, its centrality in historical materialist accounts 
of financial inclusion, and its unique capacity among international organizations to draw 
on both ideational and material resources. The analysis reveals considerable variation in 
the design of NFISs. Indeed, there is little evidence for the widespread construction of 
NFISs in a way that closely corresponds with historical materialist expectations. The NFISs 
also reveal the widespread use of benchmarking and incorporation of global benchmarks 
and quantification initiatives, while providing suggestive evidence of the use of 
institutional layering to integrate the agenda among existing regulatory arrangements. 
 To complement the findings of Chapter 4 and further probe the domestic 
implementation of the agenda, Chapter 5 presents evidence on a Ghanaian case study. 
Given the historical position of Ghana as a “success story” of the Washington Consensus 
and the financing of their contemporary National Financial Inclusion Strategy by the World 
Bank, the implementation of the global agenda in Ghana serves as a “most likely” case for 
historical materialist accounts. I reconstruct the sequences of events and political 
contestation that characterized the historical development of the financial sector and its 
accompanying regulatory arrangements, the creation of the NFIS, and a selection of civil 
society programs designed to promote financial inclusion. In so doing, I reveal the 
centrality of sectoral (rather than class) conflict in interactions between the state, 
commercial banks, and telecommunications firms. Further, the construction of the NFIS, 
reflects the ambiguity of the global agenda (insofar as it seeks to accommodate a diversity 
of actors, objectives, and types of financial services). Shifting the analytical lens to a 
“bottom up” or “everyday” perspective, I find additional evidence of the power of local 





In the final empirical chapter, I further probe the explanatory power of my own 
argument. Chapter 6 thus considers the integration of financial inclusion in humanitarian 
assistance as a “least likely” case for my theoretical framework. The conflicting interests 
and ideas among development and humanitarian actors, combined with the immense 
practical challenges to providing formal financial services to forcibly displaced people, 
casts doubt on the capacity of ambiguity to facilitate coalition building. Nevertheless, I find 
evidence for the co-production of ambiguity by organizations associated with the financial 
inclusion agenda (e.g., CGAP, AFI, GPFI) and those involved with humanitarian assistance 
(e.g., UNHCR, Mercy Corps). While the embrace of digital cash transfers over in-kind aid 
among humanitarian actors provided an opportunity structure for the promotion of financial 
inclusion, deliberate promotion by financial inclusion organizations (like CGAP) and 
learning among humanitarian organizations were key components in the integration 
process. Efforts to formalize this integration at the global level typically avoided any “best 
practice” or policy prescriptions, instead opting to embrace ambiguity around the 
intersection of financial inclusion and humanitarian assistance. The evidence suggests that 
the early stage of the integration process is not conducive to the use of benchmarks. 
However, there is clear support for the layering of financial inclusion among organizational 
structures and regulatory arrangements and the importance of coordination effects in 
helping to create new financial inclusion constituencies. 
 
7.2 Contributions of the Dissertation 
This dissertation offers both theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding 





build on research spanning international diplomacy, European integration, and global 
norms that has offered important insights on the use of “strategic ambiguity.” I develop an 
alternative perspective on the construction and role of ambiguity by broadening attention 
towards a greater range of actors. In other words, rather than conceptualize ambiguity as a 
strategic instrument of entrepreneurs seeking to assemble a coalition or popular support, I 
instead consider how ambiguity is dynamically co-produced. By interrogating the 
participatory construction of ambiguity, I reveal how members of the broader coalition 
shape the ambiguity of the agenda through their creative actions and use of language. In 
the context of the financial inclusion agenda, this theoretical approach makes visible the 
agency and power of global South state and civil society organizations. In turn, the concept 
of participatory ambiguity offers a more complete explanation of the financial inclusion 
agenda and a new lens through which to explain other global agendas (as discussed in 
greater detail in section 7.6). 
 My research also makes a novel contribution to our understanding of how the global 
financial inclusion agenda is sustained over time. More specifically, I draw from literatures 
on historical institutionalism and international norms to identify how quantification, 
institutional layering, and coordination effects each contribute to the consolidation of the 
agenda and supporting coalition. This work complements and builds on the insights of 
others who have similarly explored the implementation of the agenda (Dafe, 2020; Settle, 
2020; Singh, 2019). By evaluating the evolution of the agenda from different perspectives, 
including the global (Chapter 3), the cross-national (Chapter 4), the “bottom up” (Chapter 
5) and new global spaces (Chapter 6), I demonstrate how these mechanisms serve to embed 





 The empirical research used to corroborate my key theoretical arguments make an 
additional contribution to our understanding of financial inclusion. In particular, my 
extensive use of more than 70 elite interviews and primary documents offers original 
insights into the political underpinnings of the agenda. Moreover, my original dataset of 
National Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs) enables a broad cross-national perspective 
that is rarely considered in the context of the financial inclusion agenda. While other 
scholars have made many important contributions to our understanding of financial 
inclusion in development contexts, this dissertation is one of the few projects to empirically 
investigate the integration of financial inclusion in humanitarian contexts from a political 
science perspective. 
 This dissertation also adds to important contemporary debates in international 
political economy. Most notably, the 2008 global financial crisis and growing economic 
power of China has produced a significant debate about the future of the liberal 
international order. Some scholars have stressed the dominance of the United States in 
global economic governance, especially in financial governance, as well as the persistence 
of many pre-crisis economic ideas (Blyth, 2013b; Fichtner, 2017; Helleiner, 2014; 
Underhill, 2015). Across areas like global finance, trade, and tax governance, others have 
instead argued that power is shifting towards civil society organizations and states 
throughout the global South and new economic ideas are increasingly legitimated 
(Christensen & Hearson, 2019; Grabel, 2017; Hopewell, 2020). This project uncovers 
important ways in which global South states and civil society organizations have shaped 
post-crisis global economic governance. The co-production of ambiguity around the 





such actors. The case of the financial inclusion agenda can thus be situated within this 
broader debate as an additional area in which global politics are no longer dominated by 
the global North.  
 
7.3 Limitations 
It is important to recognize the potential limitations of the project. From a theoretical 
perspective, I am unable to say with precision how much ambiguity mattered in assembling 
a global coalition behind financial inclusion. In contrasting the explanatory power of my 
own theoretical framework in relation to historical materialist accounts, my central 
argument is that participatory ambiguity provides a more complete explanation for the 
observed dynamics. This limitation is not unique to the project, but instead reflects a 
constraint of qualitative research more generally. Indeed, case study research is far more 
suited to claims about whether and how explanatory factors matter for the outcomes 
observed more than estimating the “causal effect” of a variable (George & Bennett, 2005).  
 In developing my theoretical framework, I also focus on the dynamics between and 
among different actors. This perspective builds on scholarship advocating for an “agent 
centered constructivism” in which “agents act upon [intersubjective] understandings rather 
than their materially telegraphed interests” (Widmaier et al., 2007, p. 748). However, some 
scholars increasingly push for theoretical explanations rooted in individual-level decision 
making and psychology (Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Van Esch, 2014; Widmaier, 2010). 
Although I recognize that individual members of organizations can and do exert 
considerable power over organizational behaviour, my theoretical approach instead focuses 





organizations). Consequently, I cannot make claims about the role of individuals within 
the broader sequence of events nor the specific mechanisms underpinning the actions of 
any one person. 
 Methodologically, this project primarily makes use of case studies and the 
application of (inductive) process tracing and congruence analysis, all of which are subject 
to their own set of limitations. The financial inclusion agenda is a case of a global policy 
agenda and the dissertation thus operates as a theory building case study. Consequently, 
we must be mindful of the well-established limits of such a design (George & Bennett, 
2005). Single case studies offer a high degree of internal validity, enable theoretical and 
empirical richness, and support the development of new explanations and hypotheses. On 
the other hand, such designs may not lead to generalizable claims, at least without further 
study (a point I return to in section 7.6). My research design also employs “least likely” 
and “most likely” cases to further probe the theoretical arguments within the broader 
context of the financial inclusion agenda. To this end, neither single case selection strategy 
enables a scholar to “prove” an argument. Moreover, the specific cases used within each 
selection criteria are unlikely to perfectly satisfy the criteria on every theoretical dimension. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, careful and theoretically informed case selection can still 
support rigorous theoretical development (Odell, 2001). 
 In evaluating the evidence, I rely on congruence analysis to examine the 
consistency between theoretical expectations and the observed evidence and process 
tracing to assess the specific mechanisms at key junctures.123 In weighing the empirical 
 
123 On congruence analysis, see George and Bennett (2005) and Blatter and Blume (2008). On process tracing, 





evidence, it is important to recognize that these tools do not support a strict approach to 
falsification of alternative hypotheses; instead, the goal is to make claims about the relative 
strength of the potential explanations given the evidence at hand. As such, some scholars 
may disagree with my interpretation of different pieces of evidence compiled throughout 
the dissertation. Nevertheless, the collective evidence gathered by the dissertation in its 
entirety provides compelling support for my argument. 
 To further expand on the potential empirical constraints, historically oriented 
scholarship is often limited by the availability of evidence (Frisch et al., 2012; Lustick, 
1996).124 This limitation is exacerbated when the focus of study includes organizations that 
enjoyed limited opportunities to digitize or publicize their work. For example, assessing 
the origins of the global financial inclusion agenda (Chapter 2) requires careful 
consideration of global South non-governmental organizations who participated in the 
evolution from microcredit to financial inclusion. However, records of who participated in 
the 1997 Microcredit Summit were not systematically digitized or physically stored in a 
secure location. Although the period (1990s-2000s) coincided with the development of 
computers and the internet, access to such technologies were not evenly distributed across 
the world. As a result, analyzing the political dynamics during this period is necessarily 
tempered by limitations in accurately capturing a representative view of the “global.”  
 While the analysis of more contemporary periods may not be as constrained by the 
lack of a representative historical record, it is still important to acknowledge the potential 
for unsystematic or biased evidence. More specifically, the triangulation of evidence 
 





among interviews and primary documents throughout the dissertation may not completely 
mitigate this issue (Natow, 2020). It is always possible that data gathered from interviews 
is shaped by the interpersonal dynamics between the researcher and interview participant 
(Mosley, 2013, p. 12): “Whether scholars think about this phenomenon as ‘interview 
effects’ or as ‘positionality,’ it is quite possible that different researchers using very similar 
research designs will wind up with different sets of interview data.” In recognizing my 
position as a researcher, it may be the case that my access to certain interview participants 
was facilitated by my position as a scholar from a Canadian institution while such factors 
as my gender, ethnicity, and academic status (in relation to interview participants) yielded 
data that are subjective and contextual.  
 
7.4 Policy Implications 
There are two major policy implications that stem from the findings of this project, both 
within the context of the global financial inclusion agenda and within global economic 
governance more generally. First, this dissertation sheds light on the power and agency of 
global South actors to shape the financial inclusion agenda. Not only did the creative 
actions to promote financial inclusion by global South states help produce the ambiguous 
agenda at its conception, but such ambiguity has not (yet) led to significant efforts at the 
global level to narrow or confine the agenda’s policy space. Consequently, states continue 
to enjoy considerable leeway in the construction of new domestic strategies, programs, and 
regulatory arrangements to advance financial inclusion. In stark contrast to the limited 
policy space for global South states associated with prior policy agendas, such as the 





For example, state support for and regulation of mobile money and financial technology is 
far more constrained by intersectoral competition and domestic politics than it is by the 
global agenda and its supporters. The implication of this for global South states is that they 
should recognize and make use of the considerable policy latitude that exists when 
designing new strategies, policies, and regulations around financial inclusion. 
 From the perspective of civil society organizations, especially those who promote 
financial inclusion the global South, the key takeaways are twofold. On the one hand, the 
policy space enjoyed by states extends to many civil society organizations. There is 
significant appetite for experimentation and innovation among actors that provide funding 
in this space (such as Western development agencies and the Gates Foundation). The 
ambiguity of the global agenda both enables and is created by the many new programs that 
civil society organizations have pursued. On the other hand, the opportunity to identify 
linkages between financial inclusion and new objectives (such as mitigating the effects of 
climate change and combatting modern slavery) may accomplish several tasks. This 
includes simultaneously advancing the core mission of the organization through 
coordination effects, shaping the financial inclusion agenda in ways favourable to that 
objective, and creating new opportunities for partnerships and financing. 
 In accordance with the opportunities for future research (discussed below), the 
generalizability of these policy implications beyond the financial inclusion agenda space 
remains to be seen. However, insofar as other global agendas (including the sustainable 
development and the gender equality agenda) are characterized by some degree of 





organizations to capitalize on the associated policy space and to leverage coordination 
effects to expand the agenda and coalition. 
 The second major implication of the project is that the composition of the 
supporting coalition has important consequences for the uptake of new agendas. In contrast 
to research that emphasizes the instrumental value of ambiguity for building larger 
coalitions (Van Kersbergen & Verbeek, 2007), this project instead stresses the importance 
of who ambiguity brings into the coalition. This insight is similar in spirit to the scholarship 
in comparative politics on domestic policy change, which has revealed the importance of 
“veto players” within institutional arrangements (Tsebelis, 2002) and the effects of 
coalition diversity on policy outcomes (Junk, 2019; Nelson & Yackee, 2012). The specific 
identities of new constituencies brought into the broader coalition alters the potential 
success of new agendas by bringing to bear new ideational and material repertoires. While 
the concept of participatory ambiguity suggests that central entrepreneurs do not exercise 
complete control of the substance of the agenda and, by extension, the composition of the 
coalition, it stands to reason that civil society organizations may benefit by paying close 
attention to the composition of the coalition they are promoting or seeking to join. 
 
7.5 Future Research 
There are several promising areas of future research that build on the findings of this 
project. The first opportunity reflects the rapid advances in technology during the 2010s 
that benefited the promotion of the financial inclusion agenda. As noted in a special report 
by The Economist (2018): “In both rich and poor countries, financial technology, or fintech, 





the [World Bank’s Global Findex].” However, as financial technology and 
telecommunications companies expand their share of the retail finance market, they come 
into increasing conflict with commercial banks (as seen in Chapter 5). In turn, financial 
regulators are subject to pressure from competing sectoral interests in a manner resembling 
the technological disruption we have witnessed in other sectors (e.g., transportation, 
tourism and hospitality, media). The entry of technology and telecommunications firms 
has also raised concerns about the security of financial “big data,” inspired populist 
opposition to foreign technology firms, and revealed discord among global standard-setting 
bodies. Looking beyond the narrow domain of financial inclusion, future work might 
interrogate the extent to which new financial technologies are altering global politics, 
coalitions, and regulatory arrangements associated with retail banking. 
 Considering the evolution of the agenda and coalition over the long-term is a second 
area of additional research. The period of study in this project covers both the origins of 
the agenda and the decade after its global establishment. Yet, there is reason to believe that 
the 2020s will subject the global financial inclusion agenda to pressures that were 
previously avoided. More specifically, the gains made in financial inclusion from financial 
technology and telecommunications (i.e., mobile money) have largely accrued through the 
inclusion of populations that were easiest to reach. In other words, the strides made in 
financial inclusion (as measured through targets like account ownership) are not likely to 
continue in a linear fashion. Promises of “universal financial inclusion,” such as the World 
Bank’s Universal Financial Access 2020 initiative (World Bank, 2018b), are proving to be 
largely aspirational and there is concern that major supporters of the agenda (like the World 





concerns about the divergence between “access” to financial services and “use” of financial 
services. The 2017 version of the Global Findex found that approximately 25% of all 
transaction accounts were inactive, a dynamic illustrated by data from India (The 
Economist, 2018): 
India’s numbers are especially misleading. Following the launch of a bold 
financial-inclusion plan in 2014, which promised that every Indian would have 
access to a basic bank account, some 240m accounts were opened over the next two 
years. But it soon became clear that up to a quarter of them were “zero-balance 
accounts”, a euphemism for “unused”. So banks made sure most had at least some 
money in them, perhaps by depositing tiny sums, often out of the bank staff’s own 
pockets. “Zero-balance” made way for “one-rupee” (1.5 cents) accounts, but 
financial inclusion improved only on paper.  
 
It thus stands to reason that the evidentiary leeway afforded to the agenda as it initially 
developed may be a focal point – and source of strain – going forward. Can participatory 
ambiguity effectively serve as the coalitional glue as the agenda matures? 
 A third opportunity is to explore how the theoretical framework can contribute to 
the wider literature on the emergence of new agendas in global governance.  For instance, 
this framework can contribute to new insights on the development of other ambiguous 
agendas, like sustainable development (Hadden & Seybert, 2016), gender equality (Krook 
& True, 2012), and the protection of civilians in combat (Bode & Karlsrud, 2019). This 
framework may also help to explain the construction of agendas that are not typically 
associated with ambiguity. For example, John Williamson is commonly attributed with 
coining the “Washington Consensus” in the early 1990s (Williamson, 1990a, 1990b, 1994), 
which became a “transnational policy paradigm” (Babb, 2013). A recent interview with 
John Williamson, in which he described learning that that Washington Consensus was 
being used in ways he did not intend, is suggestive that participatory ambiguity might offer 





[I] was with a Brazilian, the former finance minister Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, 
generally known as Bresser. He explained to me that the Washington Consensus 
had escaped my control and it had become whatever people meant by it. And so he 
was going to use it in the sense it was being used in Latin America in general.  
 
By applying the framework in these new cases, we may develop a more complete 
explanation of the agendas themselves while also refining expectations about the 
conditions under which participatory ambiguity is more or less likely to operate. 
Finally, future research may further develop the proposed framework through a 
deeper engagement with the political economy of the “everyday.” Building on the analysis 
of the Ghanaian case (Chapter 5) and the broader everyday politics approach (Elias & Rai, 
2019; Elias & Roberts, 2018; Hobson & Seabrooke, 2007), scholars might probe how the 
participatory dynamics capture the activities of non-elite actors across a variety of contexts. 
For example, the scope of analysis in the humanitarian context (Chapter 6) prevented a 
more focused assessment of specific country contexts or humanitarian assistance projects. 
Subsequent research may interrogate the ways in which the actions of everyday actors in 
these contexts shape the implementation of the agenda, how such activities feedback into 
the global development of the agenda, and the factors that alter this dynamic across 
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Appendix 1: Disentangling the Financial Inclusion Coalition 
Type of Actor Illustrative 
Organizations 











Bank of India: “Not only is financial inclusion 
essential because of its implications for the 
welfare of citizens but it needs to be stressed 
that it has to be an explicit strategy for fostering 
faster economic growth in a more inclusive 
fashion.” (Mohan, 2006, p. 1) 
 
Bank of Namibia: “The case for financial 
inclusion is, therefore, not only based on 
principle of equity – but access to affordable 
banking and other financial services is also 
required for inclusive growth with stability.” 





















CARE: “CARE, a leader in international 
development, long ago recognized the power of 
microfinance as a development tool. Not only 
does microfinance enable the poor to build their 
assets and invest in income-generating 
activities, but it has also proved to be 
remarkably effective as a vehicle for human 
empowerment, especially for women who have 
been found to benefit most from microfinance 
services and to make the best use of them in 
lifting their families out of poverty.” (Helmore, 
Chidiac, & Hendricks, 2009, p. iv)  
 
Banking with the Poor Network: “Its 
importance as an economic activity stems from 
its contribution to the lives and livelihoods of 
such families. For this reason, financial 
inclusion is widely regarded as a desirable 
objective both from the perspective of economic 
development and of human rights.” (Sinha & 
Fernando, 2010, p. 12) 
 
3. Private Firms Barclays, First 
National Bank of 
South Africa, 
Barclays: “Access to transactional and savings 
accounts and to credit and insurance services, is 
essential for enabling economic activity. The 







inclusion to more of the world’s population… 
We deliver our inclusive banking strategy by 
developing our own dedicated products and 
services as well as working in partnership with 
other organisations that help people access 
mainstream financial services.” (Barclays PLC, 















GSMA: “Working with the [Inter-American 
Development Bank] will enhance our efforts in 
Latin America and the Caribbean to enable the 
many people in the region, who currently do not 
have banks accounts, to be able to use their 
mobile phones to access a full range of financial 
services, including fast, simple and cost-
effective mobile money transfer services… We 
expect that increased access to low-cost and 
secure financial services in developing 
countries will help improve the standard of 
living for many millions of people, by 
increasing economic opportunities and by 
lowering the cost of many activities.” (Groupe 











BMGF: “I am announcing six new grants, worth 
$40 million, to support this collaboration. In 
every area where we invest at the foundation, 
we rely on partnerships. But our financial 
services partnerships may be the broadest, most 
diverse partnerships we have. Banks, 
microfinance institutions, mobile phone 
operators, regulators, retailers, and telecom 
companies. These are not sectors that typically 
work together. But you are here to do just that, 
and that is why I am so energized. This is 
historic. It is unprecedented. You are the people 
who will make the decisions that lead to 
financial inclusion. You can give poor families 
something very few of them have ever had: a 
tool that lets them use their own energy and 
talents to lift themselves out of poverty. You 






AusAID: “Financial services are increasingly 
being seen as important to poverty reduction 





Development Goals. By borrowing, saving or 
buying insurance the poor can plan for their 
future beyond the short term. They can build up 
assets and invest in education and health. 
Financial services can help them cope in times 
of need and hardship. Beyond this, access to 
financial services can promote social inclusion 
and build self-confidence and empowerment, in 
particular among women.” (Australian Aid, 
2010, p. 1) 
 

















Group to Assist 





Work for Africa 
(MFW4A), 
FinMark Trust 
UNSGSA: “This is why, where we used to talk 
mainly of "microcredit" or "microfinance", we 
now speak of "inclusive finance". Inclusive 
finance means universal access, at a reasonable 
cost, to a range of financial services, provided 
by a variety of sound and sustainable 
institutions. In addition to credit, this range of 
financial services includes savings, mortgages, 
insurance, local and international money 
transfers, and so on. Inclusive finance is a 
powerful tool, one that will help reduce poverty, 
empower women and contribute to the 
achievement of many of the Millennium 
Development Goals.” (United Nations 
Secretary-General’s Special Advocate for 
Inclusive Finance for Development, 2009) 
 
AFI: “Finding ways to encourage greater 
financial inclusion has not typically been a core 
activity of central banks and financial system 
regulators. That is changing, however, with a 
widespread realization among policymakers that 
financial inclusion is critical for poverty 
alleviation, balanced economic growth, and 
economic stability.” (Alliance for Financial 













ADB: “Microfinance can be a critical element 
of an effective poverty reduction strategy… can 
also contribute to the improvement of resource 
allocation, promotion of markets, and adoption 
of better technology; thus, microfinance helps 
to promote economic growth and development.” 








EIB: “Improved access to financial services is 
one of the pillars supporting poverty alleviation 
and economic growth – the EIB’s main 
objectives in developing economies.” 















UNDP: “Financial products and services reduce 
risk and transaction costs and create stability. 
Credit and insurance reduce vulnerability and 
allow businesses to seize opportunities. Savings 
and transactional banking services help manage 
resources more efficiently. Improved access to 
basic financial services is especially critical for 
emerging and potential entrepreneurs—and, by 
extension, for larger or better-established 
businesses to buy from or sell to those 
entrepreneurs.” (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2008, p. 37) 
 
UNCTAD: “Such limited use of financial 
services in developing countries has become an 
international policy concern… This reflects 
what must be — and increasingly is — a 
concern of development and poverty eradication 
policy at national and local levels: the 
recognition of the important contribution a 
broad-based financial sector makes to economic 
development and poverty alleviation.” (United 

















FATF: “I do believe that the pursuit of financial 
inclusion and the pursuit of an effective 
AML/CFT regime are complementary; they are 
by no means conflicting financial sector policy 
objectives. Without a sufficient degree of 
financial inclusion, a country’s AML/CFT 
system will safeguard the integrity of only a 
part of its financial system – the formally 
registered part – leaving the informal and 
unregistered components vulnerable to abuse.” 







Appendix 2: World Bank Financing for Financial Sector Development, Financial 
Inclusion Projects, Individual Countries, 2004-2019 
Appendix 2 depicts all countries for which financial inclusion projects were identified. For 
each country, the total amount of project financing was weighted by the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product in 2018 (measured in current USD). Additionally, Appendix B includes 
a regional colour scheme and the total number of financial inclusion projects as the number 
on top of each bar. From this, we can clearly see that the bulk of financing for financial 
inclusion projects has been directed towards African countries. While some countries, like 
Mexico and India, have received a relatively large number of projects (5 and 8, 









Appendix 3: World Bank Financing for Financial Sector Development, Financial 
Inclusion Projects, Regional Distribution, 2014-2019 
Appendix 3 focuses attention on the distribution of financial inclusion project financing 
over time and across regions. Unlike the previous figure, the financing in Appendix C is 
unweighted. Notable is the recent and sustained increase in project financing - 2017, 2018, 
and 2019 are the three largest years to date - as well as the concentration of recent financing 











Appendix 4: List of National Financial Inclusion Strategies Included in Analysis 
Number Country/Jurisdiction Year Document Title 
1 Afghanistan 2019 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2020 
– 2024 (Draft) 
2 Bangladesh 2019 National Financial Inclusion Strategy – 
Bangladesh (NFIS-B) 
3 BCEAO 2015 Strategie Regionale D’Inclusion 
Financiere Dans L’Uemoa 
4 Belize 2019 Belize National Financial Inclusion 
Strategy 2019-2022 
5 Bhutan 2017 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
2018-2023 
6 Brazil 2012 National Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion 
7 Burundi 2015 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
(NFIS) 2015-2020 
8 China 2016 Plan for Advancing Inclusive Finance 
Development (2016-2020) 
9 Colombia 2016 Estrategia Nacional de Inclusión 
Financiera en Colombia: Comisión 
Intersectorial para la Inclusión Financiera 
10 Comoros 2011 Schema Directeur de Finance Inclusive 
Aux Comores (SD-FIC) 2011-2013 
11 Côte D’Ivoire 2013 Élaboration de la Stratégie Nationale pour 
l’Inclusion Financière en Côte d’Ivoire 
12 Ethiopia 2017 Ethiopia: National Financial Inclusion 
Strategy 
13 Fiji 2016 National Financial Inclusion Strategic Plan 
2016–2020 
14 Ghana 2019 National Financial Inclusion and 
Development Strategy (NFIDS) 
15 Haiti 2015 Stratégie Nationale d'lnclusion Financière 
16 India 2020 National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 
17 Indonesia 2012 National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 
Fostering Economic Growth and 
Accelerating Poverty Reduction 
18 Indonesia 2016 National Strategy for Inclusive Finance 
19 Jamaica 2016 National Financial Inclusion Strategy: 
Access for All 2016-2020 
20 Jordan 2018 The National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
2018-2020 







22 Liberia 2009 The Liberian Strategy for Financial Inclusion (2009-
2013) 
23 Madagascar 2013 Stratégie Nationale de la Finance Inclusive (SNFI) 2013 
– 2017 
24 Malawi 2010 The Malawi National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 
(2010-2014) 
25 Mexico 2016 National Policy for Financial Inclusion 
26 Morocco 2018 Stratégie Nationale D’Inclusion Financière 
27 Mozambique 2016 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2016-2022 
28 Nigeria 2012 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
 
29 Nigeria 2018 National Financial Inclusion Strategy (Revised) 
20 Pakistan 2015 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
Pakistan 
31 Palestine 2018 National Strategy for Financial Inclusion in Palestine 
32 Papua New 
Guinea 
2014 Papua New Guinea National Financial Inclusion and 
Financial Literacy Strategy 2014-2015 
33 Papua New 
Guinea 
2016 (Second) National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2016-
2020 
34 Paraguay 2014 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2014-2018 
35 Peru 2015 Estrategia Nacional de Inclusión Financiera: Comisión 
Multisectorial de Inclusión Financiera 
36 Philippines 2015 National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 
37 Russia 2018 Стратегия повышения финансовой доступности в 
Российской Федерации на период 2018–2020 годов 
38 SADC 2016 SADC Financial Inclusion Strategy 
39 Samoa 2017 National Financial Inclusion Strategy for Samoa 2017-
2020 
40 Sierra Leone 2017 National Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2017-2020 
41 Solomon 
Islands 
2016 Solomon Islands National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
2016-2020 
42 Swaziland 2017 National Financial Inclusion Strategy for Swaziland 
2017-2022 
43 Tanzania 2018 National Financial Inclusion Framework 2018-2022 
44 Turkey 2014 Financial Access, Financial Education, Financial 
Consumer Protection Strategy and Action Plans 
45 Uganda 2017 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2017-2022 
46 Uruguay 2017 La Agenda De La Inclusion Financiera 
47 Vanuatu 2018 Vanuatu National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2018 – 
2023 
48 Zambia 2017 National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2017-2022 







Appendix 5: Estimated Latent Position of National Financial Inclusion Strategies, 
Grouped by Time 
Appendix 5 contrasts the estimated position of National Financial Inclusion Strategies 
across time. This temporal dimension matters because of the possibility that, as might be 
argued with “sustainable development,” business and financial interests have co-opted the 
agenda over time. If this was the case, we would observe a shift from NFISs clustered 
around the ambiguous ideal type in the early years towards the opposite in more recent 
years. The alternative pattern is also possible; perhaps business interests capitalized on the 
opportunity created by the new agenda in 2010, but as other actors have mobilized around 
the agenda, we now see NFISs that are more clustered around the ambiguous ideal type. 
As demonstrated here, neither of these scenarios appears likely. We can see that the there 
is little evidence of a temporal shift in the estimated positions of NFIS over time. 
 
Note: The vertical dashed lines are visual references for the two anchor points, 





Appendix 6: Estimated Latent Position of National Financial Inclusion Strategies, 
Grouped by Income 
Appendix 6 disaggregates the estimates of NFIS position by country income level (using 
the World Bank country income classification). When considering the historical 
development of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus, we might reasonably expect 
that low (or lower middle) income countries are more vulnerable to the structural pressures 
associated with global financial interests. As such, these countries would be more likely 
than others to cluster around the historical materialist ideal type. While we  do observe that 
the countries  most closely aligned with the historical materialist ideal type are classified 
as lower middle income (Comoros, Cote D’Ivoire, Burundi), we also see far more countries 
from both of these income classifications clustered around the ambiguous ideal type. 
 
Note: Income levels correspond with the World Bank income classification system: HIGH 
= High Income, UM =  Upper Middle Income, LM = Lower Middle Income, LOW = Low 
Income. Three NFISs (BCEAO, SADC, Palestine) excluded due to missing or not 
applicable income classification. The vertical dashed lines are visual references for the 





Appendix 7: Estimated Latent Position of National Financial Inclusion Strategies, 
Grouped by Geographic Region 
Appendix 7 depicts the estimated position of each NFIS while grouping by geographic 
region (using the UNCTAD region classification). Due to the uneven historical legacies of 
geographic regions, with respect to the role of international financial institutions and the 
Washington Consensus, it might be the case that some areas are more susceptible to the 
historical materialist ideal type of National Financial Inclusion Strategies than others. 
While the countries with the closest estimated position to the historical materialist ideal 
type are located in Africa, we see wide variation across Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Asia, and Oceania. 
 
Note: Regions correspond with UNCTAD Region Classification system. The vertical 
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